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  When such circumstances have their origin in affections that are hard to [20] change and permanent they are called qualities. For if pallor or darkness have come about in the natural make-up they are called qualities (for in virtue of them we are said to be qualified); and if pallor or darkness have resulted from long illness or from sunburn, and do not easily give way—or even last for a lifetime—these too are [25] called qualities (since, as before, in virtue of them we are said to be qualified). But those that result from something that easily disperses and quickly gives way are called affections; for people are not, in virtue of them, said to be qualified somehow. Thus a man who reddens through shame is not called ruddy, nor one who pales in [30] fright pallid; rather he is said to have been affected somehow. Hence such things are called affections but not qualities.

  Similarly with regard to the soul also we speak of affective qualities and affections. Those which are present right from birth as a result of certain affections are called qualities, for example, madness and irascibility and the like; for in virtue [10a1] of these people are said to be qualified, being called irascible and mad. Similarly with any aberrations that are not natural but result from some other circumstances, and are hard to get rid of or even completely unchangeable; such things, too, are [5] qualities, for in virtue of them people are said to be qualified. But those which result from things that quickly subside are called affections, e.g. if a man in distress is rather bad-tempered; for the man who in such an affection is rather bad-tempered is not said to be bad-tempered, but rather he is said to have been affected somehow. [10] Hence such things are called affections but not qualities.

  A fourth kind of quality is shape and the external form of each thing, and in addition straightness and curvedness and anything like these. For in virtue of each of these a thing is said to be qualified somehow; because it is a triangle or square it is [15] said to be qualified somehow, and because it is straight or curved. And in virtue of its form each thing is said to be qualified somehow.

  ‘Rare’ and ‘dense’ and ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ might be thought to signify a qualification; they seem, however, to be foreign to the classification of qualifications. [20] It seems rather to be a certain position of the parts that each of them reveals. For a thing is dense because its parts are close together, rare because they are separated from one another; smooth because its parts lie somehow on a straight line, rough because some stick up above others.

  [25] Perhaps some other manner of quality might come to light, but we have made a pretty complete list of those most spoken of.

  These, then, that we have mentioned are qualities, while things called paronymously because of these or called in some other way from them are qualified. Now in most cases, indeed in practically all, things are called paronymously, [30] as the pale man from paleness, the grammatical from grammar, the just from justice, and so on. But in some cases, because there are no names for the qualities, it is impossible for things to be called paronymously from them. For example, the runner or the boxer, so called in virtue of a natural capacity, is not [10b1] called paronymously from any quality; for there are no names for the capacities in virtue of which these men are said to be qualified—as there are for the branches of knowledge in virtue of which men are called boxers or wrestlers with reference to their condition (for we speak of boxing and of wrestling as branches of knowledge, [5] and it is paronymously from them that those in the condition are said to be qualified). Sometimes, however, even when there is a name for a quality, that which is said to be qualified in virtue of it is not so called paronymously. For example, the good man is so called from virtue, since it is because he has virtue that he is called good; but he is not called paronymously from virtue. This sort of case is, however, [10] rare. Things then that are called paronymously from the qualities we mentioned, or called from them in some other way, are said to be qualified.

  There is contrariety in regard to qualification. For example, justice is contrary to injustice and whiteness to blackness, and so on; also things said to be qualified in [15] virtue of them—the unjust to the just and the white to the black. But this is not so in all cases; for there is no contrary to red or yellow or such colours though they are qualifications.

  Further, if one of a pair of contraries is a qualification, the other too will be a qualification. This is clear if one examines the other predicates. For example, if justice is contrary to injustice and justice is a qualification, then injustice too is a [20] qualification. For none of the other predicates fits injustice, neither quantity nor relative nor where nor in fact any other such predicate except qualification. Similarly with the other contraries that involve qualification. [25]

  Qualifications admit of a more and a less; for one thing is called more pale or less pale than another, and more just than another. Moreover, it itself sustains increase (for what is pale can still become paler)—not in all cases though, but in most. It might be questioned whether one justice is called more a justice than [30] another, and similarly for the other conditions. For some people dispute about such cases. They utterly deny that one justice is called more or less a justice than another, or one health more or less a health, though they say that one person has health less than another, justice less than another, and similarly with grammar and the other [11a1] conditions. At any rate things spoken of in virtue of these unquestionably admit of a more and a less: one man is called more grammatical than another, juster, healthier, and so on.

  Triangle and square do not seem to admit of a more, nor does any other shape. [5] For things which admit the definition of triangle or circle are all equally triangles or circles, while of things which do not admit it none will be called more that than another—a square is not more a circle than an oblong is, for neither admits the [10] definition of circle. In short, unless both admit the definition of what is under discussion neither will be called more that than the other. Thus not all qualifications admit of a more and a less.

  Nothing so far mentioned is distinctive of quality, but it is in virtue of qualities [15] only that things are called similar and dissimilar; a thing is not similar to another in virtue of anything but that in virtue of which it is qualified. So it would be distinctive of quality that a thing is called similar or dissimilar in virtue of it.

  We should not be disturbed lest someone may say that though we proposed to [20] discuss quality we are counting in many relatives (since states and conditions are relatives). For in pretty well all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular cases is. For knowledge, a genus, is called just [25] what it is, of something else (it is called knowledge of something); but none of the particular cases is called just what it is, of something else. For example, grammar is not called grammar of something nor music music of something. If at all it is in virtue of the genus that these too are spoken of in relation to something: grammar is called knowledge of something (not grammar of something) and music knowledge [30] of something (not music of something). Thus the particular cases are not relatives. But it is with the particular cases that we are said to be qualified, for it is these which we possess (it is because we have some particular knowledge that we are called knowledgeable). Hence these—the particular cases, in virtue of which we are [35] on occasion said to be qualified—would indeed be qualities; and these are not relatives.

  Moreover, if the same thing really is a qualification and a relative there is nothing absurd in its being counted in both the genera.

  [11b1] 9 · Doing and being-affected admit of contrariety and of a more and a less. For heating is contrary to cooling, and being heated to being cooled, and being pleased to being pained; so they admit of contrariety. And of a more and a less also. [5] For it is possible to heat more and less, and to be heated more and less, and to be pained more and less; hence doing and being-affected admit of a more and a less.5

  . . . . . . . . .

  [10] [So much, then, is said about these; and about being-in-a-positi
on too it has been remarked, in the discussion of relatives, that it is spoken of paronymously from the positions. About the rest, when and where and having, owing to their obviousness nothing further is said about them than what was said at the beginning, that having is signified by ‘having-shoes-on’, ‘having-armour-on’, where by, for example, ‘in the Lyceum’—and all the other things that were said about them.]

  [15] 10 · [About the proposed genera, then, enough has been said; but something must be said about opposites and the various ways in which things are customarily opposed.]

  Things are said to be opposed to one another in four ways: as relatives or as contraries or as privation and possession or as affirmation and negation. Examples [20] of things thus opposed (to give a rough idea) are: as relatives, the double and the half; as contraries, the good and the bad; as privation and possession, blindness and sight; as affirmation and negation, he is sitting—he is not sitting.

  Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites or [25] in some other way in relation to them. For example, the double is called just what it is (double) of the half. Again, knowledge and the knowable are opposed as relatives, and knowledge is called just what it is, of the knowable, and the knowable too is [30] called just what it is, in relation to its opposite, knowledge; for the knowable is called knowable by something—by knowledge. Thus things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites or in some other way in relation to one another.

  Things opposed as contraries, however, are never called just what they are, in [35] relation to one another, though they are called contraries of one another. For the good is not called good of the bad, but the contrary of it; and the white not white of the black, but its contrary. Thus these oppositions differ from one another.

  [12a1] If contraries are such that it is necessary for one or the other of them to belong to the things they naturally occur in or are predicated of, there is nothing intermediate between them. For example, sickness and health naturally occur in [5] animals’ bodies and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to belong to an animal’s body, either sickness or health; again, odd and even are predicated of numbers, and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to belong to a number, either odd or even. And between these there is certainly nothing intermediate—between sickness and health or odd and even. But if it is not necessary for one or the [10] other to belong, there is something intermediate between them. For example, black and white naturally occur in bodies, but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to belong to a body (for not every body is either white or black); again, bad and good are predicated both of men and of many other things, but it is not [15] necessary for one or the other of them to belong to those things they are predicated of (for not all are either bad or good). And between these there is certainly something intermediate—between white and black are grey, yellow and all other colours, and between the bad and the good the neither bad nor good. In some cases [20] there exist names for the intermediates, as with grey and yellow between white and black; in some, however, it is not easy to find a name for the intermediate, but it is by the negation of each of the extremes that the intermediate is marked off, as with the neither good nor bad and neither just nor unjust. [25]

  Privation and possession are spoken of in connexion with the same thing, for example sight and blindness in connexion with the eye. To generalize, each of them is spoken of in connexion with whatever the possession naturally occurs in. We say that anything capable of receiving a possession is deprived of it when it is entirely absent from that which naturally has it, at the time when it is natural for it to have [30] it. For it is not what has not teeth that we call toothless, or what has not sight blind, but what has not got them at the time when it is natural for it to have them. For some things from birth have neither sight nor teeth yet are not called toothless or blind.

  Being deprived and possessing are not privation and possession. For sight is a [35] possession and blindness a privation, but having sight is not sight nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is a particular privation but being blind is being deprived, not a privation. Moreover, if blindness were the same as being blind both would be [40] predicated of the same thing. But though a man is called blind a man is certainly not called blindness. These do, however, seem to be opposed—being deprived and [12b1] having a possession—as privation and possession are. For the manner of opposition is the same. For as blindness is opposed to sight so also is being blind opposed to having sight. (Nor is what underlies an affirmation or negation itself an affirmation [5] or negation. For an affirmation is an affirmative statement and a negation a negative statement, whereas none of the things underlying an affirmation or negation is a statement. These are, however, said to be opposed to one another as [10] affirmation and negation are; for in these cases, too, the manner of opposition is the same. For in the way an affirmation is opposed to a negation, for example ‘he is sitting’—‘he is not sitting’, so are opposed also the actual things underlying each, his [15] sitting—his not sitting.)

  That privation and possession are not opposed as relatives is plain. For neither is called just what it is, of its opposite. Sight is not sight of blindness nor is it spoken of in any other way in relation to it; nor would one call blindness blindness of [20] sight—blindness is called privation of sight but is not called blindness of sight. Moreover, all relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, so that with blindness, too, if it were a relative, that in relation to which it is spoken of would reciprocate; but it does not reciprocate, since sight is not called sight of [25] blindness.

  Nor are cases of privation and possession opposed as contraries, as is clear from the following. With contraries between which there is nothing intermediate it is necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to the things they [30] naturally occur in or are predicated of. For there was nothing intermediate in just those cases where it was necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them, as with sickness and health and odd and even. But where there is something intermediate it is never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything: it is not necessary for everything to be white or black that is capable of [35] receiving them, or hot or cold, since something intermediate between these may perfectly well be present. Moreover, there was something intermediate in just those cases where it was not necessary for one or the other to belong to a thing capable of receiving them—except for things to which the one belongs by nature, as being hot belongs to fire and being white to snow; and in these cases it is necessary for [40] definitely one or the other to belong, and not as chance has it. For it is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black. Thus it is not necessary for one or the other of them [13a1] to belong to everything capable of receiving them, but only to things to which the one belongs by nature, and in these cases it must be definitely the one and not as chance has it.

  But neither of these accounts is true of privation and possession. For it is not necessary for one or the other of them always to belong to a thing capable of [5] receiving them, since if it is not yet natural for something to have sight it is not said either to be blind or to have sight; so that these would not be contraries of the sort that have nothing intermediate between them. Nor, however, of the sort that do have something intermediate between them. For it is necessary at some time for one or the other of them to belong to everything capable of receiving them. For when [10] once it is natural for something to have sight then it will be said either to be blind or to have sight—not definitely one or the other of these but as chance has it, since it is not necessary either for it to be blind or for it to have sight, but as chance has it. But with contraries which have something intermediate between them we said it was never necessary for one or the other to belong to everything, but to certain things, [15] and to them definitely the one. Hence it is clear that things opposed as privation and possession are not opposed in either of
the ways contraries are.

  Further, with contraries it is possible (while the thing capable of receiving [20] them is there) for change into one another to occur, unless the one belongs to something by nature as being hot does to fire. For it is possible for the healthy to fall sick and for the white to become black and the hot cold; and it is possible to become bad instead of good or good instead of bad. (For the bad man, if led into better ways [25] of living and talking, would progress, if only a little, towards being better. And if he once made even a little progress it is clear that he might either change completely or make really great progress. For however slight the progress he made to begin with, he becomes ever more easily changed towards virtue, so that he is likely to make still [30] more progress; and when this keeps happening it brings him over completely into the contrary state, provided time permits.) With privation and possession, on the other hand, it is impossible for change into one another to occur. For change occurs from possession to privation but from privation to possession it is impossible; one who has gone blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor [35] does a toothless man grow teeth.

  It is plain that things opposed as affirmation and negation are not opposed in any of the above ways; for only with them is it necessary always for one to be true [13b1] and the other one false. For with contraries it is not necessary always for one to be true and the other false, nor with relatives nor with possession and privation. For [5] example, health and sickness are contraries, and neither is either true or false; similarly, the double and the half are opposed as relatives, and neither of them is either true or false; nor are cases of possession and privation, such as sight and blindness. Nothing, in fact, that is said without combination is either true or false; [10] and all the above are said without combination.