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  Durkin was adamant. The Democrats had controlled the entire investigative hearing. Republicans had not been consulted concerning witnesses, played a minor part in forming the committee agenda, and had little input in the final committee report. It was business as usual for the Republicans. The Democrats had controlled the Illinois house for decades, except for a short two-year period when the Republicans gained the majority and Lee Daniels, the Republican leader from Elmhurst, was elected Speaker. Michael Madigan had been Speaker since 1983 except for those two years. Democratic control had become institutionalized and became the legislative temperament, and it could be sharp elbowed. Blagojevich’s appointment of Burris was an embarrassment to the Democrats; legislative leaders had discussed the political fallout of a Burris appointment since November. Durkin seized the opportunity to exploit the situation and have a Republican moment in the sun. The Democrats had little choice but to accede to Durkin’s demands. Thus on January 8, the last day the investigative committee met, Burris was called as a witness.

  The Burris appointment had become an extension of the Blagojevich circus and soon became a national media event. For Republicans, it was a chance at last to score political points. For the Democrats, the Burris appearance was something to be endured. They opted for a “rope-a-dope” defense. Burris’s appearance satisfied Durkin’s insistence, and Democrats attempted to simply intercept any political fallout. The only enthusiastic inquisitors were Republicans. Prior to the meeting the Democratic staff had already distributed the final committee report. The committee had what it needed; the investigation was over.

  Durkin began the questioning by exchanging pleasantries with Burris and then asked him what his thoughts were on hearing of the governor’s arrest. The question was immediately challenged by John Fritchey, and the room became tense. It rapidly became clear that the Democrats intended to protect the witness. Interrupted by challenges from Fritchey, Lang, and Burris’s attorney, Timothy Wright III, Durkin attempted to establish Burris’s business connections and background, including the state lobbying he had performed during the Blagojevich administration and contributions he had made to the governor’s campaign. Burris said that he had no conversations with the governor after his arrest until he was offered the senate seat. He testified that he had received a call from Sam Adam Jr. in the late afternoon on December 26; Adam had something important to discuss and later that evening stopped by Burris’s home. Burris claimed that Sam Adam Jr. was like a son to him and he had known him for years. Later that evening Adam asked if he would accept the appointment to fill Barack Obama’s senate seat. Burris said he talked it over with several friends, and two days later he confirmed with Adam that he would accept the senate seat. The governor called a short while later and offered the seat.43

  Durkin turned to the controversial loan of $1.2 million from a Mr. Stroud under the name of the company Telephone USA Investments. The loan to the Burris campaign was suspicious; it was the largest exchange of money to a campaign committee in Illinois history, and the only other campaign contribution from Telephone USA Investments was one for $100,000 to Blagojevich in 2006. Burris responded that the $1.2 million was a loan and it was never paid back because the campaign committee was dissolved. The loan was still outstanding. Lang, the committee monitor, immediately objected to the relevance of Durkin’s questioning. Durkin kept probing, and Currie suggested that Durkin end this line of questioning quickly.44 Burris was unswerving; he had not had conversations with Stroud about repaying the loan, and his campaign committee was dissolved. Durkin continued to verbally spar with the Blagojevich appointee, asking hypothetical questions and soliciting opinions as he tried to establish a past connection with Blagojevich, but he had scored all the political points he could. Burris was not offering anything that Durkin did not know, and the Democrats wanted the exercise to end.

  Attempting to discredit the Burris appointment, the Republican members continued to ask follow-up questions. But the exercise seemed procedural. The history and possible mischievous deeds of Burris and the governor would remain a mystery. They would not be discovered through questioning from the Republican committee members. An exchange between Republican representative Roger Eddy of Hutsonville and Ed Genson drew little audience attention but portended future events. There was major tension between the defense counsels. Addressing Burris, Eddy said he thought it curious that the governor’s defense attorney, Sam Adam Jr., would play any role in the appointment of Barack Obama’s successor. Genson and Adam were both in attendance for Burris’s appearance. Somewhat irritated, Genson interrupted and emphatically stated that Sam Adam Jr. was not a defense attorney. “Mr. Adams [sic], Jr., does not, has not, and will not represent Governor Blagojevich in the criminal case,” he said.45

  Later events would prove Genson’s statement to have been a sad misconception. Genson had misjudged his client and fellow attorneys. He had brought Adam and later his father into the case, and their subsequent conduct prompted him to leave the case.46 The Adamses’ approach to the defense differed dramatically from Genson’s, and Blagojevich made his choice. He ignored Genson’s advice not to appoint Barack Obama’s senate successor, taking the advice of Adam and appointing Burris. Genson counseled restraint and dignity. Instead, Blagojevich hired a public relations firm and made appearances on Late Night with David Letterman, The View, and Larry King Live, taking his appeal to a national audience.47 There he attacked Patrick Fitzgerald, Michael Madigan, John Cullerton, and the Illinois legislature. The Burris appointment was a sign of what was to come: Adam and his father would represent the governor in his criminal proceedings, and Genson would leave the case.

  Prior to his appearance, Burris had filed a sworn affidavit with the committee. After the committee hearing, he filed another affidavit to supersede the original one. Madigan ask the Sangamon County state’s attorney to investigate, but an investigation did not follow. After some complimentary statements by Democratic members, meant to show partisan support, Burris was excused. The committee went into recess.

  When the committee reconvened after the recess, it met for the last time. One item was still outstanding. The house Democratic leadership was conscious of Blagojevich’s popularity in the African American community and worried about black house members balking at a vote to impeach. They were especially concerned about black members in the senate. Monique Davis had served in the house since 1987, represented a district on Chicago’s far South Side, and had been appointed by the Speaker to the investigation committee. She introduced a written statement from Brenda Gold, who had been terminated from the Illinois Department of Transportation for allegedly investigating hiring practices that discriminated against African Americans. “There are a lot of African American people who feel that this Governor has been extremely good and kind to them,” she said, “but when they look at these kind of practices, and this is just one example, they will know that this Governor carried his vendetta against people for no reason to a large extent, which was very harmful to the state.”48 Gold’s statement became the committee’s Exhibit 70 and provided justification—cover—for wavering members.

  Currie briefly summarized the committee report. The sixty-one-page Final Report of the Special Investigative Committee was carefully constructed to build a case for impeachment based on multiple incidents of possible criminal conduct, taken from the criminal complaint, and of maladministration uncovered by investigations and audits. The totality of evidence provided cause. The litany of charges began with the most resonating ones: that the governor had attempted to trade the appointment to the US Senate for personal gain, had conspired to grant financial assistance from the Illinois Finance Authority to the Tribune Company in return for firing members of the Tribune editorial board, and had attempted to exchange the signing of a bill favorable to the horse-racing industry for a campaign contribution. Additionally, the governor had announced a $1.8 billion tollway project and then pressed someone identified as Highway Contractor 1 for a $500,000 contrib
ution. He had made a commitment of $8 million in pediatric care reimbursement and demanded in return a $50,000 contribution from an executive with Children’s Memorial Hospital in Chicago. Ali Ata had given campaign contributions for an appointment to the Illinois Finance Authority. Using Joe Cari’s testimony from the Rezko trial, the report detailed how Tony Rezko, Chris Kelly, and Stuart Levine plotted to pick contractors and then solicit for campaign contributions. Turning to administrative cause, incompetency, and maladministration, Currie noted that the report also contained the ongoing JCAR incident, flu vaccine procurement, the I-SaveRx program, the so-called efficiency initiatives, and the inspector general’s report finding that the governor had violated state and federal laws regarding hiring and firing of state employees.

  There was no discussion. Everyone knew what was in the report and everyone supported it. Durkin remarked that the investigation had been fair and that the governor had been allowed due process. Genson and Adam had left the hearing room; they knew there was no point in being present. Durkin, speaking for the minority Republicans, moved that the committee adopt the report. The partisan sparring that had taken place moments before was replaced by a unified determination to remove Blagojevich. Led by Barbara Currie, each member of the committee gave a short explanation and voted aye. All twenty-one members voted aye to adopt the committee report. The house investigation, the first step of removing Blagojevich from office, was over. It was time to present the resolution to impeach the governor to the full house.

  Chapter 4

  The Impeachment Resolution

  On January 9, as house members began to take their seats and prepared to consider House Resolution 1671—the resolution to impeach Governor Rod Blagojevich—the gallery was crowded but strangely quiet. The elderly men who served as part-time gallery attendants seemed unsettled. Democratic chief of staff Tim Mapes had instructed them to keep order and restrain any outbursts from the galleries, but there was little reason to worry; the audience was not of a boisterous bent. In fact, spectators were greeted by an unfamiliar silence as they looked to find an open seat. Those in the house gallery that afternoon were not the familiar faces of regular visitors, the Springfield lobbyists who often watched the floor action from discreet vantage points or sat on the sofas and chairs along the sides of the house chambers waiting for a particular bill, bargaining with legislators and other lobbyists or just killing time. The large chandeliers that have graced the house chamber since the late nineteenth century seemed slightly dimmed, adding a somber vagueness to the scene below. Noticeably absent were the normally ubiquitous house staff and pages whose activity ordinarily caused constant distraction up and down the chamber’s aisles. A few members talked on their cell phones, and some spoke to each other in hushed tones, but most did not speak at all. Those in attendance, the curious and interested, were ordinary folks, the general public—the people.

  The house was meeting not to debate the impeachment resolution but to present it, hear restrained comments, and pass it. The Republican and Democratic caucuses had discussed the resolution and the conduct and decorum expected from the members; everyone knew what was about to take place. The resolution had been filed with the house clerk the day before, the same day the Final Report of the Special Investigative Committee was released. Speaker Michael Madigan, Chairwoman Barbara Currie, minority leader Tom Cross, and Jim Durkin, the Republican spokesman on the Special Investigative Committee, were the resolution’s chief sponsors. Impeachment had received overwhelming support in the house. When the resolution was filed with the clerk, 107 members immediately requested to be added as co-sponsors. In the words of a senior Democratic staff member, “It was a done deal.”

  The five-page resolution synthesized the sixty-one-page report and justified the findings of the investigative committee that Rod Blagojevich should be impeached. The resolution reiterated the purpose of the Special Investigative Committee: to investigate alleged evidence of “misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance and other misconduct of Governor Rod Blagojevich.” It spelled out the findings detailed in the committee’s report and presented thirteen reasons—cause—for impeachment. The first eight findings covered the criminal acts discussed in conversations recorded by the FBI in the months leading up to the arrest. The other five findings dealt with incidences of mismanagement and the abuse of power, maladministration, and violations of federal and state law and Illinois’ Constitution. The resolution stated that the governor had displayed an “utter disregard of the doctrine of separation of powers” and refused to recognize the authority of the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR). The committee found that the governor had exceeded his constitutional authority, violated the law, and obstructed legislative oversight by bypassing the ruling of JCAR and implementing a program that expanded health care benefits without legislative authority or funding appropriation. The resolution expressed a pattern of criminal allegations, violations of state and federal law, and willful mismanagement.1

  When the session was called to order, the Reverend Milton Bost, pastor of the Chatham Baptist Church and the brother of Republican state representative Mike Bost, set the tone for the day. His invocation called on “Almighty and sovereign God” to “grant Speaker Madigan and each Member of this House a mindset and a resolve to initiate correction and healing within the government of our state” (1).2 Speaker Madigan chaired the proceedings and recognized Barbara Currie to present HR 1671.

  With a calm and measured voice, Currie justified and summarized the actions of the Special Investigative Committee. Her selection of words revealed her emotions. It was the “perfidy of one man, Rod Blagojevich,” that brought the house to this day. After his arrest the house had given the governor a week to “do the right thing,” to resign. Instead, the governor had chosen to “fight, fight, fight.” Currie cautioned that what the house was doing was the beginning step in overturning an election and was “not something that should be undertaken lightly.” She noted the vagueness of the Illinois Constitution and insisted that the committee had taken action because of “allegations of serious infractions, serious betrayals.” Currie offered evidence of maladministration within the Blagojevich administration and blamed the governor for disregarding the prerogatives of the legislature, and she briefly reviewed the offenses (3–4).

  But the mainspring for the impeachment resolution was not maladministration; it was the criminal allegations. In the minds of many citizens, expanding health care was a good thing and could be defended no matter what administrative avenue was taken to achieve it. The flu vaccine fiasco could have been excused as a mistake, a lack of oversight, or just politics as usual. The trigger for impeachment was the arrest of the governor and the evidence of taped conversations between Blagojevich and his cohorts, planning various schemes to enrich themselves and the governor. After years of confrontation with Blagojevich, at last the legislature had justification to remove him. Referring to portions of the taped conversations contained in the criminal complaint, she gave an account of the alleged criminal offenses and pronounced, “They show a public servant who has chosen not to serve the public but only his own interests. . . . They show a public servant . . . who is prepared to turn public service into an avenue for private benefit” (5).

  Currie’s presentation was short, to the point, and presented with certitude. Her remarks were carefully designed to establish the seriousness of Blagojevich’s misconduct and the criteria needed to follow the Constitution’s requirements to show and justify cause for impeachment. Intently, Currie concluded that the governor had chosen not to answer the allegations against him. “His silence in this grave matter is deafening,” she said (5).

  Following protocol, Tom Cross was recognized next. The remarks from the Republican minority leader were obligatory. He thanked everyone—committee chair Currie, Republican spokesman Jim Durkin, staff, and Republican counsel Tom Durkin, Jim Durkin’s brother—for working together. Cross said that the emotion he felt was anger; the governor had
violated the trust invested in him when he took the oath of office. He urged all members to read the committee’s report and said, “Unfortunately or fortunately, however you want to look at it, we have no choice today but to vote yes on this Resolution” (12). The remarks served to diminish any doubts that the resolution would pass with unanimous Republican support.

  The house leaders and the lawyers who had provided counsel, conducted the investigative committee proceedings, and written the committee’s report were well aware of the potential for future court challenges from the governor, and they presented and managed the proceedings with careful attention. They wanted to explicitly express, for the legislative record, that the reasons and methods used to bring about the impeachment action complied with the terms set forth in the Constitution.

  Republican Jim Durkin followed Cross, and like Currie, he reinforced the legitimacy of the resolution and the methods of the investigative committee. As the minority spokesman on the investigative committee and an assistant minority leader, he expressed the unity of the house. The committee had performed its duty “in a truly bipartisan manner,” he said. Durkin focused on the committee’s methods and stated that its purpose had been to determine “whether there is an existence of cause to impeach the governor.” Addressing criticism from the governor’s attorney that Blagojevich had not been afforded due process, he argued that the Constitution did not state that the governor’s attorney for was permitted “to participate in the hearings,” “to question witnesses, “to rebut or mitigate the evidence” presented by the committee, or “to call witnesses,” but that the committee had afforded those privileges in its quest to ensure “that we were going to be fair.” Like Currie, Durkin remarked that “the Governor failed to participate in those proceedings; we invited him.” He also pointed out that “the Governor’s attorney failed to rebut any of the evidence which was presented before this committee.” The former Cook County prosecutor told the house that “the evidence was overwhelming.” Durkin recounted the allegations in the resolution and concluded that the action of the house would ensure “that a system of checks and balances works and is also the best form of government” (13–14).