Daoist Identity Read online

  DAOIST IDENTITY

  History, Lineage, and Ritual

  Edited by Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth

  Daoist Identity

  DAOIST

  IDENTITY

  History, Lineage, and Ritual

  Edited by Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth

  University of Hawai‘i Press

  Honolulu

  © 2002 University of Hawai‘i Press

  All rights reserved

  Printed in the United States of America

  02 03 04 05 06 07

  6 5 4 3 2 1

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Daoist identity : history, lineage, and ritual / edited by Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth.

  p.

  cm.

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  ISBN 0–8248–2429–6 (cloth : alk. paper)—

  ISBN 0–8248–2504–7 (pbk : alk. paper)

  1. Tao.

  I. Kohn, Livia

  II. Roth, Harold David.

  B127.T3 D36

  2002

  181'.114—dc21

  2001053064

  University of Hawai‘i Press books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources

  Designed by Kenneth Miyamoto

  Printed by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group

  Dedicated to

  Michel Strickmann

  Contents

  Acknowledgments

  ix

  Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth

  Introduction 1

  Part I Early Formations

  1. Terry F. Kleeman

  Ethnic Identity and Daoist

  Identity in Traditional China

  23

  2. Tsuchiya Masaaki

  Confession of Sins and Awareness

  of Self in the Taiping jing

  39

  3. Peter Nickerson

  “Opening the Way”: Exorcism,

  Travel, and Soteriology in Early

  Daoist Mortuary Practice and Its

  Antecedents

  58

  Part II Texts and Symbols

  4. Mark Csikszentmihàlyi

  Traditional Taxonomies

  and Revealed Texts in the Han

  81

  5. Suzanne Cahill

  Material Culture and the Dao:

  Textiles, Boats, and Zithers in the

  Poetry of Yu Xuanji (844–868)

  102

  6. Mabuchi Masaya

  A Mid-Ming Reappraisal of the

  Laozi: The Case of Wang Dao

  127

  vii

  viii

  Contents

  Part III Lineages and Local Culture

  7. Edward L. Davis

  Arms and the Dao, 2: The Xu

  Brothers in Tea Country

  149

  8. Mori Yuria

  Identity and Lineage: The Taiyi

  jinhua zongzhi and the Spirit-Writing

  Cult to Patriarch Lü in Qing China

  165

  9. Shiga Ichiko

  Manifestations of Lüzu in Modern

  Guangdong and Hong Kong: The

  Rise and Growth of Spirit-Writing

  Cults 185

  Part IV Ritual Boundaries

  10. Charles D. Orzech

  Fang Yankou and Pudu: Translation,

  Metaphor, and Religious Identity

  213

  11. Mitamura Keiko

  Daoist Hand Signs and Buddhist

  Mudras

  235

  12. Maruyama Hiroshi

  Documents Used in Rituals of Merit

  in Taiwanese Daoism

  256

  13. Asano Haruji

  Offerings in Daoist Ritual

  274

  Glossary

  295

  Names of Authors Cited

  309

  List of Contributors

  311

  Index

  315

  Acknowledgments

  This volume is the result of a three-day conference, held at the Breckinridge Conference Center of Bowdoin College in York, Maine, May 29–June 1, 1998. Twenty scholars from Japan and the United States—

  all specialists of various aspects of Daoism— met to discuss the difficult and heretofore unexplored question of Daoist identity. The Japanese scholars who attended the conference were part of a study group from the Tokyo area known as the Dokyo bunka kenkyu kai, or Society for the Study of Daoist Culture. The group had also sponsored a first international meeting in 1995, which resulted in the publication of the conference volume, Dokyo no rekishi to bunka (The History and Culture of Religious Taoism), edited by Yamada Toshiaki and Tanaka Fumio (Tokyo: Hirakawa, 1998). While the first meeting discussed various issues in the history and worldview of Daoism, the Breckinridge meeting looked specifically at the question of Daoist identity from a number of perspectives.

  Both the book and the conference would not have been possible without the active and cheerful cooperation of many people. First, there are the participants, both paper presenters and discussants, whose research, engagement, and efforts are at the very root of the work. We would like to extend our hearfelt gratitude to them all, and especially to our Japanese organizers, Yamada Toshiaki and Tanaka Fumio, as well as our American discussants, Stephen R. Bokenkamp, Russell Kirkland, and Benjamin Penny, for being such wonderful col-leagues and creating such an engaging discussion.

  As for organizing the meeting, we owe a great debt of gratitude to American Council of Learned Societies, whose generous financial support made this most memorable experience possible. The unbureau-ix

  x

  Acknowledgments

  cratic and friendly cooperation of Jason Parker was, especially, a pleasure to experience, and we are most happy to thank him. Also of great help was the Office of Sponsored Programs at Boston University, especially David Berndt and Phyllis Cohen. Their work made administering the grant easy and allowed timely payments to all concerned parties. Moreover, Gail Berneike made our stay at the Breckinridge Center comfortable and delightful, going to no end of trouble to keep us all pleasantly housed, fed, and entertained. Our only problem was the shortness of the stay, but we all have taken wonderful memories home with us.

  During the conference, we greatly relied on the help of two graduate students, James Miller (Boston University) and Zhonghu Yan (Brown University), who set up the conference room, ran the tape recorders, and kept us all well watered during the discussions. They also contributed valiantly to the publication effort, Zhonghu by translating the chapter by Asano, and James by creating a set of typed tran-scripts of the discussions—more intelligent and, certainly, more in-telligible than they seemed at the time. Another graduate student, Louis Komjathy (Boston University), moreover, helped greatly with the editing process, converting files, entering changes and characters into the computer, and pointing out errors and technical problems. The efforts of these three on our behalf were invaluable, and we are most pleased to thank them now.

  Introduction

  Livia Kohn and Harold D. Roth

  Identity

  The concept of identity is vague and diffuse. The word, originally related to the Latin idem, indicates sameness and lack of change or deviation and is, indeed, still used in this sense, most commonly in its adjectival form, “identical.” The Latin word identitas, on the other hand, comes closer to our general sense of the term, indicating “the way in which the substantia of an entity remains the same despite all the changes undergone by its accidentes” (Van der Ven 1994, 28). In other words, at the most elementary level, identity is the continuity of an inhe
rent substance or solidity, however perceived, that lasts through all the various transformations its carrier might undergo.

  In Western thought, the concept of identity has developed through three major phases of definition and usage. It was first used by rational thinkers from the Enlightenment to the nineteenth century, then developed in great intricacy by psychologists in the twentieth century. In the last few decades, it has become the focus of scholars of theology and religion. Rational thinkers such as Locke, Leibniz, Kant, and Kierkegaard saw identity as mainly a function of consciousness, a personal sense of reflection and self-awareness created actively by the thinking, rational ego. “Only that of which we were conscious belonged to our identical self” (Mol 1976, 56); the term referred to a taken-for-granted continuity in the way people think of and evaluate themselves.

  Psychologists such as William James, Sigmund Freud, and Erik Erikson took on the concept next and expanded its application to the emotional dimension of humanity, defining identity as a personal sense of sameness that “arises from the resemblance and continuity of our feel-1

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  L. Kohn and H. D. Roth

  ings” ( James 1890, 1:459) and that is intricately tied up with our internal drives and sexuality. Erikson, in particular, made identity the cornerstone of his psychological theory, defining it as “a persistent sameness within oneself” while also sharing one’s “essential character” with others (Mol 1976, 57). This represents a first foray into defining identity not merely on the basis of the individual but also as a function of social groups and larger communities. Erikson enhanced this view in studies of the Sioux, through which he found that identity among what he termed primitive societies was less the “unconscious striving for continuity of personal character” (Erikson 1960, 51) than a reser-voir of collective integrity that placed and protected the individual.

  He then came to distinguish true identity from synthetic identity—a pervasive sense of wholeness based on a sound mutuality between individual and group versus an overwhelming feeling of totality created by an arbitrary delineation of self and others (Erikson 1964, 92; Mol 1976, 57). He focused strongly on the concept of boundaries in identity formation, insisting that every sense of identity is closely tied up with both its inner delimitations and its surrounding structures, and pointing out that despite the desired sense of sameness and continuity, boundaries of identity must remain flexible and open to change.

  Whereas true identity has this flexibility, synthetic identity is rigid and unmovable, leading to tensions and personality disorders. While one major danger to identity, then, is this inner rigidity, which he calls

  “identity-foreclosure,” the opposite is also problematic: identity diffusion, where boundaries are kept too open and fluid and the sense of sameness is lost (Mol 1976, 58). One can also describe the two problem areas as an overemphasis on the ego, on the one hand, and an excessive other-directedness, on the other. Identity, as it evolves from the work of Erikson, is, therefore, seen as the continuous balancing of a sense of self between the demands of the individual versus those of society, between an attitude of inner openness and self-centered rigidity.

  Developing the work of Erikson, the theologian and anthropologist Hans Mol has created an even more complex understanding of identity, relating it actively to systems of belief and religious practice.

  He begins by defining identity generally as a “stable niche in the whole complex of physiology, psychology, and social patterns of interaction”

  that is characterized by a continuous regularity of worldview, emotional reactions, and patterns of behavior (Mol 1976, 8). It evolved historically even among early humanity as a means of survival, of “man’s evolutionary necessity to cope successfully with his environment” (Mol

  Introduction

  3

  1976, 31), and can be described as a balancing of two opposite forces or tendencies: differentiation and integration. Differentiation means the development of new, increasingly complex, and forever changing conditions; left unchecked or not properly adapted to, it leads to het-erogeneity, incoherence, and an overall sense of meaninglessness in the person or group (Mol 1976, 28). Integration means the establishment of a stable, strong, organized system with clear boundaries and a firm set of responses; it leads to a sense of belonging and wholeness (Mol 1976, 32, 35); but if left without challenge, integration can result in personal or social rigidity and become an obstacle to successful adaptation.

  The key point of identity for Mol, therefore, is the creation of a stable system both within the self, as a sense of wholeness, and in society, as a mode of fruitful interaction. Identity is not so much a given, whether rational or emotional, but a process—it has moved far away from its original Latin definition as substantia and grown into an ongoing activity that we all engage in all the time. Outlining this identity as process in more detail, Mol describes it with the term sacralization. Sacralization is “a process by means of which on the level of symbol-systems certain patterns acquire the same taken-for-granted, stable, eternal quality which on the level of instinctive behavior was acquired by the consolidation and stabilization of new genetic materials” (1976, 5). In other words, to create a sense of identity, people make the choice to elevate certain patterns to sacred status, that is, place them in the position of being unchanging and eternally valid.

  Developing thereby “a system of meaning, or a definition of reality that modifies, obstructs or (if necessary) legitimates change” (1976, 6), they find feelings of belonging, of rightness, and of wholeness in their world.

  The patterns, moreover, that are being selected to serve as the mainstays of the identity process tend to involve rational, emotional, and behavioral components and can be divided into several distinct groups.

  Mol distinguishes four: a conscious creation of order in a set of beliefs, which he describes as “objectivation”; an emotional attachment to ideas, people, or groups that creates a sense of belonging, which he calls “commitment”; a concrete and practical choice of certain key sets of formal behavior, described as “ritual”; and the reinforcement of the overall worldview and people’s actions through tales and stories, which he calls “myths.”1

  Objectivation, to begin, is the “tendency to sum up the variegated elements of mundane experience in a transcendent frame of reference

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  L. Kohn and H. D. Roth

  where they can appear in a more orderly, more consistent, and more timeless way” (1976, 206). It is the creation of meaning and order through a set of beliefs and in a specific interpretation of reality. Meaning, in this context, indicates a set of taken-for-granted interpretations and a choice of ultimate reference points that answer the “why” of existence and drive out feelings of meaninglessness and loss (1976, 69).

  To create meaning, symbol systems are developed that help people ma-nipulate their environment and find a sense of security and competence in it. The systems involve values, criteria of validity, patterns of logic, and a distinct perspective on the world in addition to a set of substantive beliefs, rules, and prohibitions and a specific understanding of technology (Hardin and Kehrer 1978, 84–85). The notion of objectivation, moreover, follows Berger and Luckmann and their understanding of the sociology of knowledge (1967), which postulates that human beings, in order to survive, need to create meaning in themselves and their environment and that “there is no such thing as uninterpreted reality” (Mol 1976, 68). Choosing specific concepts and beliefs to create meaning and wholeness, people also develop a pre-disposition toward new social forms. For example, by placing themselves in a religious community that focuses predominantly on a transcendent world or deity, they see themselves as outside the established society and become able to overcome this society’s restrictions and limitations. The creation of new social forms, in which women are equal or people from different ethnic backgrounds are actively integrated, can often be related to the choice of certain new and transcendent beliefs over traditional patterns
(Mol 1983, 29).

  Commitment, next, is defined as the “focused emotion or emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity. It is an anchoring of the emotions in a salient system of meaning—social, group, or personal, whether abstract or concrete” (Mol 1976, 216). By channeling major feelings, even passions, toward a specific idea, deity, or person, commitment affords the individual a higher level of integration and creates a sense of emotional consistency and predictability. It enhances the definiteness of who one is and dictates one’s choices of behavior and role in the world, and these, in turn, provide a yet greater sense of continuity and stability. Commitment becomes most obvious in cases of conversion, when people leave one set of emotional support behind and turn to something new. Moving from meaninglessness to meaning, from alienation to integration, from anomie to order (Mol 1976, 67), they become devout and dedicated followers of their new focus—

  Introduction

  5

  often a charismatic leader—and change their identity in the process.

  Commitment is often characterized by feelings of awe and reverence, commonly called “faith,” and is very evident in the willingness to sacrifice objects of value or even oneself for the cause, group, or belief (Mol 1976, 227). Commitment, while necessary to create a sense of personal stability, can also become extreme and lead to the complete surrender of the person and to the establishment of cults. The example Mol cites is the People’s Temple in Jonestown (1983, 32).

  Here, as in other cases of intense commitment, the focus was a person who represented an ideal rather than an abstract sense of belief or value; intentional segregation of members was used to enhance and empower group identity.2

  Ritual, the sacralization of behavior, is the third method by which identity is created. It is described as repetitive, emotion-evoking action, a systematic and patterned focus of behavior that reinforces social cohesion and personal integration (Mol 1976, 13). Rites, more specifically, are a “means of articulating and reiterating a system of meaning.

  They act out and sacralize sameness. They restore, reinforce, or redi-rect identity. They maximize order by strengthening the place of the individual in the group or society, and vice versa by strengthening the bond of a society vis-à-vis the individual. They unify, integrate, and sacralize” (Mol 1976, 233). The repetitive action of the rites reinforce and validate both personal identity and the social structure, also affording a “recommitment to memory of a system of meaning” and thus strengthening commitment and belief (Sinha 1978, 141). Anxieties on various levels are mitigated, whether created by social restraints, collective guilt, or personal conscience. The sameness and predictability of the rites, then, serve to integrate the identity of the participants and support the customs and habits of the group. Yet rites also allow the articulation of aggressive and destructive actions, thereby controlling and curbing them; they reinforce the boundaries of group and personal identity. Special rites, moreover, enhance the community while providing different focal points of identity, so that rites of passage bridge major changes in the status of community members (e.g., initiations, weddings) and restore community and personal identity after a major disruption (e.g., funerals) (Mol 1976, 238).