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  Ambassadors Volker and Sondland left Kyiv with “a very favorable impression” of the new Ukrainian leader.220 They believed it was important that President Trump “personally engage with the President of Ukraine in order to demonstrate full U.S. support for him,” including by inviting him to Washington for a meeting in the Oval Office.221 It was agreed that the delegation would request a meeting with President Trump and personally convey their advice. They were granted time with President Trump on May 23.

  According to Mr. Kent, the delegation was able to secure the Oval Office meeting shortly after the return from Kyiv because of Ambassador Sondland’s “connections” to Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney and President Trump.222 Christopher Anderson, Special Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, also attributed the delegation’s ability to quickly confirm a meeting with President Trump to Ambassador Sondland’s “connections to the White House.”223

  At the May 23 meeting, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker were joined by Secretary Perry, Senator Johnson, and Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, the Deputy National Security Advisor. Mr. Mulvaney may have also participated.224

  Lt. Col. Vindman, who had represented the White House at President Zelensky’s inauguration, did not participate in the meeting. Dr. Hill directed him not to join, because she had learned that “there was some confusion” from the President “over who the director for Ukraine is.”225 Specifically, Dr. Hill testified that around the time of the May 23 debriefing in the Oval Office, she “became aware by chance and accident” that President Trump had requested to speak with the NSC’s Ukraine director about unspecified “materials.”226 A member of the NSC executive secretary’s staff stated that in response to the President’s request, “we might be reaching out to Kash.”227

  Dr. Hill testified that she understood the staff to be referring to Mr. Patel, who then served as a director in the NSC’s directorate of International Organizations and Alliances, not the directorate of Europe and Russia.228 She subsequently consulted with Dr. Kupperman and sought to clarify if Mr. Patel “had some special…Ambassador Sondland-like representational role on Ukraine” that she had not been informed about, but “couldn’t elicit any information about that.”229 All Dr. Kupperman said was that he would look into the matter.230 Dr. Hill also testified that she never saw or learned more about the Ukraine-related “materials” that the President believed he had received from Mr. Patel, who maintained a close relationship with Ranking Member Nunes after leaving his staff to join the NSC.231

  President Trump Put the Three Amigos in Charge of the United States’ Ukraine Relationship and Directed Them to “Talk to Rudy” About Ukraine

  According to witness testimony, the May 23 debriefing with the President in the Oval Office proved consequential for two reasons. President Trump authorized Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Volker to lead engagement with the President Zelensky’s new administration in Ukraine. He instructed them, however, to talk to and coordinate with his personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani.

  Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, and Senator Johnson “took turns” making their case “that this is a new crowd, it’s a new President” in Ukraine who was “committed to doing the right things,” including fighting corruption.232 According to Ambassador Sondland, the group “emphasized the strategic importance of Ukraine” and the value to the United States of strengthening the relationship with President Zelensky.233 They recommended that President Trump once again call President Zelensky and follow through on his April 21 invitation for President Zelensky to meet with him in the Oval Office.234

  President Trump reacted negatively to the positive assessment of Ukraine. Ambassador Volker recalled that President Trump said Ukraine is “a terrible place, all corrupt, terrible people” and was “just dumping on Ukraine.”235 This echoed Mr. Giuliani’s public statements about Ukraine during early May.

  According to both Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, President Trump also alleged, without offering any evidence, that Ukraine “tried to take me down” in the 2016 election.236 The President emphasized that he “didn’t believe” the delegation’s positive assessment of the new Ukrainian president, and added “that’s not what I hear” from Mr. Giuliani.237 President Trump said that Mr. Giuliani “knows all of these things” and knows that President Zelensky has “some bad people around him.”238 Rather than committing to an Oval Office meeting with the Ukrainian leader, President Trump directed the delegation to “[t]alk to Rudy, talk to Rudy.”239

  Ambassador Sondland testified that the “Three Amigos” saw the writing on the wall and concluded “that if we did not talk to Rudy, nothing would move forward on Ukraine.”240 He continued:

  [B]ased on the President’s direction we were faced with a choice. We could abandon the goal of a White House meeting for President Zelensky, which we all believed was crucial to strengthening U.S.-Ukrainian ties…or we could do as President Trump directed and talk to Mr. Giuliani to address the President’s concerns. We chose the latter path.241

  Ambassador Volker reached a similar conclusion. He believed “that the messages being conveyed by Mr. Giuliani were a problem, because they were at variance with what our official message to the President was, and not conveying that positive assessment that we all had. And so, I thought it was important to try to step in and fix the problem.”242 Ultimately, however, the “problem” posed by the President’s instruction to coordinate regarding Ukraine with his personal attorney persisted and would become more acute.

  After the May 23 meeting, Ambassador Sondland stayed behind with President Trump and personally confirmed that the Three Amigos “would be working on the Ukraine file.”243

  Multiple witnesses testified about this shift in personnel in charge of the Ukraine relationship.244 Mr. Kent recalled that, after the Oval Office meeting, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Volker began “asserting that, going forward, they would be the drivers of the relationship with Ukraine.”245 Catherine Croft, Special Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, recalled that “Sondland, Volker, and sort of Perry, as a troika, or as the Three Amigos, had been sort of tasked with Ukraine policy” by President Trump.246 Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale testified about his understanding of the meeting, “[I]t was clear that the President, from the readout I had received, the President had tasked that group, members of that delegation to pursue these objectives: the meeting, and the policy goals that I outlined earlier. So I was, you know, knowing I was aware that Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Sondland would be doing that.”247

  On a June 10 conference call with the Three Amigos, “Secretary Perry laid out for Ambassador Bolton the notion that” they “would assist Ambassador Taylor on Ukraine and be there to support” him as the U.S.-Ukraine relationship “move[ed] forward.”248

  This de facto change in authority was never officially communicated to other officials, including Dr. Hill, who had responsibility for Ukraine at the National Security Council.249

  U.S. Officials Collaborated with Rudy Giuliani to Advance the President’s Political Agenda

  Ambassador Sondland testified that in the weeks and months after the May 23 Oval Office meeting, “everyone was in the loop” regarding Mr. Giuliani’s role in advancing the President’s scheme regarding Ukraine.250 The “Three Amigos” did as the President ordered and began communicating with Mr. Giuliani. E-mail messages described to the Committees by Ambassador Sondland showed that he informed Mr. Mulvaney, Ambassador Bolton, and Secretaries Pompeo and Perry, as well as their immediate staffs, of his Ukraine-related efforts on behalf of the President.251

  According to Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry agreed to reach out to Mr. Giuliani first “given their prior relationship.”252 Secretary Perry discussed with Mr. Giuliani the political concerns that President Trump articulated in the May 23 meeting.253

  Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Volker, A
mbassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry “gave us every impression that they were meeting with Rudy Giuliani at this point, and Rudy Giuliani was also saying on the television, and indeed has said subsequently, that he was closely coordinating with the State Department.”254 These meetings ran counter to Ambassador Bolton’s repeated declarations that “nobody should be meeting with Giuliani”255

  Like Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton also closely tracked Mr. Giuliani’s activities on behalf of the President. According to Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton closely monitored Mr. Giuliani’s public statements and repeatedly referred to Mr. Giuliani as a “hand grenade that was going to blow everyone up.”256 During a meeting on June 13, Ambassador Bolton made clear that he supported more engagement with Ukraine by senior White House officials but warned that “Mr. Giuliani was a key voice with the President on Ukraine.”257 According to Ambassador Bolton, Mr. Giuliani’s influence “could be an obstacle to increased White House engagement.”258 Ambassador Bolton joked that “every time Ukraine is mentioned, Giuliani pops up.”259

  Ambassador Bolton also reportedly joined Dr. Hill in warning Ambassador Volker against contacting Mr. Giuliani.260 Dr. Hill was particularly concerned about engagement with Mr. Giuliani because “the more you engage with someone who is spreading untruths, the more validity you give to those untruths.”261 She further testified that she also discussed Mr. Giuliani’s activities with Dr. Kupperman, specifically her concern that “Ukraine was going to be played by Giuliani in some way as part of the campaign.”262

  On June 18, Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and State Department Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl participated in a meeting at the Department of Energy to follow up to the May 23 Oval Office meeting.263 Ambassador Bill Taylor, Chargé d’Affaires for U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, who had arrived in Ukraine just the day before, participated by phone from Kyiv.264 The group agreed that a meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky would be valuable.265 However, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland subsequently relayed to Ambassador Taylor that President Trump “wanted to hear from Zelensky before scheduling the meeting in the Oval Office.”266 Ambassador Taylor testified that he did not understand, at that time, what the President wanted to hear from his Ukrainian counterpart.267 However, Ambassador Volker’s assistant, Mr. Anderson, recalled “vague discussions” about addressing “Mr. Giuliani’s continued calls for a corruption investigation.”268

  The quid pro quo—conditioning the Oval Office meeting that President Trump first offered the Ukrainian leader during their April 21 call on the Ukrainians’ pursuit of investigations that would benefit President Trump politically—was beginning to take shape. As Ambassador Sondland testified, the conditions put on the White House meeting and on Ukraine’s continued engagement with the White House would get “more insidious” with the passage of time.269

  President Trump Invited Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election

  As U.S. officials debated how to meet the President’s demands as articulated by Mr. Giuliani, President Trump publicly disclosed on June 12 in an Oval Office interview with ABC News’ anchor George Stephanopoulos that there was “nothing wrong with listening” to a foreign power who offered political dirt on an opponent. The President added, “I think I’d want to hear it.”

  Mr. Stephanopoulos then pressed the President directly, “You want that kind of interference in our elections?” to which President Trump replied, “It’s not an interference, they have information. I think I’d take it.”270 President Trump also made clear that he did not think a foreign power offering damaging information on an opponent was necessarily wrong, and said only that he would “maybe” contact the FBI “if I thought there was something wrong.”271

  President Trump’s willingness to accept foreign interference in a U.S. election during his interview with Mr. Stephanopoulos was consistent with tweets and interviews by Mr. Giuliani at this time. For example, on June 21, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

  New Pres of Ukraine still silent on investigation of Ukrainian interference in 2016 election and alleged Biden bribery of Pres Poroshenko. Time for leadership and investigate both if you want to purge how Ukraine was abused by Hillary and Obama people.272

  On June 18, Dr. Hill met with Ambassador Sondland at the White House. She “asked him quite bluntly” what his role was in Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied that “he was in charge of Ukraine.”273 Dr. Hill was taken aback and a bit irritated. She prodded Ambassador Sondland again and asked, “Who put you in charge of Ukraine?” Dr. Hill testified: “And, you know, I’ll admit, I was a bit rude. And that’s when he told me the President, which shut me up.”274

  Dr. Hill tried to impress upon Ambassador Sondland the “importance of coordinating” with other national security officials in the conduct of Ukraine policy, including the NSC staff and the State Department. Ambassador Sondland “retorted” that he was “coordinating with the President” and Mr. Mulvaney, “filling in” Ambassador Bolton, and talking to State Department Counselor Ulrich Brechbuhl. Ambassador Sondland asked: “Who else did he have to inform?”275

  Dr. Hill stated that, in hindsight, with the benefit of the sworn testimony by others during the impeachment inquiry and seeing documents displayed by witnesses, she realized that she and Ambassador Sondland were working on two fundamentally different tasks. Dr. Hill testified:

  But it struck me when yesterday, when you put up on the screen Ambassador Sondland’s emails and who was on these emails, and he said, These are the people who need to know, that he was absolutely right. Because he was being involved in a domestic political errand, and we were being involved in national security foreign policy, and those two things had just diverged. So he was correct. And I had not put my finger on that at the moment, but I was irritated with him and angry with him that he wasn’t fully coordinating. And I did say to him, Ambassador Sondland, Gordon, I think this is all going to blow up. And here we are. 276

  Reflecting on her June 18 conversation with Ambassador Sondland, Dr. Hill concluded:

  Ambassador Sondland is not wrong that he had been given a different remit than we had been. And it was at that moment that I started to realize how those things had diverged. And I realized, in fact, that I wasn’t really being fair to Ambassador Sondland, because he was carrying out what he thought he had been instructed to carry out, and we were doing something that we thought was just as—or perhaps even more important, but it wasn’t in the same channel.277

  3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine

  The President froze military assistance to Ukraine against U.S. national security interests and over the objections of career experts.

  Overview

  Since 2014, the United States has maintained a bipartisan policy of delivering hundreds of millions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine each year. These funds benefit the security of the United States and Europe by ensuring that Ukraine is equipped to defend itself against Russian aggression. In 2019, that bipartisan policy was undermined when President Trump ordered, without justification, a freeze on military assistance to Ukraine.

  For fiscal year 2019, Congress authorized and appropriated $391 million in security assistance: $250 million through the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and $141 million through the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing program. In July 2019, however, President Trump ordered the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to put a hold on all $391 million in security assistance to Ukraine.

  The hold surprised experts from DOD and the State Department. DOD had already announced its intent to deliver security assistance to Ukraine after certifying that the country had implemented sufficient anti-corruption reforms, and the State Department was in the process of notifying Congress of its intent to deliver foreign military financing to Ukraine. In a series of interagency mee
tings, every represented agency other than OMB (which is headed by Mick Mulvaney, who is also the President’s Acting Chief of Staff) supported the provision of assistance to Ukraine and objected to President Trump’s hold. Ukraine experts at DOD, the State Department, and the National Security Council (NSC) argued that it was in the national security interest of the United States to continue to support Ukraine. Agency experts also expressed concerns about the legality of President Trump withholding assistance to Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express purpose.

  Despite these concerns, OMB devised a plan to implement President Trump’s hold on the assistance. On July 25, 2019, OMB began using a series of footnotes in funding documents to notify DOD that the assistance funds were temporarily on hold to allow for interagency review. Throughout August and September, OMB continued to use this method and rationale to maintain the hold, long after the final interagency meeting on Ukraine assistance occurred on July 31. The hold continued despite concerns from DOD that the hold would threaten its ability to fully spend the money before the end of the fiscal year, as legally required.

  On July 25—the same day as President Trump’s call with President Zelensky—officials at Ukraine’s embassy emailed DOD to ask about the status of the hold. By mid-August, officials at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC received numerous questions from Ukrainian officials about the hold. President Trump’s hold on the Ukraine assistance was publicly reported on August 28, 2019.

  Security Assistance to Ukraine is Important to U.S. National Security Interests

  The United States has an interest in providing security assistance to Ukraine to support the country in its longstanding battle against Russian aggression and to shore it up as an independent and democratic country that can deter Kremlin influence in both Ukraine and other European countries. In early 2014, in what became known as the Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainian citizens demanded democratic reforms and an end to corruption, thereby forcing the ouster of pro-Kremlin Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president. Shortly thereafter, Russian military forces and their proxies began an incursion into Ukraine that led to Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, as well as the ongoing, Russian-led armed conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. Approximately 13,000 people have been killed as a result of the conflict and over 1.4 million people have been displaced.278