The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Read online

  The position at Borodino, 105 verstas (112km) from Moscow and 279 verstas (297km) from Smolensk, was selected by Toll, and later reviewed by Kutuzov on 3 September. His contemporaries, as well as subsequent generations, have debated its laws and advantages ever since. Yermolov, Bennigsen, Barclay de Tolly and other senior officers criticized Kutuzov for blindly trusting Toll and being reluctant, due to obesity and lethargy, to examine it more closely. Bennigsen, who had strained relations with Toll, blamed him for selecting this inferior position, since he ‘has gained complete control over the mind of Prince Kutuzov.’ Bennigsen lamented:

  I never described Borodino as a favourable position but Colonel Toll, appointed [by Kutuzov] to the position of Quartermaster General, selected it himself […] He was satisfied by the mere fact that its front was protected by shallow rivulets that could be forded everywhere, and ignored the fact that both flanks were exposed and not reinforced.

  In his Izobrazhenie voyennikh deistvii, Barclay de Tolly remarked that the position at Borodino was ‘favourable in the centre and on the right flank, but the left lank was completely exposed’. He then placed the responsibility on Bennigsen’s shoulders, who ‘denounced everything that he did not come up with or that was not suggested by him.’

  Bagration, reconnoitring the area around Semeyonovskoye, immediately voiced his criticism of the position and highlighted the exposed position of the 2nd Western Army, which, he felt, was threatened the most.

  Vistitsky remembered that Kutuzov initially disapproved of the position but then weighed its laws and advantages, and under Toll’s influence, finally decided to accept it. Clausewitz agrees: ‘It was thus that Colonel Toll could find no better position than that of Borodino, which is, however, a deceptive one, for it promises at first sight more than it performs.’

  Kutuzov himself displayed a mixture of optimism and caution in a letter to Alexander, dated 4 September:

  The position at the village of Borodino in which I have stopped […] is one of the best to be found in the vicinity [of Moscow]. The weak point of this position is on the left flank, which I will try to rectify.51

  The terrain was rolling, intersected by several streams and sharp valleys, and littered with woods and hamlets. The battlefield stretched from the confluence of the Moscow and Kolocha rivers in the north to the hamlets of Utitsa on the Old Smolensk Road in the south. The Kolocha and several other brooks flowed along the north of the plain, eventually joining the Moscow river. The streams were deeply scored in the ground and marked with steep banks that would have proved serious obstacles for the French attacks, had the hot summer not rendered some of them shallow. There were about two dozen small settlements and four major villages, the most important being the village of Borodino, which gave its name to the battle. The village was noteworthy for its white two-storey Church of the Nativity, the bell tower of which would serve as an advantageous observation point for Russian scouts.

  The lower stretch of the Kolocha, between Borodino and the Moscow river, had a steep right bank overlooking the opposite bank, which made it easier for the Russians to defend their positions. Beyond the river was a vast field, convenient for cavalry action. Still, the terrain here was hilly with the gullies of the Voina, Stonets and Ognik brooks cutting across it. In the centre the Russians held heights that dominated the surrounding area in all directions. In the south the Russian positions were covered only by the shallow gullies of the Semeyonovskii and Kamenka streams. The village of Semeyonovskoye occupied a key position on a hill on the east bank of the Semeyonovskii brook, but its wooden houses were useless for defence so they were dismantled. Further south, the extensive Utitsa forest separated Semeyonovskoye from the Old Smolensk Road. As Clausewitz elaborated:

  The ground taken up by the left wing presented no particular advantages. Some hillocks with a gentle slope, and perhaps twenty feet high, together with strips of shrubby wood, formed so confused a whole, that it was difficult to pronounce which party would have the advantage of the ground. Thus, the best side of the position, the right wing, could be of no avail to redeem the defects of the left. The whole position too strongly indicated the left lank to the French as the object of operation, to admit of their forces being attracted to the right.52

  The Russian troops reached Borodino on 3 September and Avraam Norov recalled that by the time he reached the battlefield: ‘all nearby heights were glittering with the steel of our bayonets and the copper of our guns. The air was filled with the voices of hordes of men and the neighs of horses.’53 The stories of the enemy pillaging nearby villages and the local populace courageously defending itself spread through the Army. Pushin noted in his diary on 3 September that during a French raid on a nearby village:

  the peasants repulsed the attack, killing 45 enemy soldiers and capturing 50. Remarkably, women were also fighting with consternation. Among the dead was one 18-year-old girl, who fought with particular gallantry. Despite receiving a mortal blow, she was so strong in spirit that, with her last breath, she still managed to thrust her knife into the Frenchman who shot her …

  Fedor Glinka recounted the peasant exploits and described ‘two young peasant girls who were wounded to their hands as one of them rushed to protect her grandfather while the other killed a Frenchman who injured her mother …’ Stories like these, describing women – even innocent girls – fighting the enemy while the Army was still retreating, only further increased the soldiers’ eagerness to fight.

  The Russian Army was initially deployed in a line parallel to the Kolocha river, with its right lank near Maslovo and the left lank at Shevardino. This arrangement is sometimes referred to as the ‘first Russian position’. Clausewitz, the perceptive Prussian officer serving at Kutuzov’s headquarters, was critical of this position:

  The road from Smolensk to Moscow runs unfortunately not at right angles to the Kolocha, but parallel to it for some distance, and, after it has passed the river, diverges from it at an obtuse angle […] The consequence is, if the position be taken up parallel to the stream, the Army stands obliquely to its line of retreat and exposes its left lank to the enemy […] half a mile from the great road, a second road to Moscow issues from the village of Yelnya, and leads straight behind the rear of such a position.

  On 3 September Bagration called upon all generals of his 2nd Western Army to make a detailed reconnaissance of the position. He was dissatisfied with the position for several reasons, including the fact that: ‘the position was selected by the same eyes that selected all previous positions for Barclay, that is the eyes of Colonel Toll.’ As we have already seen, Bagration distrusted Toll and even threatened to have him demoted for incompetence.

  It was quickly realized that the left wing, anchored on Shevardino, was greatly exposed, since the French could take advantage of the Old Smolensk Road to outflank the Russian position. This oversight – whether made by Toll or Bennigsen – was later covered up in official reports and battle histories, but many participants voiced their criticisms in their memoirs. As we know, Clausewitz argued that the road from Yelnya led ‘straight behind the rear of such a position’ and he was supported by Yermolov’s comment that: ‘the old postal [Old Smolensk] road to Mozhaisk wound through the forest for one mile from the left wing, gradually skirting around our positions,’ as well as Norov’s remark that: ‘the position could be flanked through the woods adjacent to the Shevardino Redoubt, where the Old Smolensk Road was located.’

  The decisions made that day had important consequences for the Russian deployment, but their course remains disputed. One of the issues at stake is who made the decision to reinforce the left lank with the series of fortifications? Many Russian, and later Soviet, historians sought to give sole credit to Kutuzov, who, they claimed, devised and supervised everything on the battlefield. But Bogdanov’s study suggests that it was Bagration who closely examined the terrain of his position and finding it deficient, suggested constructing a redoubt at Shevardino and then flèches at Semeyonovskoye. Kutuzov con
sented to this. Saint Priest made it clear in his diary that:

  the village of Semeyonovskoye was selected as the key to our positions. [However,] the enemy could easily get around [the Russian left wing] position by moving along the Old Smolensk Road from Yelnya to Utitsa, and then approach Semeyonvskoe […] through the woods. To prevent this, [Bagration] arranged to reinforce the village and construct several flèches. The heights, near the village of Shevardino, in front of the village [of Semeyonovskoye] were also reinforced.54

  According to Barclay de Tolly, Bagration told Kutuzov that his position ‘was currently under the greatest risk’ and that:

  the Old Smolensk Road, located at some distance from the village of Semeyonovskoye on the left lank, could be used by the enemy to turn his left flank but Prince Kutuzov and Bennigsen claimed that this road could be easily defended by irregular [‘nestroevymi’] forces.55

  Bagration then suggested moving his troops to the eastern bank of the Semeyonovskii ravine, which would give them a positional advantage over the advancing French. Barclay de Tolly noted that, after hearing Bagration, Kutuzov decided that: ‘in case of an enemy attack, this lank would retreat and take position between the mentioned [Kurgan] Heights and the Semeyonovskoye village. Orders were issued to construct batteries and redoubts here.’

  While pleased with Kutuzov’s decision, Barclay de Tolly ‘still could not understand why such movement was to be done only after the enemy attacked and not beforehand.’ Yermolov, on other hand, gives credit to Kutuzov, who:

  after reconnoitring the deployment of the troops, ordered the left wing to move back so that deep [a] ravine lay in front of it; he also ordered the lank to be strengthened with several flèches. Following this change, the redoubt

  [at Shevardino] was out of our artillery range and so was rendered completely useless to us […] The straight line formed by the Army position was now bent at its very centre.

  This deployment is sometimes dubbed the ‘second Russian position’.

  5 September: Prelude to Borodino – The Battle of Shevardino

  By early September the French Army advanced by forced marches, closely pressing Konovnitsyn’s rearguard. Brandt, an officer in the Vistula Legion, remembered the exhausting pursuit from Smolensk to Gzhatsk, when:

  the temperature would swing dramatically from burning heat to freezing cold. The heat was terrible and the wind swept up huge billowing clouds of dust that were so thick it was often impossible to see the great trees on either side of the road […] The dust was a real torment. In order to at least protect their eyes, the soldiers improvised goggles out of glass from windows; others marched with their shakos tucked under their arms and with their heads swathed in handkerchiefs, with openings left open just enough to see and to breathe; still others made garlands out of leaves. The Army presented a comical appearance, but all signs of this masquerade would vanish at the slightest shower of rain.56

  Captain Girod de l’Ain, veteran of the Spanish campaign, also lamented:

  The heat was excessive: I had never experienced worse in Spain […] The main road […] is sandy, and the Army, marching in several serried columns abreast, raised such clouds of dust that we could not see one another two yards away and our eyes, ears and nostrils were full of it, and our faced encrusted. This heat and dust made us extremely thirsty […] [but] water was scarce. Will you believe me when I say that I saw men lying on their bellies to drink horses’ urine in the gutter!57

  Meanwhile continual retreat, agitation over the perceived treason of Barclay de Tolly and his adjutants, lack of supplies, and the emotional strain of war was affecting the Russian soldiers. In late August Kutuzov was informed of increasing disturbances among the troops and had to acknowledge in one of his orders that: ‘up to 2,000 itinerant soldiers had been captured.’ On 30 August he complained that:

  such enormous number of soldiers abandoning their units reveals remarkable loosening of discipline on the part of the regimental commanders. A tendency towards marauding, facilitated by the weakness of their superiors, had an effect on the soldier’s morale and now almost evolved into this habit that must be eradicated through the strictest measures.

  Forthwith, the Russian Commander-in-Chief ordered the execution of any soldier caught pillaging. But even draconian measures like this barely inluenced the rank and file, forcing Kutuzov to repeat his order on 2 September.58

  On 1 September, in unbearable heat, the Russians fought a delaying action lasting almost thirteen hours around Gzhatsk, and three days later the rearguard repulsed French attacks at Gridnevo. Meanwhile, Kutuzov’s main forces concentrated at Borodino.

  Early in the morning of 5 September the sound of gunfire was heard from the direction of Kolotsk and by 1pm Konovnitsyn’s troops came into view, pursued by the French advance guard. As the French advance guard proceeded from Gridnevo to Kolotsk, Konovnitsyn called for reinforcements, especially in cavalry, to hold the French cavalry at bay, consequently General Fedor Uvarov arrived to support him. Although senior in rank, Uvarov gallantly subordinated himself to Konovnitsyn, telling him: ‘This is not the time to discuss seniority. You are leading the rearguard and I am sent to assist you – so command me.’ Uvarov’s cavalry made frequent charges and the Russian artillery acted with relative success while, as Konovnitsyn reported, ‘the infantry largely did not participate in the ighting due to the [broken] terrain.’

  A Wurttemberger serving in the Grand Army remembered how:

  [The Russians] chose very advantageous positions. On the left flank, their artillery was covered by a wide building of the monastery that was firmly occupied by the Jägers. Numerous cavalry covered the right flank. We unlimbered our guns and the ighting soon turned into a hell. The Russians persisted for a quarter of an hour before they hastily retreated.59

  Air Blitz at Borodino?

  Some months before the French invasion, the Russian Minister to Stuttgart, D. Alopeus, met a young German inventor Franz Leppich, who had earlier approached King Frederick of Württemberg with the grand idea of constructing a new kind of flying machines.

  After Joseph and Étienne Montgolfier first flew them in 1783, hot air balloons had been used by the French military for reconnaissance. Leppich suggested improving their performance and turning them into fighting machines. The trouble with balloons, he explained, was their inability to fly against the wind, but by attaching wings they could be made to move in any direction. Although the idea seemed enticing, the King of Württemberg initially passed on it, especially after Napoleon rejected Leppich’s similar offer. But King Frederick later changed his mind and provided modest funding for Leppich’s experiments. The inventor was busy building his machine when, in early 1812, the Russian Minister approached him with a tempting offer to work in Russia. In his letter to Emperor Alexander, Alopeus described in detail a machine ‘shaped somewhat like a whale’, capable of lifting ‘40 men with 12,000 wounds of explosives’ to bombard enemy positions and sailing from Stuttgart to London in an incredible thirteen hours.

  Leppich’s project appealed to Alexander, especially as war with Napoleon was looming, and any ideas that promised to give Russia an edge sounded attractive. On 26 April Alexander approved the project and Leppich’s workshop was set up at a village near Moscow, where Governor Rostopchin provided Leppich – now working under the alias ‘Schmidt’ – with all the production of artillery ammunition.

  Maintaining secrecy over the project was of paramount impoance, but difficult to maintain. Suspicions were immediately aroused when guards were deployed around the estate. And they were further heightened when Rostopchin placed large orders for fabric, sulphurid acid, file dust and other assets, totalling a staggering 120,000 roubles. By July, some hundred labourers were working 17-hour shifts at the workshop. Leppich assured Rostopchin that the money was well spent and the flying machine would be completed by 15 August: by autumn entire squadrons would soar into the skies above Moscow!

  On 15 July, Alexander personally visited the wo
rkshop and was shown various elements of the flying machine, including wings and a large gondola 15m long and 8m wide. The Emperor soon informed Kutuzov of the secret weapon and instructed him and Leppich to closely coordinate their actions in the future ‘air blitz’ against the French.

  However, the deadline of 15 August passed without any results.

  By now the invasion was under way and Napoleon was already at Smolensk. Rostopchin, beginning to suspect Leppich, demanded results. The scientist promised to deliver the machine by 27 August, but when nothing was forthcoming, Rostopchin wrote a letter to Alexander denouncing Leppich as a ‘crazy charlatan’. The machine was not completed by the time Borodino was fought, and the subsequent French advance threatened Leppich’s secret workshop: so it was loaded onto 130 wagons and moved to Nizhni Novgorod, while Leppich himself was recalled to St Petersburg.

  Back in Moscow, Napoleon, already aware of rumours about a flying machine, ordered an investigation. Reports came back that some work had been done ‘by an Englishman who called himself Schmidt and claimed to be a German’. The purpose of this secret weapon, it was alleged, was to destroy Moscow before the French could seize it.

  Meantime, Leppich continued his experiments at the famous Oranienbaum observatory. In November 1812 his first prototype balloon collapsed as it was wheeled out of the hanger. By September 1813 he finally built a flying machine that could ascend 12–3m above the ground – a far cry from his earlier promises of soaring squadrons in the skies above Russia.