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  It might, indeed, very well seem that the same sort of thing does occur in the case of contraries said with combination, ‘Socrates is well’ being contrary to ‘Socrates is sick’. Yet not even with these is it necessary always for one to be true [15] and the other false. For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does not both will be false; neither ‘Socrates is sick’ nor ‘Socrates is well’ will be true if Socrates himself does not exist at all. As for possession and privation, if he does [20] not exist at all neither is true, while not always one or the other is true if he does. For ‘Socrates has sight’ is opposed to ‘Socrates is blind’ as possession to privation; and if he exists it is not necessary for one or the other to be true or false (since until the time when it is natural for him to have it both are false), while if Socrates does not [25] exist at all then again both are false, both ‘he has sight’ and ‘he is blind’. But with an affirmation and negation one will always be false and the other true whether he exists or not. For take ‘Socrates is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: if he exists it is [30] clear that one or the other of them will be true or false, and equally if he does not; for if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’ true. Thus it would be distinctive of these alone—opposed affirmations and negations—that always one or [35] the other of them is true or false.

  11 · What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad; this is clear by induction from cases—health and sickness, justice and injustice, courage and [14a1] cowardice, and so on with the rest. But what is contrary to a bad thing is sometimes good but sometimes bad. For excess is contrary to deficiency, which is bad, and is itself bad; yet moderation as well is contrary to both, and it is good. However, though this sort of thing may be seen in a few cases, in most cases what is contrary [5] to a bad thing is always a good.

  With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to exist too. For if everyone were well health would exist but not sickness, and if everything were white whiteness would exist but not blackness. Further, if Socrates’s being well is contrary [10] to Socrates’s being sick, and it is not possible for both to hold at the same time of the same person, it would not be possible if one of the contraries existed for the other to exist too; if Socrates’s being well existed Socrates’s being sick would not.

  It is clearly the nature of contraries to belong to the same thing (the same [15] either in species or in genus)—sickness and health in an animal’s body, but whiteness and blackness in a body simply, and justice and injustice in a soul.

  All contraries must either be in the same genus or in contrary genera, or be [20] themselves genera. For white and black are in the same genus (since colour is their genus), but justice and injustice are in contrary genera (since the genus of one is virtue, of the other vice), while good and bad are not in a genus but are themselves [25] actually genera of certain things.

  12 · One thing is called prior to another in four ways. First and most strictly, in respect of time, as when one thing is called older or more ancient than another; for it is because the time is longer that it is called either older or more ancient. [30] Secondly, what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence. For example, one is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one whereas if there is one there are not necessarily two, so that the implication of the other’s existence does not hold reciprocally from one; and that from which the implication [35] of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior. Thirdly, a thing is called prior in respect of some order, as with sciences and speeches. For in the demonstrative sciences there is a prior and posterior in order, for the elements are [14b1] prior in order to the constructions (and in grammar the elements are prior to the syllables); likewise with speeches, for the introduction is prior in order to the exposition. Further, besides the ways mentioned, what is better and more valued is [5] thought to be prior by nature: ordinary people commonly say of those they specially value and love that they ‘have priority’. This fourth way is perhaps the least proper.

  There are, then, this many ways of speaking of the prior. There would seem, [10] however, to be another manner of priority besides those mentioned. For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other’s existence might reasonably be called prior by nature. And that there are some such cases is clear. For there being a man reciprocates as to implication of [15] existence with the true statement about it: if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and reciprocally—since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true statement is [20] in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true: it is because the actual thing exists or does not that the statement is called true or false. Thus there are five ways in which one thing might be called prior to another.

  13 · Those things are called simultaneous without qualification and most [25] strictly which come into being at the same time; for neither is prior or posterior. These are called simultaneous in respect of time. But those things are called simultaneous by nature which reciprocate as to implication of existence, provided that neither is in any way the cause of the other’s existence, e.g. the double and the [30] half. These reciprocate, since if there is a double there is a half and if there is a half there is a double, but neither is the cause of the other’s existence. Also, co-ordinate species of the same genus are called simultaneous by nature. It is those resulting from the same division that are called co-ordinate, e.g. bird and beast and fish. For [35] these are of the same genus and co-ordinate, since animal is divided into these—into bird and beast and fish. And none of them is prior or posterior, but things of this kind are thought to be simultaneous by nature. (Each of these might itself be [15a1] further divided into species—I mean beast and bird and fish). So those things resulting from the same division of the same genus will also be simultaneous by nature. Genera, however, are always prior to species since they do not reciprocate as [5] to implication of existence; e.g. if there is a fish there is an animal, but if there is an animal there is not necessarily a fish. Thus we call simultaneous by nature those things which reciprocate as to implication of existence provided that neither is in any way the cause of the other’s existence; and also co-ordinate species of the same [10] genus. And we call simultaneous without qualification things which come into being at the same time.

  14 · There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. That the rest are distinct from one another [15] is obvious (for generation is not destruction, nor yet is increase or diminution,6 nor is change of place; and similarly with the others too), but there is a question about alteration—whether it is not perhaps necessary for what is altering to be altering in virtue of one of the other changes. However, this is not true. For in pretty well all the [20] affections, or most of them, we undergo alteration without partaking of any of the other changes. For what changes as to an affection does not necessarily increase or diminish—and likewise with the others. Thus alteration would be distinct from the [25] other changes. For if it were the same, a thing altering would, as such, have to be increasing too or diminishing, or one of the other changes would have to follow; but this is not necessary. Equally, a thing increasing—or undergoing some other change—would have to be altering. But there are things that increase without altering, as a square is increased by the addition of a gnomon but is not thereby [30] altered; similarly, too, with other such cases. Hence the changes are distinct from one another.

  Change in general is contrary to staying the same. As for the particular kinds, [15b1] destruction is contrary to generation and diminution to increase, while change of place seems most opposed to staying in the same place—and perhaps to change towards the contrary place (upward change of place, for example, being opposed to [5] downward
and downward to upward). As for the other change in our list, it is not easy to state what is contrary to it. There seems to be nothing contrary, unless here too one were to oppose staying the same in qualification or change towards the contrary qualification (just as with change of place we had staying in the same [10] place or change towards the contrary place). For alteration is change in qualification. Thus to change in qualification is opposed staying the same in qualification or change towards the contrary qualification (becoming white, for example, being [15] opposed to becoming black). For a thing alters through the occurrence of change towards contrary qualifications.

  15 · Having is spoken of in a number of ways: having as a state and condition or some other quality (we are said to have knowledge and virtue); or as a [20] quantity, like the height someone may have (he is said to have a height of five feet or six feet); or as things on the body, like a cloak or tunic; or as on a part, like a ring on a hand; or as a part, like a hand or foot; or as in a container, as with the measure of [25] wheat or the jar of wine (for the jar is said to have wine, and the measure wheat, so these are said to have as in a container); or as a possession (for we are said to have a house and a field). One is also said to have a wife, and a wife a husband, but this seems to be a very strange way of ‘having’, since by ‘having a wife’ we signify [30] nothing other than that he is married to her. Some further ways of having might perhaps come to light, but we have made a pretty complete enumeration of those commonly spoken of.

  **TEXT: L. Minio-Paluello, OCT, Oxford, 1956, 2nd ed.

  1Read τῶν ʶ τέρων γενῶν.

  2The Oxford text continues: ‘For all the other things are either said of these as subjects or in them as subjects; so that if the primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.’ Most scholars excise those sentences.

  3The function performed in English by “of” and “by” is performed in Greek by the genitive and dative cases, which have different endings.

  4Read oὐκ ἡἀναγκαῖόνά ἐστιν εἰδέναι. The received text says: ‘. . . it is not possible to know definitely.’

  5Aristotle’s discussion of the categories ends here, in an unfinished state: the following passage in square brackets was added by an ancient editor in order to link Chapters 1–9 to Chapters 10–14.

  6Read ‴ αὔξησις ἡἢά μείωσις.

  DE INTERPRETATIONE**

  J. L. Ackrill

  1 · First we must settle what a name is and what a verb is, and then what a [16a1] negation, an affirmation, a statement and a sentence1 are.

  Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, [5] neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul2 and do not belong to the present subject.

  Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are [10] necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation. Thus names and verbs by themselves—for instance ‘man’ or ‘white’ when nothing further is added—are like the thoughts that [15] are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false. A sign of this is that even ‘goat-stag’ signifies something but not, as yet, anything true or false—unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added (either simply or with reference to time).

  2 · A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without time, none of whose parts is significant in separation. For in ‘Whitfield’ the ‘field’ does not [20] signify anything in its own right, as it does in the phrase ‘white field’. Not that it is the same with complex names as with simple ones: in the latter the part is in no way significant, in the former it has some force but is not significant of anything in [25] separation, for example the ‘boat’ in ‘pirate-boat’.

  I say ‘by convention’ because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name.

  ‘Not man’ is not a name, nor is there any correct name for it. It is neither a [30] phrase nor a negation. Let us call it an indefinite name.

  ‘Philo’s’, ‘to-Philo’, and the like are not names but inflexions of names. The [16b1] same account holds for them as for names except that an inflexion when combined with ‘is’, ‘was’, or ‘will be’ is not true or false whereas a name always is. Take, for example, ‘Philo’s is’ or ‘Philo’s is not’; so far there is nothing either true or false. [5]

  3 · A verb is what additionally signifies time, no part of it being significant separately; and it is a sign of things said of something else.

  It additionally signifies time: ‘recovery’ is a name, but ‘recovers’ is a verb, because it additionally signifies something’s holding now. And it is always a sign of [10] what holds, that is, holds of a subject.

  ‘Does not recover’ and ‘does not ail’ I do not call verbs. For though they additionally signify time and always hold of something, yet there is a difference—for which there is no name. Let us call them indefinite verbs, because they hold [15] indifferently of anything whether existent or non-existent. Similarly, ‘recovered’ and ‘will-recover’ are not verbs but inflexions of verbs. They differ from the verb in that it additionally signifies the present time, they the time outside the present.

  When uttered just by itself a verb is a name and signifies something—the [20] speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses—but it does not yet signify whether it is or not. For not even3 ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply ‘that which is’); for by itself it is nothing, but it additionally [25] signifies some combination, which cannot be thought of without the components.

  4 · A sentence is a significant spoken sound some part of which is significant in separation—as an expression, not as an affirmation.

  I mean that animal, for instance, signifies something, but not that it is or is not [30] (though it will be an affirmation or negation if something is added); the single syllables of ‘animal’, on the other hand, signify nothing. Nor is the ‘ice’ in ‘mice’ significant; here it is simply a spoken sound. In double words, as we said, a part does signify, but not in its own right.

  [17a1] Every sentence is significant (not as a tool but, as we said, by convention), but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true or false. The present investigation deals with the statement [5] making sentence; the others we can dismiss, since consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or poetry.

  5 · The first single statement-making sentence is the affirmation, next is the negation. The others are single in virtue of a connective.

  [10] Every statement-making sentence must contain a verb or an inflexion of a verb. For even the definition of man is not yet a statement-making sentence—unless ‘is’ or ‘will be’ or ‘was’ or something of this sort is added. (To explain why ‘two-footed land animal’ is one thing and not many belongs to a different inquiry; [15] certainly it will not be one simply through being said all together.)

  A single statement-making sentence is either one that reveals a single thing or one that is single in virtue of a connective. There are more than one if more things than one are revealed or if connectives are lacking.

  (Let us call a name or a verb simply an expression, since by saying it one cannot reveal anything by one’s utterance in such a way as to be making a statement, whether one is answering a question or speaking spontaneously.)

  Of these the one is a simple statement, affirming or denying something of [20] so
mething, the other is compounded of simple statements and is a kind of composite sentence. The simple statement is a significant spoken sound about whether something does or does not hold (in one of the divisions of time).

  6 · An affirmation is a statement affirming something of something, a [25] negation is a statement denying something of something.

  Now it is possible to state of what does hold that it does not hold, of what does not hold that it does hold, of what does hold that it does hold, and of what does not hold that it does not hold. Similarly for times outside the present. So it must be [30] possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed, and to affirm whatever anyone has denied. Thus it is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation. Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I speak of statements as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing—not homonymously, [35] together with all other such conditions that we add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists.

  7 · Now of actual things some are universal, others particular (I call universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular). [17b1] So it must sometimes be of a universal that one states that something holds or does not, sometimes of a particular. Now if one states universally of a universal that something holds or does not, there will be contrary statements (examples of what I mean by ‘stating universally of a universal’ are: every man is white—no man is [5] white). But when one states something of a universal but not universally, the statements are not contrary (though what is being revealed may be contrary). Examples of what I mean by ‘stating of a universal not universally’ are: a man is white—a man is not white; man is a universal but it is not used universally in the [10] statement (for ‘every’ does not signify the universal but that it is taken universally). It is not true to predicate a universal universally of a subject, for there cannot be an affirmation in which a universal is predicated universally of a subject, for instance: [15] every man is every animal.