The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Read online

  As the ighting intensiied, Murat’s cavalry moved across the river to ill the gap between the I and V Corps. The Divisions of Friant and Morand also crossed the river in the vicinity of Aleksino. Both divisions were instructed to lank the Russian right wing while Poniatowski threatened the Russian left.86 Behind them moved Gérard’s 3rd Division and Girardin’s light cavalry division. With such reinforcements, Compans was able to rally his division for a direct assault on the Shevardino Redoubt.

  Around 5pm the French voltigeurs advanced in open order towards the redoubt, followed by the 57th Line and 61st Line. Gourgaud witnessed as Compans:

  hastened to throw five or six companies of voltigeurs […] [and] these scattered over [the knoll], and covering themselves as much as possible, were ordered to keep up a constant ire on the artillery men at the guns on the redoubt […] A Battalion [probably the 1st Battalion of the 61st] was placed in rear of the knoll to support the tirailleurs.87

  Compans, at the head of the 61st and four battalions of the 57th Line with voltigeurs preceding them, directed his march toward the right side of the redoubt, while Duppelin (with the 25th and the 111th Line) moved towards the left wing. The 25th Line was to attack the village while the 111th was placed still farther to the left, in order to turn the Russian lank and get into the rear.88 Simultaneously, Morand’s division marched from the north-west towards Shevardino, threatening the Russian right lank.

  The artillery ire had a devastating effect on both sides, but especially on the French, exposed on the rolling terrain. Karl Löwenstern, who was sent by Bennigsen and Bagration ‘to examine the redoubt and determine if it was capable of repulsing the dynamic enemy attacks’, reported that ‘despite numerous killed and wounded due to our dreadful canister ire, the French boldly advanced towards our fortiications’. Compans exploited the terrain and ‘a wattle fencing’ that enabled him to continue his movement despite the Russian cavalry charge, ‘and even to repulse it with considerable loss’. On his orders, a company of the 2nd Combined Voltigeurs Battalion seized the Doronino hill (or Kurgan) about 250m west of the Russian redoubt. Moments later, Compans deployed his artillery (eight or twelve guns depending on the source) there and bombarded the Russian troops in and around the fortiication. To preserve his men, Gorchakov had most of his cavalry arranged in battle formation on the left lank behind the redoubt.89

  South of the redoubt, the Poles continued their attack, which the Russian Jägers contained. Poniatowski sent the 2nd Polish Regiment through the woods south of the redoubt to flank the Russian defenders, while the 12th Regiment was sent to the left to protect the battery that operated against the Russians.90 The Tarnopolskii Infantry Regiment was sent to assist the jägers, and Nikolai Andreyev, an officer of the 50th jägers, recalled seeing:

  [for] the first, and the last, time as the Tarnopolskii Regiment attacked in a column formation with music playing and soldiers singing. Right in front of my eyes, the regiment made a bayonet charge. The combat was brief and their regimental commander [Lieutenant Colonel Alekseyev] was wounded by a musket ball in the back of his head. He was carried out and the Regiment wavered.91

  Simultaneously, Gorchakov sent the Fanagoriiskii Grenadier Regiment to relieve the 5th jägers.

  The combined French and Polish artillery and musket ire outgunned the Russian defenders of Shevardino and the 12th Battery Company, at its own discretion, began to withdraw from the redoubt. The 27th Division, deployed behind the redoubt, was also exposed to the enemy fire and began to waver. However, Löwenstern, who earlier left the battlefield to bring Bagration up to date, now returned in time to halt the Russian troops. Yet, it was one moment too late. A brief cessation of ire allowed the French to close in and charge the redoubt. The 27th Division was already falling back when Löwenstern turned it back against the French.92 As Vossen, an officer of the 111th Line, recalled:

  we almost caught up with the retreating enemy, when it suddenly halted, turned back and opened fire at us. Our courageous Chef de Bataillon rushed in front of the 1st Battalion and ordered, ‘Grenadiers en avant, croisez les bayonets!’

  Meanwhile, Gourgaud saw:

  a most murderous fusillade [that] started between Compans’ two regiments and the Russian infantry supporting the redoubt’s left flank. Only separated by a couple of dozen yards, the troops on either side of the wattle fences were protected from each other up to chest level. Thus, this sanguinary fusillade lasted three-quarters of an hour; its vivacity and noise made it impossible to hear the generals’ order to advance with the bayonet, a manoeuvre which would have cost us a lot of men.

  Gourgaud’s account is supported by Lieutenant Damploux, who recalled ‘such confusion that no voices could be overheard [and] it was even impossible to give orders with signs,’ and by Louis Gardier of the 3rd Battalion of the 111th Line, who also remembered that: ‘division commanders could not hear orders and senior adjutants were forced to lead one [unit] after another into the battle’.

  Realizing the gravity of the situation, Löwenstern led some units of the 27th Division in a bayonet counter-attack that briely halted the French. Sievers watched as Löwenstern ‘halted the [French] advance for some time until they received reinforcements and seized the redoubt’. Indeed, Compans brought in two reserve battalions and personally led a new attack on the redoubt. As Gourgaud described, he then:

  took a Battalion [probably the 2nd] of the 57th Line and, having opened up the fences on his right, made it advance in close column of divisions, covering four guns charged with grape that moved behind it. He led this battalion against the extreme right of the Russians flanking the redoubt. When, at 50 toises [~100m] from them, he unmasked his battery, which caused a dreadful destruction of the enemy [with its grapeshot]. Compans profiting by the disorder which he observed in their ranks, charged with his battalion at the point of the bayonet.

  Despite the Russian counter-fire, a battalion of the 57th Line fought its way into the redoubt (Gourgaud says the battalion lost its major and 200 killed and wounded in the process), supported by Colonel Charles Bouge with the 1st Battalion of the 61st Line and two voltigeur companies of the 57th Line. The report of the 61st Line reveals that Captain Duhon, commander of the 1st Battalion, and Captain Destor were the irst oficers to break into the redoubt and showed ‘remarkable courage’ in the process.93 The hand-to-hand combat proved vicious, leading to mounting casualties on both sides; the 2nd Battalion of 57th Line lost sixteen killed, including Major La Boulayer, and 178 wounded in this charge.94

  Around 7pm the French seized the redoubt, capturing several guns the Russians could not evacuate. The Russian gunners rendered a stiff resistance and some tried to escape with the guns but were killed on the spot. Six French soldiers, led by Sergeant Rodant, turned one of the captured guns and tried in vain to fire at the retreating Russians.95

  The precise number of Russian guns captured inside the redoubt remains in doubt. The Polish officer, Soltyk, claimed as many as twelve, Denniée referred to six, Chambray to ive, while other French participants (Lejeune, Berthezene, François, Vaudoncourt etc.) acknowledged seven guns. On the Russian side, Sievers and Löwenstern failed to mention any losses, while Barclay de Tolly and Saint Priest referred to three pieces lost. As mentioned above, Lieutenant Bogdanov, who supervized the construction of the redoubt, saw only three guns deployed inside, which seem to have been captured in Compans’ charge, while nine other cannon, deployed outside the redoubt, were safely removed by the defenders. Raspopov, who served with the 12th Battery Company, claimed that only two cannon were lost.

  As evening approached, many participants hoped for the end of the carnage and Gorchakov later admitted that he ‘wanted nothing better than for the darkest night to fall and bring an end to the battle’. The flames of burning villages lit some parts of the battleield, which was now obscured by fast approaching darkness and thick smoke.

  Compans rallied his battalions in and around the redoubt and brought up reinforcements, anticipating an attack. The
initial Russian counter attack was made by the Sibirskii and Malorossiiskii Grenadier Regiments, which were motivated by priests who blessed the soldiers as they attacked. However, the French held their ground. Bagration soon ordered the 2nd Grenadier Division and four battalions of the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division to support Gorchakov.96 As these forces – it is unclear who led the Grenadier attack, since Russian participants and scholars name both Gorchakov and Bagration – reached the battlefield after 7pm, a fierce hand-to-hand resumed. Murat reported that the Russians ‘returned at a charge with two columns of infantry to retake the redoubt but it was vigorously received by Compans’ division’.97

  Some French participants disputed that the redoubt was ever recaptured by the Russians, and responding to Ségur’s memoirs, Gourgaud defended his comrades: ‘It is false that this redoubt, once in our power, ever was retaken by the enemy [and] it was, therefore, impossible there should be found any of our dead in it.’ Napoleon’s faithful companion was mistaken, since the redoubt did change hands at least three times and a battalion of the 61st Line, though ighting valiantly, was almost completely destroyed inside the redoubt.

  As the Russian Grenadiers fought around the redoubt, the Russian 2nd Cuirassier Division was deployed in squadron columns some 300 paces behind the redoubt, ready to charge the enemy.98 The Russians soon saw the French troops, which under cover of darkness, sought to march between the redoubt and Shevardino. Sievers reported that he:

  perceived the enemy’s daring intention of attacking our infantry in flank and rear with two strong columns [probably the 25th and 111th Line] that were quickly moving between the redoubt and the village [of Shevardino]. I rushed to the right lank of the cavalry line that was under my command [and found] two newly arrived cuirassier regiments [Glukhovskii and Malorossiiskii Cuirassiers] deploying in front of the line [of dragoon regiments]. Their commander, gallant Colonel Tolbuzin met me and I directed him towards the enemy column that was the closest …

  Approaching the French, Tolbuzin charged with the Malorossiisk and Glukhov Cuirassiers, while two squadrons of the Kharkovskii Dragoons, led by Major Zhbakovsky, and two squadrons of the Chernigovskii Dragoons, under Major Musin-Pushkin, soon followed. Panchulidzev described his Chernigovskii Dragoons supporting the cuirassiers and ‘impetuously charging the enemy column’. Sievers’ report implies that Dragoons protected ‘the right lank of the cuirassiers that was threatened by two enemy infantry columns that appeared on the other side of the village’. Colonel Yuzefovich’s report reveals that:

  [when the] two enemy columns appeared near the burning village and began to harm our cavalry with their ire, I charged with my regiment; one of the columns was destroyed while the second was forced to lee and one enemy cannon, still loaded with canister, was captured before it could ire upon us.99

  The Russian charge had a particularly devastating effect on the 111th Line, which was moving in the dark, north of Shevardino, when it was suddenly charged. Although it tried to organize a square, the impetus of the Russian charge pierced it and the regiment suffered heavy casualties. Louis Gardier, serving in the 3rd Battalion of this regiment, provides interesting details of this charge:

  It was already dark when a division of Russian cuirassiers, who claimed to be our allies and indeed looked like the Saxon cuirassiers, appeared [in front of us]. Assuming that they arrived to charge the enemy, we allowed them to pass nearby. But they rallied behind us and charged, killing anyone who came under their blows. We rushed as fast as we could to the orchard that was behind us and in front of the burning village.

  Gardier’s testimony is enhanced by Lieutenant Vossen, who noted that ‘the cuirassiers overwhelmed the first battalion and broke through the square, which was so hastily arranged, and killed everyone they could ind. Other battalions became disordered …’

  The Russian cavalry, Segur recalled, ‘fell upon [the French] and scattered them, ring three guns and taking or killing three hundred men. The survivors immediately gathered themselves up in a compact mass, bristling with steel and firearms.’100 Panchulidzev reported that ‘over 300 men fell’, and Vossen also referred to ‘up to 300 killed, including [the] Chef de Bataillon and twelve non-commissioned oficers’. As it retreated, the unfortunate 111th Line was subjected to friendly fire when, as Vossen recalled, ‘a French infantry regiment, not far away, mistakenly took us for the Russians and opened ire until the courageous Adjutant Riston galloped there to explain that the troops standing near the village were the Frenchmen’.101

  Meanwhile, Friant, whose 2nd Division was deployed north of Shevardino, ordered Colonel de Tschudy to lead the Spaniards of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the joseph Napoleon Regiment, closer to Shevardino to protect the division’s right lank. As it marched southward, the joseph Napoleon Regiment approached Shevardino at the very moment when the Russian cavalry routed the 111th Line, and so it formed a square, in anticipation of a charge. According to E. Lopes, a non commissioned officer in the regiment, Colonel de Tschudy deployed a company of voltigeurs that lured the unsuspecting Russian dragoons of the Kharkovskii and Chernigovskii Regiments directly onto the Spanish square, which opened a surprise ire in the dark. ‘The [enemy] cavalry retreated in disorder,’ Tschudy later reported, ‘having lost a dozen killed, including its commanding officer and large number of wounded men and horses; the battalion lost not a single man and the enemy made no further movement for the rest of the night.’102 Indeed, the Chernigovskii Dragoon Regiment lost ive oficers killed, while the Kharkovskii Dragoons lost Captain Nesteley, commanding its Chef Squadron, and Captain von Nagel, leading the second squadron. The Russian cavalry soon retreated since, according to Panchulidzev, ‘a strong enemy cavalry detachment appeared to support [the French infantry units] …’103

  The number and afiliation of guns seized in this cavalry charge remains unclear. Sievers reported that his men captured ‘[an] entire French artillery battery’ in front of Doronino but removed only three guns. Saint Priest referred to six guns, while Kutuzov, Kaisarov, Toll, Harting and others, claimed as many as eight, with ive of them removed and three damaged and left behind.104 Cornet von Dreyling of the Malorossiiskii Cuirassier Regiment, who did not participate in the charge but certainly heard the stories from his comrades, wrote in his memoirs that his regiment seized an eight-gun battery, destroying four guns and removing the remaining four. An official Army report claimed eight guns captured by the cuirassiers. Modern Russian historians, however, believe that the Russian cuirassiers seized only three guns in this fighting. Russian regimental nominations for rewards provide interesting details in this respect. Privates Gregory Baranov, Ivan Velichko, Roman Pelikh and Arkhip Sergeiev, of the Kharkov Regiment, were commended for quickly dismounting and harnessing their own horses to remove the cannon.105 Among other officers, Major Babarsov was first among the Kharkovskii Dragoons ‘to attack the infantry column and seize an enemy gun’, but three of his comrades, Lieutenants Spanovsky, Pereyaslavtsev and Pluzhansky, were killed in action as they tried to rally their troops after the death of Nesteley and von Nagel. An NCO named Fisenko and Dragoons Pavlenko, Gubskoy, Tereshenko and Gontarenko, seized a gun and helped to remove it under enemy fire.106

  In his report to Bagration two weeks after the battle, Gorchakov sought to correct Kutuzov’s praise of the Cuirassier Division for capturing ‘five enemy guns’. He explained that, before the cuirassiers arrived:

  I sent a Battalion of the Simbirskii Infantry Regiment, under [the] command of Colonel Loshkarev, against the strong French column, which he attacked with bayonets and managed to capture two guns before the arrival of the Cuirassier Division, which completed the destruction of this enemy column and seized three more cannon.107

  Panchulidzev reported that his troops captured two guns but because of haste and no horses to pull one of them, he was forced to abandon it, while the other gun was removed with the aid of three horses.108 French sources are often silent on this issue, but some do acknowledge the loss of three guns belonging
to the 111th. Most importantly, General Lonchan’s report explained why the 111th lost its regimental artillery, noting that: ‘an artillery oficer, who had no orders to follow the regiment, moved to the left and, by accident, fell into a ravine, where he lost all guns without the regiment’s knowledge’.109

  The battle was raging south of Shevardino as well, where, as Gourgaud noted, ‘notwithstanding all the efforts of [Poniatowski], the many obstacles he encountered in the wood retarded his march and only one of his batteries assisted in the battle’. The Polish advance was halted by combined efforts of the Russian jägers, Tarnopol Infantry and Fanagoriiskii Grenadier Regiments, which held positions on the edge of the woods. Gorchakov later directed the Ekaterinoslavl and Military Order Cuirassiers to support them. The cavalry initially directed its efforts towards the Polish battery near Doronino but it failed to capture it due to counter-charges of Bruyere’s 1st Light Cavalry Division and the Polish Lancers. A Grenadier Company of the 16th Polish Regiment, led by Captain Jan Skrzynecki (future general and leader of the 1831 uprising), distinguished itself as it fought off the Russian cavalry. As one participant described, the night was ‘[not] so dark we could not make out movement [but] dark enough to prevent us from seeing which arm [the Russian cavalry] was composed of’. This was signiicant, for the French could not see that the Russians wore cuirasses, causing General Nansouty to send the Red Lancers of Hamburg110 against them. As Thirion de Metz described:

  This regiment flew to the attack, delivered its charge and fell on the enemy with felled lances aimed at the body. The Russian cavalry received the shock without budging and, in the same moment as the French lance-heads touched the enemy’s chest, the regiment about-faced and came back towards us as if it in turn had been charged.