The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Read online

  The destruction of Smolensk introduced me to a completely new feeling which wars outside your native land cannot inspire. I had never witnessed the destruction of my native land or seen the burning cities of my motherland. For the first time in my life, my ears heard the moans of my compatriots and for the first time did my eyes see the horrors of their terrible conditions. I do consider magnanimity a gift from God, but I would never have allowed it into my heart before revenge was satisfied!

  Most Russian officers had opposed the surrender of Smolensk, General Kutaisov actually pleading with Barclay de Tolly to continue the battle. The Commander-in-Chief listened attentively and then replied: ‘Let everyone mind his own business and I shall mind mine.’36 Later, Zakrevsky complained to Vorontsov that: ‘no matter how much we appealed to our Minister not to surrender the city he did not listen to us […] No, the Minister is not a military commander, he cannot lead the Russians …’ The following day Zakrevsky noted:

  I cannot ascribe our Minister’s aloofness and indifference to anything but treason […] I say this as a Russian, with all my heart and tears. When was there a time in our past when we abandoned our ancient cities? I cannot watch without tears the many residents who follow us with their children, bemoaning and losing their native land and property.37

  In Dorogobuzh, some officers complained to Grand Duke Constantine of Barclay de Tolly’s leadership, claiming the ‘soldiers were disappointed, downcast […] concerned with the future of the Army.’38 To their dishonour, many officers publicly slandered Barclay de Tolly – especially Grand Duke Constantine, who publicly grumbled that ‘there is not a single drop of Russian blood in our Commander’s veins.’ He even insulted him in the presence of aides-de-camp and Staff members: ‘You are German, a traitor, vermin, and you are betraying Russia!’39 And as Zhirkevich justly noted: ‘When such words can be heard from the Emperor’s brother himself, one can imagine what was spoken by the rank-and-file.’

  Later, a Russian veteran neatly summed up why Barclay de Tolly was so detested in the Army: ‘Because in 1812 he was called Barclay de Tolly [a foreign-sounding name] and not Kutuzov or Bagration.’40

  Some generals felt such antipathy towards Barclay de Tolly and the ‘German Party’ that radical proposals were mooted. For example, one day Platov approached Yermolov to discuss ‘untrustworthy and useless persons that overwhelmed the headquarters’ and the name of Colonel Wolzogen, Barclay de Tolly’s trusted adjutant, cropped up:

  Being in a joyous mood, Ataman Platov told me in his peculiar, humorous manner, ‘Here, brother, is what we need to do. You can suggest sending him on a reconnaissance of the French Army and direct him to me, and leave it to me to separate these Germans [i.e. Wolzogen and Barclay]. I will assign him special [Cossack] guides, who will show him the French in such a manner that he would never see the light of day again.’

  29–31 August: Looking For a New Commander

  Meantime, Emperor Alexander cautiously followed military events, as the reports from the Army were far from cheerful. Wittgenstein’s success at Klyastitsy and Polotsk, and Tormasov’s at Kobrin, were overshadowed by the loss of Smolensk and Napoleon’s continued march on Moscow. The anxiety in society grew daily, while news from the Army was so disturbing that a new commander-in-chief had to be appointed immediately. In his letter to Alexander on 17 August, General Count Shuvalov, the Tsar’s friend and advisor, painted a devastating picture of a grumbling, demoralized and ill-fed Army, blaming Barclay de Tolly for indecision and mismanagement: ‘The Army has not the least confidence in the present Commander […] A new commander is necessary, one with authority over both armies and Your Majesty should appoint him immediately; otherwise, Russia is lost.’41

  The letter reflected the sentiments of a large number of senior Russian officers and motivated Alexander to make a decision. On 17 August he convened a committee to select a new commander. The committee considered only full generals, while excluding two elderly field marshals (76-year-old Count Saltykov and 70-year-old Count Gudovich) on the grounds of age.

  The committee members initially discussed the candidacies of Bagration, Bennigsen, Tormasov, Dokhturov and Pahlen but none of them were supported unanimously.42 Kutuzov’s candidacy was discussed last, since it was a delicate question. Though the nobility and most of the Army had long been talking of Kutuzov’s appointment, the members of the committee were well aware that, after the disaster at Austerlitz in 1805, the Tsar disliked Kutuzov, who felt likewise about the Sovereign. For several hours the committee hesitated to make its proposal but finally gathered the courage to recommend Kutuzov. Alexander vacillated for three days before finally signing the decree on 20 August. Lord Cathcart noted that:

  in appointing Koutousof [sic], it was considered that his long-standing in the Army, his recent able conduct of the Turkish campaign, and his former military reputation, would place him above rivalry, and that in consequence he might be a kind of head to unite all parties.43

  Imperial orders were sent to Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, informing them that ‘various dire complications occurring after the two armies united, have impelled me to appoint one commander above all others. I have chosen for this post General of Infantry Prince Kutuzov.’ Russian society – and especially St Petersburg – celebrated Kutuzov’s appointment, an eyewitness describing how: ‘the people surrounded him [Kutuzov], touched his clothes and appealed, “Save us and defeat this cruel enemy.’’ Kutuzov’s departure to join the Army turned into a majestic and touching procession.’44

  Despite the popular Western perception of him, Kutuzov was far from being a sluggish, simple-minded man. Although his career was largely based on victories against the decadent Ottoman Empire, Kutuzov’s military talents are hard to deny. He was a shrewd diplomat and adroit courtier, who rarely spoke his mind openly and could skilfully manipulate people around him, causing Suvorov to observe: ‘Shrewd, he is very shrewd, no one can trick him.’ His was a subtle personality, which Sir Robert Wilson found ‘polished, courteous, shrewd as a Greek, naturally intelligent as an Asiatic and well-instructed as a European.’ Yet Kutuzov was also a sybarite, who valued power and honours, and the effects of this indulgent life were evident by 1812. The 65-year-old Kutuzov had grown stouter since Austerlitz, walked heavily, often out of breath, and had difficulty riding a horse, preferring his carriage. Although his rival Bennigsen claimed that Kutuzov had lost the habit of mental work, below that drowsy and absent-minded appearance was keen judgement, cunning and patience.

  While he was hailed by society, Kutuzov was not as universally welcomed in the Army. Alexander himself was not overly thrilled about his appointment and later conided to his aide-de-camp: ‘The public wanted Kutuzov to be appointed and I appointed him; as for me, I wash my hands of it.’ Many generals were also disenchanted by Kutuzov’s appointment. Bagration described him as a ‘swindler’, Rayevsky considered him a ‘mediocrity’, Miloradovich called him ‘a petite courtier’, while Dokhturov regarded him a ‘coward’. Still, the appointment of Kutuzov – an ethnic Russian of ancient noble family and considerable military reputation – silenced disgruntled officers.

  On the French side, Brandt recalled learning of the appointment of ‘old Kutuzov, nicknamed “the runaway of Austerlitz’’ by the French troops […] This change seemed to augur well for us …’

  Barclay de Tolly received his copy of the imperial decree regarding Kutuzov’s appointment on 27 August, as his army marched through Vyazma. He was certainly disappointed by the news, especially since the Tsar’s order was not accompanied by any personal note or message. Such casual treatment – even more than the decision itself – was particularly depressing for him. The timing was also unfortunate: for Kutuzov’s appointment came just as Barclay’s strategy was showing results and Napoleon’s superiority in numbers was significantly reduced. Nevertheless, he assured Alexander of his desire to prove his:

  eagerness to serve the country at any post or assignment […] Had I been motivated by blind an
d reckless ambition, Your Majesty would probably have received a number of reports of battles fought, and nevertheless the enemy would still be at the gates of Moscow without Russia retaining sufficient forces to resist him.

  Like many others, Colonel Benckendorff, one of the imperial Flügel Adjutants, would later praise Barclay de Tolly for his actions, noting that: ‘his great self-sacriice [in 1812] was a hundred times more deserving of praise than all the victories that later crowned him with laurels and brought him the title of prince and the rank of field marshal.’

  The Russian armies reached Tsarevo–Zaimische on 29 August 1812. The village may not have been a perfect defensive position, but it had several features to recommend it. Located at the edge of a plain with a virtually unobstructed view for miles around, it was dominated by gently rising ground, which provided the Russians with vantage points for observing enemy movements and for deploying their artillery batteries. Beyond the ridge the Smolensk–Moscow route stretched eastward across marshland and offered an unimpeded avenue of withdrawal in case of retreat. Barclay and Bagration agreed that this was one of the best defensive positions to be found between Smolensk and Moscow: so they immediately put the soldiers to work, building redoubts and other fortifications. The same day Kutuzov arrived at Gzhatsk, followed by an impressive suite of generals and aides-de-camp.

  Kutuzov’s actions on that day reveal his cunning. He, without a doubt, shared Barclay de Tolly’s belief in the necessity of retreat, but unlike him, he appreciated that popular opinion demanded the Army make a stand, ending the policy of incessant withdrawal. Kutuzov’s initial orders to attack were aimed at calming the rank-and-ile, addressing the common soldiers in their own simple language. The fact that he was Russian to the marrow of his bones, while Barclay de Tolly was of foreign extraction, made Kutuzov more acceptable to the troops in the moment of national crisis, when most foreigners were suspected of treason. In the words of Clausewitz: ‘Kutuzov […] knew Russians and how to handle them […] He could flatter the self-esteem of both populace and army, and sought by proclamation and religious observances to work on the public mind.’45

  Kutuzov did just the right things and said exactly what was needed to foster the impression that he was going to stand and fight. After climbing out of his carriage at Tsarevo–Zaimische he nodded approvingly at the sight of the honour guard drawn up to greet him and then muttered audibly: ‘How can one go on retreating with young lads like these?’46 The comment, repeated from mouth to mouth, was on everyone’s lips within hours. Meanwhile, knowing well what everyone expected of him, Kutuzov, shortly after his arrival, instructed a Cossack detachment to scout the woods some distance from the main road. Later, accompanied by a magnificent suite of generals and Staff officers, he set off down the road on a grand reconnaissance. When the party approached the woods Kutuzov pointed to the horsemen in the distance, asking: ‘Who can that be?’ No one was able to distinguish their uniforms and some suggested it was a French patrol. ‘No, they are Cossacks,’ Kutuzov assured them and calmly ordered some of his adjutants to investigate the identity of the horsemen. As they returned, conirming Kutuzov’s opinion, everyone was stunned by the old man’s sharp eyesight and confidence.

  Kutuzov made several changes at headquarters that had important consequences. He effectively ignored the regulations established within the official ‘Yellow Book’ adopted under Barclay de Tolly’s command. Kutuzov was well known for his preference for issuing oral instruction and avoiding official channels of correspondence, advising Yermolov: ‘My dear boy, you know that not everything can be written in reports so keep me informed via separate messages.’ Several persons soon emerged as the centres of power at headquarters and covetously guarded access to Kutuzov. Yermolov, a perceptive witness to this development, remarked:

  Age, serious wounds and [the] years of abuse [Kutuzov] endured significantly reduced his powers. His previous mannerisms, proven in numerous trials, were now replaced by timid caution. It was easy to gain his confidence with open flattery and it was as easy to lose his trust because of outside influence. His associates, having studied his character, could even direct his will. Because of this, many undertakings, either just starting or already in progress, were cancelled by new orders. Among his close associates were some with limited abilities who, through shrewdness and intrigues, managed to become indispensable and get appointments. There was constant intriguing [at headquarters]; intriguers rose quickly and their fall was hardly discernible.

  Colonel Toll was Kutuzov’s old-time favourite, having studied under Kutuzov’s direction as an adolescent: he now became the Commander-in-Chief’s right-hand man. Alexander Sherbinin, serving in the quartermaster service, noted that after Kutuzov’s appointment General Vistitsky, the Quartermaster of the 2nd Western Army, became the Quartermaster General of the united armies. However:

  the moral influence Colonel Toll wielded over officers was so strong that we all continued to gather around him while Vistitsky, a tall and lean old man, rode alone like the Commendatore in Don Juan. He finally ordered me angrily to remain with him and I initially followed his command but when he joined the suite surrounding Kutuzov, I immediately left him and joined my comrades.47

  Two other persons around Kutuzov were Nikolai Kudashev (Kutuzov’s son-in-law) and Paisii Kaisarov, both known for their tendency towards intrigues. Yermolov lamented the chaotic situation that quickly emerged at the headquarters:

  Following Kutuzov’s arrival I became aware of the tension he was creating with Barclay de Tolly, who was exasperated by the disorder in the Army, something which was now becoming incredibly widespread. Initially, the Prince’s orders were sent to the Chiefs of Staff, that is to me and Count Saint Priest, via Colonel Kaisarov, who served as duty officer to Kutuzov as well as through many other officers; frequently, they contradicted each other, which caused misunderstanding, confusion and unpleasant recriminations. Sometimes, the orders were delivered directly to the corps and local commanders, who carried them out and reported to the Army commanders only when their troops left camp or returned. [Toll and Kudashev] were also authorized to publicize orders personally on behalf of the commander-in-chief.

  Upon reaching the Army, Kutuzov inspected the position at Tsarevo–Zaimische and initially approved it, telling Barclay de Tolly and Bagration that it is ‘very advantageous and strong’. However, later that night, Kaisarov, Kudashev and Toll went to work on Kutuzov, appealing to his vanity by saying that he could not fight on ground selected by another general, especially when that general was Barclay de Tolly. Swayed by their arguments, Kutuzov rescinded his initial decision and ordered a withdrawal beyond Gzhatsk. ‘That unbearable drum woke us up at 3 o’clock in the night and we immediately marched on the road to Moscow,’ recalled Captain Pushin.

  1–4 September: Arrival at Borodino

  As the Russian Army left Tsarevo-Zaimische, the Russian generals examined several positions at which to fight a decisive battle. None of them proved acceptable, since, as Clausewitz noted:

  Russia is very poor in positions. Where the great morasses prevail, the country is so wooded that one has trouble to find room for a considerable number of troops. Where the forests are thinner, as between Smolensk and Moscow, the ground is level without any decided mountain ridges and without any deep hollows; the fields are without enclosures, therefore everywhere easy to be passed; the villages of woods and so ill adapted for defence […] There is therefore little choice of positions.

  Bagration reflected the frustration of many officers when he wrote to Rostopchin: ‘As usual we have yet to make a decision where and when to give a battle – we are still selecting places and are finding each new one to be worse than the previous.’48

  Kutuzov’s initial choice was the terrain near the Kolotsk Monastery, and on 2 September he wrote to the Governor of Moscow: ‘Even half an hour ago I could not tell anything speciic about the position for the anticipated decisive battle. Yet, after examining all locations before Mozhaisk, it se
ems that the position we currently occupy [near the Kolotsk Monastery] seems to be the best.’ Still, Kutuzov’s next message to Rostopchin reveals that his earlier letter was too optimistic: ‘the position, which was selected today, is very good but also too vast for our army and could expose one of the flanks.’49

  Discussing this initial Russian choice of battlefield, Yermolov noted that:

  Kutuzov intended to give battle near the Kolotsk Monastery. Fortifications were constructed there but the position was soon abandoned as it had some advantages but just as many laws. The right lank was placed on some vital heights, which dominated the surroundings along our entire line, but a failure to hold them would have complicated our retreat since a narrow valley lay behind them. Our rearguard was left there and another position was selected some 12 verstas [12.8km] further back near the village of Borodino located near the Moscow river.

  The Russian Army marched eastward in three columns: the right column consisting of Bagration’s army; the middle column of the III, V and VI Corps, under the command of Dokhturov; and the left column, of the II and the IV Corps, led by Miloradovich. Cavalry was left behind to support the rearguard while the artillery proceeded along the main road.50 On 3 September the official Journal of Military Operations recorded that: ‘the Army set up its camp near the village of Borodino.’