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  But Ellis had more. He transitioned to the incidents that had received the most attention of the house investigative committee: the flu vaccine and I-SaveRx audits and JCAR. The audits would “show that the Governor liked splashy ideas, big ideas, headlines,” Ellis said, “but when it came to implementing his policies, he consistently violated state law and federal law, often jeopardizing the safety of our citizens” (80).

  Finally, the house prosecutor addressed the rules governing the senate proceedings. The rules were modeled after the Clinton impeachment trial, he said, and, emphasizing the fairness of the rules, the presidential trial had resulted in an acquittal. Once again, employing the prestige of the law enforcement agencies involved in the governor’s arrest, he stressed that the governor’s own words would be verified by Special Agent Cain. Ellis closed by noting that there was one person who could “refute any charges that he was capable of refuting,” who had “absolute personal knowledge of all of the information contained in this complaint.” That was the governor, and the rules permitted him “to testify in his own defense.” The governor had “betrayed the public trust” and “violated his constitutional oath,” and thus “he should be removed from office” (81–82).

  Immediately after Ellis’s opening remarks, Chief Justice Thomas Fitzgerald spoke. Again, for the record, the chief justice intoned, “Is the Governor present? Is counsel present on behalf of the Governor?” His questions were met by silence. Fitzgerald then asked that the record reflect that the governor had “chosen not to make an opening statement” (82).

  The first witness for the house prosecutors was John Scully. Scully’s task was to verify the legitimacy of the wiretap, which was the foundation on which the impeachment was based. The house prosecutors made sure Scully’s background in the military and with law enforcement agencies was not lost on the senators; they passed out a copy of his “curriculum vitae” (86). Michael Kasper questioned Scully about his experience, the types of recordings, and the procedures necessary to obtain court permission. Then for the record, Fitzgerald asked if the governor or his counsel wished to cross-examine the witness. Again his inquiry was met with silence. After a short recess to formulate questions, only the Republicans chose to ask anything of Scully, with a few general questions concerning the particulars of wiretaps and the procedure necessary to obtain permission. The day was over. The purpose of Scully’s appearance had been to substantiate the legitimacy of the wiretap evidence, and there was no dispute from the senators.

  The Second Day

  Throughout the house investigative hearings, Ellis had relied on the criminal affidavit as the source of the major charges for impeachment and removal, referring to it when he opened the house hearings and as he gave his opening arguments before the senate. He had stressed the importance of the testimony of Special Agent Daniel Cain, someone who was a participant in the ongoing criminal investigation and who could attest that the contents of the affidavit were accurate. Although highly restricted by the US attorney, it would provide Ellis the opportunity to use the actual language of the affidavit, giving him the ability to paint graphic scenes that the senators could easily envision.

  Ellis, the ever-meticulous attorney, was ready. The night before and early that morning he had met with the other prosecuting attorneys to go over the affidavit, and they decided which remarks, corroborated by Cain, would confirm the prosecution’s claims. Before beginning the interrogation of his witness, Ellis introduced the senate to Assistant US Attorney Tom Walsh, who would sit next to Cain during his testimony. If the questions from Ellis or the senators were deemed beyond the scope of verifying the accuracy of what the affidavit contained, Walsh would instruct him not to answer.

  After the obligatory background questions to establish the credibility of the witness, Ellis read a paragraph from the affidavit that informed the senate of Cain’s knowledge of the criminal investigation. The investigation involved many government agencies, and Cain had worked with agents from those agencies. He had interviewed witnesses and analyzed reports, and he had been involved with the investigation for an extended period of time, long before the governor’s alleged wrongdoings were discovered by wiretapping.8 The paragraph also established that there had been ongoing investigations concerning Blagojevich and his confederates for several years.

  Ellis constructed his interrogation for the maximum effect on the senate. He moved through the affidavit by subject rather than chronologically. Lawyerly instincts indicated that the first subject discussed set the tenor for the entire presentation. The first topic needed to not only prove culpability but also ignite a sense of outrage over the governor’s actions. He began with Blagojevich’s attempt to obtain personal benefits from the appointment of a successor to the vacant US senate seat of president-elect Obama.

  For the record, but mainly for impact, Ellis emphasized the title of paragraph 86 of the affidavit: “Evidence Concerning Efforts to Obtain Personal Benefits for Rod Blagojevich in Return for His Appointment of a United States Senator.” He then summarized the paragraph, which said that through intercepted calls, evidence was obtained proving that Blagojevich had conspired with his chief of staff John Harris and others to attempt to receive some benefit for his wife and himself in exchange for Obama’s vacant senate seat. In particular, revealed through the weeks of wiretaps, Blagojevich considered a range of options. He started high, contemplating a cabinet position or an ambassadorship, but as time went by, he became frustrated and his proposals became driven by monetary concerns. The governor “focused on an effort to obtain campaign contributions, up front, in consideration of an appointment” (159; para. 86).9 Blagojevich also considered using the president’s assistance to create positions within the private sector or to help place his wife on paid corporate boards. Finally, he kept open the option of filling the vacant senate seat himself. Through a series of convoluted schemes and options, with several possible choices identified in the affidavit as Senate Candidates 1 through 5, he continued to discuss the possibilities of personal monetary gain with his advisors. At the end of this and every other section Ellis read from the quoted affidavit, he asked Cain to validate the truth of his statements. Cain answered in the affirmative each time.

  Many of the schemes recorded by the wiretaps seemed farcical. Initially, the governor proposed trading the appointment of a candidate—identified in the affidavit as Senate Candidate 1, believed to be Valerie Jarrett, the candidate supported by Barack Obama—for Blagojevich’s appointment as secretary of health and human services. He also considered being appointed as an ambassador, but he quickly realized that the negative publicity surrounding the recent convictions of several key advisors, his nonattendance to governance, and his relationship with the legislature prohibited Obama from ever considering a direct appointment. Blagojevich then considered asking President-elect Obama to arrange for a position with a union organization called Change to Win or to persuade his wealthy supporters—including Warren Buffett—to donate millions of dollars to a start-up political action and lobbying organization. Blagojevich thought he could head the new organization and also remain politically active. On several occasions he discussed experiencing financial stress and stated that he needed to make money, even suggesting the amounts necessary. Placing his wife in paid positions on corporate boards was another possibility that he raised. Blagojevich also considered appointing himself to the senate seat (143–94; paras. 86–116).

  Ellis continued to summarize and quote from the intercepted conversations revealed in the affidavit. From the day of Obama’s election to the day he was arrested, Blagojevich and his advisors plotted to receive something of personal value for appointing the US senator. The summaries and the quotes from the affidavit clearly revealed a governor weighing various possibilities to barter the senate seat. The governor repeatedly stated that he would not give up the senate seat and receive nothing in return. To reinforce and highlight the governor’s words, Ellis exhibited them on large display cards before the sena
te. As he moved through the paragraphs of the affidavit, staff attorney Cindy Grant changed the cards.

  The prosecutor referred to a conversation that took place on November 3, 2008, between the governor and a person identified in the affidavit as Advisor A. Blagojevich stated that he wanted something in return for the senate appointment: “Unless I get something real good for Senate Candidate 1, [expletive deleted in the transcript], I’ll just send myself. You know what I’m saying?” Later the governor remarked that the senate seat “is a F-ing valuable thing. You don’t just give it away for nothing” (161; para. 90).

  Throughout early November 2008, in a series of phone calls and conversations, the governor continued to explore various options to gain something of value. The excerpts extracted from the supporting affidavit starkly revealed the governor’s motivation. On November 3 Blagojevich spoke to his deputy governor, identified as Deputy Governor A, regarding Obama’s assumed choice for the vacant senate seat: “If they’re not going to offer anything of any value, then I just might take it” (160; para. 89). Two days later Blagojevich was recorded speaking to Doug Scofield, identified in the recorded conversations as Advisor A.10 The governor pronounced what became the signature statement of the impeachment: “I’ve got this thing, and it’s F-ing golden, and uh, uh, I’m just not giving it up for F-ing nothing. I’m not going to do it. And—and I can always use it. I can parachute me there” (166–67; para. 96).

  On November 7 the governor and John Harris discussed the option of having Obama intervene with the Service Employees International Union and the union-affiliated organization Change to Win as compensation for getting his choice for the senate. Harris insisted that a three-way deal would give Obama a “buffer so there is no obvious quid pro quo” and cautioned him to be careful and not make it look like “some sort of selfish grab.” Blagojevich said that he was “financially hurting,” and Harris responded that the governor’s staff was considering what would help the governor’s “financial security.” The governor responded, “I want to make money” (168–70; para. 99).

  Ellis summarized a conference call placed on November 10, which lasted almost two hours, involving the governor; his wife, Patti; chief of staff John Harris; the governor’s general counsel; and several Washington, DC, based advisors. The participants came on and off the call, and they again discussed the many options open to the governor. The governor talked about the possibilities of making money and potentially “participating in the political arena again.” He kept returning to the possibility of his wife being placed on corporate boards, and once again Blagojevich expressed how he was “struggling financially—struggling.” Patti Blagojevich claimed that she was qualified to serve on corporate boards because she had a background in real estate and appraisals. Blagojevich’s consultants told him to “suck it up for two years and do nothing and give this [expletive deleted], referring to the President-Elect, his senator.” The governor responded, “F him. For nothing? F him.” Blagojevich went on to state that he would appoint Senate Candidate 4, believed to be a deputy governor of the state of Illinois, before he appointed Senate Candidate 1 to the “F-ing Senate seat and I don’t get anything.” And once again the call participants discussed the possibilities of going to Change to Win and making a three-way deal (173–76).

  Finally, Ellis read paragraph 116 of the affidavit, summarizing Blagojevich’s motives and the viability of appointing himself to the senate seat. He was frustrated with being “stuck” as governor, and appointing himself to the US Senate was a viable option. He was aware of the possibility of indictment and impeachment, and if this occurred, Blagojevich supposed he could “obtain greater resources” to defend himself as a sitting senator than as a governor. The senate also would allow him to remake his personal image, with an eye toward running for president in 2016. If he decided to leave public office, he mused, the corporate contacts he could make as a senator would prove valuable to securing future positions and would assist in generating speaking fees. And being a member of the US Senate would also facilitate his wife’s employment as a lobbyist. Cognizant of his present relationship with the Illinois legislature, he thought that by taking the senate seat, he could avoid impeachment.

  The senate audience sat stunned as they listened to these words from the recorded conversations. The audacity and hubris expressed by the governor seemed incredible. The governor’s schemes bordered on absurdity, but the conversations laid bare the dealings and priorities of Rod Blagojevich. The discourse went beyond politics. Everyone knew that the US Senate appointment would be made with political considerations. No one expected the governor to appoint someone who would not be advantageous to him, but the scheming and devious scenarios discussed among the governor and his aides and advisors shocked and embarrassed the audience of seasoned politicians. Few in the senate galleries had read the criminal complaint or the attached affidavit. Most of the senators had been aware of the charges but not the dialogue or language in the conversations recorded by the FBI wiretaps. Politics can be harsh, niceties are sometimes abandoned, and the words used by the participants are often direct, but the governor’s base and vulgar language was inappropriate and made the listeners feel uncomfortable and awkward. His foul language notwithstanding, the governor’s motives were clear. The prosecutor had scored with his first charge.

  Ellis moved to another subject: the governor’s attempt to coerce the Tribune Company into firing members of the editorial board of the Chicago Tribune in exchange for financial assistance from the Illinois Finance Authority (IFA). Funds from the IFA, Blagojevich was informed, could be distributed at the governor’s discretion without intervention from the legislature. The criminal complaint alleged that the governor and John Harris attempted to “corruptly use the power and influence of the Office of the Governor to cause the firing of the Chicago Tribune editorial board members as a condition of State of Illinois financial assistance” (198–200; para. 71).

  The wiretaps revealed that the governor instructed John Harris to inform the Tribune owner, through an individual identified in the affidavit as the Tribune Financial Advisor, that assistance from the IFA would not be forthcoming unless members of the Tribune’s editorial board were fired. Blagojevich believed that the Tribune was “driving” the notion of impeachment (201; para. 72). The newspaper had been critical of Blagojevich for bypassing the legislature to achieve what he wanted, and the governor mentioned the irony of bypassing the legislature to grant IFA funds to help the Tribune Company.

  Reading from the affidavit, Ellis painted a graphic image of the developing plot. On November 3 the governor was recorded speaking at length to an individual, identified as Deputy Governor A, about the Chicago Tribune’s endorsement of Speaker Michael Madigan and an editorial calling for an impeachment investigation. The governor’s wife, Patti, could be heard in the background, shouting to Blagojevich to tell the deputy governor to “hold up that F-ing Cubs, blank. Blank them.” Later in the conversation the governor’s wife spoke directly to Deputy Governor A and explained that the Tribune owner could “just fire the writers because [the] Tribune Owner owns the Tribune” (202–3; para. 73). As the discussion progressed, the governor told Deputy Governor A to put together the articles that called for removing Blagojevich and John Harris would approach the Tribune Company. “We’ve got some decisions to make now.” Musing, he followed with “Someone should say, Get rid of those people.” Blagojevich was becoming frustrated, his thoughts running together. “Someone’s got to go to [the] Tribune Owner. We want to see them. It’s a political F-ing operation in there” (203–4; para. 74). Recordings from later that evening had Blagojevich speaking to Lon Monk about his scheme to pressure the Tribune owner to fire members of the newspaper’s editorial board.

  The next day Blagojevich told John Harris to explain to the Tribune financial advisor, its owner, and the Cubs chairman that the Tribune was writing editorials criticizing the governor for taking actions like those the owner wanted to take concerning the C
ubs and the IFA. Because of the past impeachment investigation editorials, he said, “We don’t know if we can take a chance and do this IFA deal now. I don’t want to give them grounds to impeach me.” Slipping back into his usual vulgar vernacular, Blagojevich told Harris that the recommendation was to “fire all those F-ing people, get them the ‘F’ out of there and get us some editorial support” (208; para. 76). On November 5 Blagojevich conducted a conference call with Harris, Scofield, and an individual identified in the affidavit as a press spokesman. He instructed Harris to call someone at the Tribune Company and “lay a foundation with them.” Harris said he would call the financial advisor. Blagojevich told Harris to say that “this is a serious thing now . . . and that the only way around it is around the legislature and that the Tribune is trumping up impeachment discussions because I do this stuff to get things done.” He directed Harris to tell the financial advisor, “Everything is lined up, but before we go to the next level, we need to have a discussion about what you guys are going to do about that newspaper” (209–10; para. 77).

  The following day Harris confirmed to the governor that he had talked with the financial advisor about the problem of going forward with the Cubs IFA assistance with the current Tribune editorial board in place. The financial advisor was aware of the delicacy of the issue and would discuss it with the Tribune owner, Harris reported. Blagojevich was concerned about whether the financial advisor had gotten the message that editorial board members had to be fired. Harris responded, “Oh, yeah, he got it loud and clear” (212; para. 78). However, the Tribune Company failed to act on Blagojevich’s recommendations. Blagojevich and Harris continued discussions about the company throughout November, and the governor repeatedly restated his desire to remove members of the editorial board in exchange for assistance from the IFA, but nothing changed at the Chicago Tribune.