The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Read online

In October 1813 General Alexei Arakcheyev launched an investigation into Leppich’s experiments and branded him ‘a complete charlatan, who knows nothing whatever of even the elementary rules of mechanics or the principles of levers’. Deprived of funding and in disgrace, Leppich left Russia in February 1814. By that time the Russian overnment had spent a staggering 250,000 roubles on Leppich’s project.

  Konovnitsyn had no choice but retreat, since he was facing numerically superior forces that were trying to turn his right flank. As Eugene’s troops pressed forward, a French officer described advancing in Konovnitsyn’s wake: ‘Coming out of the woods, which were full of Cossacks who were routed by the Italian cavalry, we passed through several villages devastated by the Russians. The devastation, which these barbarians left in their wake, showed us the way.’60

  To cover Konovnitsyn’s rearguard, the Russian command dispatched the Leib-Guard jager Regiment to secure crossings across the Voina and Koloch streams. Colonel Karl Bistrom sent Colonel P. Makarov with the 3rd Battalion to deploy in a line along the right bank of the river. To accelerate Konovnitsyn’s retreat, Makarov instructed his subordinates to locate fords, since there was only one bridge that could have delayed the Russian retreat.

  Quickly retreating from the Kolotsk direction, the Leib-Guard Cossack Regiment and part of Konovnitsyn’s cavalry forded the stream on the left side of Borodino, while the Izumsk Hussars led the remaining cavalry across another ford on the right side of the village. This allowed the artillery and other transports to move across the bridge without delay and the rearguard wasted no time in taking up positions on the right bank.61 The bridge itself was defended by Makarov’s troops.

  Around 2pm Prince Eugène, accompanied by his staff and escort, arrived at the advance guard to reconnoitre the Russian positions. Eugene had hardly begun his observations when the Emperor himself galloped in front of the Allied cavalry and approached his stepson. Labaume, who witnessed this moment, later recalled that Napoleon carefully studied the terrain, and after a brief conversation with Prince Eugène, galloped back towards the troops of Marshal Davout. Then Eugène dispatched aides-de-camp with orders to begin an attack towards Borodino.62

  Leaving the Italian guard in reserve, Eugène directed the 13th and 14th Divisions to occupy the nearby heights west of the Voina stream, in order to threaten the Russian right lank. In the meantime, the troops of General Gérard (from Davout’s Corps) supported Eugène from the south, and in fact, had already engaged the Russian skirmishers.

  The 13th and 14th Divisions reached the Voina stream but failed to take up positions there. As Barclay de Tolly reported: ‘the enemy’s repeated attempts to seize the village of Borodino were repelled by the Guard jägers, the Elisavetgrad Hussar Regiment and an [artillery] battery set up on the right bank of the river.’ Major General Vsevolodsky particularly distinguished himself as he led his hussars in several charges against the French. Supported by artillery and reinforced with three Cossack regiments from Bagration’s 2nd Army, Vsevolodsky was able to defend his position until late into the night.63

  While Prince Eugène’s troops were engaged in the north, the rest of the Grand Army was slowly approaching the site of the future battle. Near Valuyevo, the French advance guard encountered the Russian skirmishers, iring from bushes and ravines along the Kolocha river. Compans dispatched four voltigeur companies (under the command of Adjutant Major Duchesne of the 25th Line) to the right and, supported by the two companies of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, they seized the village of Okinshino, which was abandoned by the Russians.64 General Montbrun, commander of the II Cavalry Corps, soon reported to Murat that a major fortification had been observed between the villages of Doronino and Shevardino. According to Dumonceau, the French could see:

  a broad, tall hillock, like a truncated cone, which we took for a redoubt. Some individuals were visible on its summit, probably put there to observe. At its base and behind its flanks we could make out two black masses, which could only be the heads of columns intended to support it.

  Shaped like a pentagon, the redoubt at Shevardino was initially designed to anchor the left wing of the Russian positions at Borodino, but eventually became a forward fortification, protecting the approaches to Kutuzov’s left flank. Who decided to construct this fortification, and why, is still disputed. As we have seen above, Bagration considered building it by 3 September and had made some arrangements for this purpose before discussing the laws of his position with Kutuzov. At the same time, Clausewitz argued that this fortifications was constructed after Colonel Toll suggested an observation post to ‘discover the direction from which the French forces were advancing and possibly to discover Napoleon’s intentions.’ Vistitsky also noted: ‘[The Redoubt] was constructed at a distance [from Borodino] to halt the enemy advance and keep [the current] positions intact.’ Kutuzov himself considered the redoubt as: ‘a separate fortiication whose loss would not have had any effect on the defence of Russian positions and was mainly designed to delay the enemy from approaching [positions] for some time.’65

  Among historians, Buturlin based his narrative on Kutuzov’s report and naturally repeated the Russian commander’s opinion that ‘the redoubt was built only to determine the direction of the advance of the French column.’ Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky thought that one of the purposes of the redoubt was ‘to facilitate attacks into the lank of the enemy columns advancing along the main road towards Borodino.’66 The latter opinion influenced later histories of Borodino and N. Neyelov used it to suggest that the redoubt was built for two main reasons: to prevent the French ‘from seizing this location, which would have allowed them to observe the entire disposition of the Russian troops’; and ‘to delay the enemy advance along the main road by acting against his flank.’67 Among later Russian historians a small group of scholars (E. Bogdanovich, I. Bozheryanov etc.) ntinued to sustain this idea but many – including M. Dragomirov, A. Witmer, G. Ratch, M. Bogdanovich, N. Polikarpov, A. Skugarevsky, A. Gerua, B. Kolyubyakin, V. Kharkevich – rejected the notion that the Shevardino Redoubt could threaten the lank of the French Army advancing along the main road, since the fortiication was located beyond its effective artillery range (the road was about 1,700m away to the north). Soviet historians, breaking with the imperial historiography, sought to tread their own path, leading to frequent overstatements and factual errors. Thus Garnich claimed that the Shevardino Redoubt placed the French lank in grave danger from Russian cannon-ire, later producing nonsensical data on artillery ranges that had Russian guns capable of firing at 2,500m with a target range of over 1,200m. This idea was slightly revised in later works, which downplayed the role of artillery, asserting that Napoleon was more concerned about lank attacks from Russian troops deployed around Shevardino.68

  Kutuzov’s report, cited above, is a little misleading. One can wonder what was the purpose of sacriicing men in defending this place if, as he claimed, its loss ‘would not have had any effect’ on his overall position? This is especially interesting in view of the considerable effort the Russian command committed to protect the Shevardino Redoubt. More plausible suggestions are voiced in contemporary memoirs. As we noted above, the initial Russian left lank was anchored near the village of Shevardino but Bagration and other generals complained about this exposed position and Kutuzov agreed to their suggestions, ordering the left wing to be withdrawn to Semeyonovskoye. As Bagration began gradually withdrawing his troops to new positions near Semeyonovskoye, he left the so-called ‘Corps de Bataille’ under General Andrei Gorchakov to cover his movement and support the Russian rearguard if necessary. With the withdrawal of the 2nd Western Army, the Redoubt at Shevardino had lost its early task of reinforcing the Russian left lank and now became a forward fortiication that could hinder Napoleon’s deployment. Some participants suggested that the battle at Shevardino began because the French:

  noticed our movement [as Bagration withdrew to Semeyonovskoye] and wanted to take advantage of it. This battle quickly escalated and no one on our
side expected such rapid onslaught by the French Army. Yet we had to defend the redoubt while the new disposition of our left wing at Semeyonovskoye was completed.

  This opinion is repeated in the memoirs of Yermolov, who, as the Chief of Staff of the 1st Western Army, was certainly better informed. Yermolov explained that Prince Kutuzov had earlier ordered the left wing to move back but during the rearguard action near the Kolotsk Monastery:

  a part of the rearguard, comprising some troops from the 2nd Army, withdrew so hastily, and without warning the Army, that the pursuing enemy appeared on the heights before the position had been changed by the orders of Prince Kutuzov. Thus, our change of position was conducted in front of the enemy, and, notwithstanding the speed in which it was made, the enemy was presented with a chance to attack. An otherwise useless redoubt now had to be defended out of necessity, in order to give the troops time to occupy their [new] positions, since the enemy could try to impede and even to throw our entire army into confusion.69

  The construction of the Redoubt was begun by some thirty pioneers led by Lieutenants Bogdanov and Oldengren in the evening of 4 September. However, hard ground and lack of manpower greatly delayed the process. According to Bogdanov, after seven hours of work, his pioneers barely managed to dig a foot-deep trench to defend the fortiication, and constructed a 1.5m-high walls of the redoubt, which, however, were not reinforced. Because the redoubt had been hastily constructed, some of its guns had been positioned in improper embrasures that compromised their effectiveness, while the rest had to fire over the crude earthwork.70 The redoubt’s key weakness lay in the fact that it was exposed to the ire from a hill located some 200m away south-west. This spot was not protected and would allow the French to deploy a battery that would inflict heavy casualties on the redoubt’s defenders.

  On 5 September, as the French Army approached Shevardino, Marshal Murat informed the Emperor about the Russian fortification and Napoleon soon arrived to make a personal reconnaissance. Across the battleield, Paskevich could see ‘a cavalry group standing on the heights in front of us. Two generals left the group, one of them in a grey coat and three-cornered hat. He reconnoitred positions for about fifteen minutes and waved his hand to the right.’71 Despite thick smoke from burning villages and a drizzling rain, both of which obscured his view – as Lejeune and Constant inform us – Napoleon spent some time reconnoitring the enemy positions.

  Napoleon assumed that Gorchakov’s troops constituted the left wing of the Russian Army and believed the redoubt at Shevardino would impede the deployment of the French troops. Gourgaud recalled that: ‘Napoleon considered it highly important to gain possessions before night of this position, which covered the left centre of the Russian line.’ However, Pelet suggested that the entire Battle of Shevardino was fought in vain, since Napoleon was misled by his maps that misrepresented the low of the Kolocha river, and had Napoleon known the terrain better, he would not have attempted this attack but simply forced the Russian to retreat through a lanking manoeuvre.72

  As the French engineers put up bridges across the Kolocha, Napoleon, ‘without waiting for the other Divisions of the first Corps to arrive’, ordered General Compans’ 5th Division of Davout’s corps to attack the redoubt from north-west, while the 16th and 18th Divisions of Poniatowski’s V Corps, which was approaching Yelna, would make a flanking attack through the wooded terrain from the south-west. Followed by the two cavalry corps of Nansouty and Montbrun, Compans’ troops crossed the Kolocha at Fomkino around 3pm. The total number of French forces committed, including Murat’s cavalry, was approximately 34,000-36,000 men with about 194 guns.73

  On the Russian side, Prince Andrei Gorchakov, the nephew of the renowned Field Marshal Alexander Suvorov, commanded about 8,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and thirty-six guns.74 The 27th Division was deployed in battalion columns behind the redoubt, with the Odesskii and Simbirskii Regiments in the irst line and the Vilenskii and Tarnopolskii Regiments in the second. The 2nd Cuirassier Division was arranged further behind, between the fortification and the Utitsa woods. The 49th, 41st and the 6th Jàgers, under Colonel Glebov I, were in skirmishing chain around Doronino, while the 42nd, 5th and 50th Jager, under Colonel Gogel I, were south of Doronino, extending to the Old Smolensk Road. To the north-west of the redoubt were the Kharkovskii and Chernigovskii Dragoon regiments of the IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. In the south-west, the Novorosiiskii and Kievskii Dragoons stood behind Doronino while two squadrons of the Akhtyrskii Hussar Regiment, protected the eight gun battery of the 9th Horse Artillery Company.

  Most scholars acknowledge that the twelve pieces of the 12th Battery Company were placed inside the Redoubt, and twenty-four other guns (the 23rd (Lieutenant Colonel Sablin) and 47th (Capt. Zhurakovski) Companies) placed in support around it. However, the redoubt itself was relatively small (smaller than the southern flèche at Semeyonovskoye) and could not have accommodated a twelve gun battery. Lieutenant Bogdanov, who supervised construction of the redoubt and saw the deployment of the guns, specifically mentions only three guns inside the redoubt, while the remaining nine were unlimbered on a hill on the northern side of the fortification; the fact that not all guns of the 12th Battery Company were inside the redoubt is also conirmed by the memoirs of Sub Lieutenant Raspopov, who served in this company and was deployed outside the redoubt. This evidence may explain why Russian battle reports refer to the loss of three guns at the redoubt.

  The Russian reserves included the 2nd Grenadier Division, deployed behind the 27th Division. The 2nd Combined Grenadier Division was initially deployed near the village of Semeyonovskoye but its four battalions were later committed to the fighting at Shevardino. Major General Karpov IPs detachment of seven Cossack regiments was further south on the Old Smolensk Road.

  The initial attack on Shevardino came from the south-west, where Polish cavalry encountered the Cossacks near Yelna. After a brief skirmish, the Cossacks retreated towards Utitsa and Poniatowski turned his forces northward to attack the left wing of the Russian positions at Shevardino. Preceded by several voltigeur companies, the 16th Division (Krasinski) moved over the ravine and through brushes, while the 18th Division and the cavalry secured the road and protected the lank against any Cossack attack. Krasinski’s troops suffered from the Russian guns at Shevardino and the Russian jager skirmishers. The Poles deployed twenty-four guns to bombard the enemy positions but they were exposed on a disadvantageous position and suffered from Russian counter-fire. Seeing the 5th jägers under attack, Colonel Emmanuel the Kievskii Dragoon Regiment and was supported by two squadrons of the Akhtyrskii Hussar Regiment. The charge briefly halted the Polish advance but could not stop it. Among the Polish casualties was Major Sowinski, Chief of Artillery of the 16th Division, who was seriously injured in the leg but continued commanding lying on the ground.75

  The Shevardino Redoubt (based on a study by Nefedovich and Kolubyakian)

  Meantime, Compans was preparing to attack from the north-east. Colonel Griois was fascinated by the scene that:

  was enhanced by the splendid sky and the setting sun that was reflected from the muskets and sabres. From its positions the rest of the Army cheered [Compans’] troops as they marched on, proud to have been chosen to open the battle.76

  But his comrade-in-arms, Labaume seemed less optimistic as he noticed the Russians ‘sending considerable forces to defend the Redoubt’s approaches.’

  Compans took full advantage of the rolling terrain, where, as a participant noted: ‘the hillocks provided platforms from which [Compans’] cannon could batter the redoubt, and sheltered the infantry as they formed into columns for attack’.77 The French enjoyed superiority in artillery, and a Russian officer reported that ‘strong French batteries deployed on both sides’ of the redoubt soon bombarded the Russian troops, provoking an artillery duel lasting about two hours.78

  Between 2pm and 2.30pm the 1st Battalion of the 57th Line was ordered to seize the village of Doronino and woods adjacent to it, and was soon engaged in a
heated action with the Russian Jägers defending the village.79 As Kutuzov reported, ‘our Jägers, lodged in the ravines and amidst the bushes on the right bank of the Kolocha and inside the villages […] made it very difficult for the enemy to advance along the main road’.80

  The French battalion was soon reinforced by a company of the 2nd Battalion and the entire 3rd Battalion of the 57th Line, which drove the Russians back and secured initial positions near Doronino. Simultaneously, two other columns (1st and 2nd Voltigeur Companies of the 57th, led by Captain Simon), covered by a thick chain of tirailleurs from Duchesne’s 1st Combined Voltigeur Battalion, drove the Russian skirmishers near the village but suffered from the Russian artillery. Furthermore, they were soon charged by the Novorossiiskii Dragoon Regiment, led by Major Terenin, who had been sent by Count Sievers to support the Jägers. The Russian dragoons tried to cut off the French tirailleurs by moving in-between Doronino and the woods, where the French sought cover. Three Russian squadrons, led by Captain Sievers, Lieutenant Stanikovich and Major Borgraf, charged the French, while the fourth squadron (under Major Milfeld) tried to cut them off.81 The voltigeur companies were caught on an open plain but organized an unexpectedly stiff resistance to the dragoons, deploying into squares to repel the attacks.82

  Retreating towards the woods, the French were supported by the newly arriving cavalry, which charged the Russian cavalry and forced it to retreat, inlicting heavy casualties, Sievers acknowledging ‘considerable loss in staff junior officers and the rank-and-file’.83 The French – four companies of tirailleurs under Duchesne and two companies under Simon84 – then resumed their assault on Doronino, which was defended by the few remaining Russian Jägers, and seized it after a brief but tenacious fight.85 The Novorosiiskii Dragoons, meantime, rallied for the second charge after which they covered the retreating Jägers and helped the Kievskii Dragoon Regiment in removing the guns of the 9th Horse Artillery Company from the nearby heights.