Hitler's Commanders Read online

  Jodl was a highly respected officer; however, his unbridled enthusiasm for Hitler and the Nazi Party created a chasm between himself and many other officers—a gap that was never bridged. In 1935 Jodl (by then a colonel)16 entered the Armed Forces Office (Wehrmachtamt), and when Hitler created the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), Jodl took charge of the National Defense Office. A few weeks later, in March, 1938, Lieutenant General Max von Viebahn suffered a nervous breakdown because he feared war would result over the Austrian crisis.17 Jodl replaced him as chief of operations of OKW.

  Colonel Jodl took on his new task with enthusiasm and leveled harsh criticisms at the army generals (such as Ludwig Beck) who, following a Hitler talk on August 10, claimed Germany was not ready for war. Jodl, writing in his diary, called the generals’ attitude “pusillanimous” and wrote that they should focus on military strategy, not political decisions. He further noted that it was a tragedy that the whole nation supported the Fuehrer with one exception: army generals. He castigated the generals for not recognizing Hitler’s “genius.”18 Without question, Jodl had unbridled faith in Hitler and truly believed the Fuehrer was politically infallible.

  Although Jodl now assumed Hitler would utilize the OKW Operations Staff to plan his military campaigns, the Fuehrer turned instead to OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, the High Command of the Army) in the early planning stages. Meanwhile, Jodl was promoted to major general in 1939 and assumed command of the 44th Artillery Command (which became the 44th Infantry Division) in Vienna in November 1938. An avid mountaineer, Jodl became hopeful when General Keitel (the chief of OKW and brother of the chief of the Army Personnel Office) discussed the possibility of Jodl’s receiving command of the 2nd Mountain Division in early October 1939; however, he did not get to command this or any other mountain division because the war intervened.19

  On August 23, 1939, Keitel telegraphed Jodl to return to OKW as chief of operations; there he would conduct the planning for the attack on Poland (Case White). Jodl would remain in this post throughout the war, receiving a promotion to general of artillery in 1940 and to colonel general on January 30, 1944 (the 11th anniversary of the Nazis’ assumption of power). He bypassed the rank of lieutenant general altogether. He enjoyed his first personal conversation with Hitler on the Fuehrer’s train during the Polish campaign and remained loyally at Hitler’s side until the end of the war.

  Due to the fact that Hitler turned to OKH to direct the campaigns against Poland (1939) and France (1940), Jodl made the decision to support Hitler whenever disagreements arose between OKH and the Fuehrer. According to his deputy, Walter Warlimont, Jodl initiated an order in May 1940, directing the 1st Mountain Division to turn south (i.e., carry out a Hitler order) without OKH approval. Such an action—in direct violation of the military principle of unity of command—is evidence of both Jodl’s outspoken support for Hitler, as well as of his frustration (shared by his superior, Keitel) with the lack of command authority of the OKW.

  Operation Weser (the invasion of Norway) finally gave OKW an opportunity to exercise direct operational control. The Fuehrer sealed Weser for OKW by appointing General of Infantry Nikolaus von Falkenhorst as commanding general of the operation and as commander of Group XXI.20 Normally, such command assignments were made by OKH and then sent to Hitler for routine approval. Hitler further decreed that Falkenhorst was to serve directly under him and that Falkenhorst’s staff be composed of officers from all three services. Consequently, Weser came directly under Hitler’s command through the OKW.

  The operation was planned principally by Jodl and his staff. The German invasion of Norway caught the British (who were themselves planning to occupy Norway) completely by surprise. Although the campaign succeeded, a particularly tense situation developed when the British destroyed 10 German destroyers that had escorted Major General Eduard Dietl’s landing force to Narvik in northern Norway. The British also landed a large number of troops north of Narvik on April 14. A worried Hitler frantically ordered that Dietl’s troops be instructed to fall back to the south.

  Jodl realized the folly of Hitler’s judgment. To abandon the battle merely because the enemy threatened the Narvik position might endanger the entire campaign. Jodl pointed out to Hitler that a march south would not only be impossible, but could well result in considerable loss of airplanes, which would then have to land on frozen lakes to resupply the mountain troops. Hitler, having calmed down, agreed to postpone a decision. However, on April 17, the navy suggested that Dietl’s group might be destroyed and thus rekindled Hitler’s anxieties. Even Goering entered the fray against OKW, claiming there was now no way the Luftwaffe could assist Dietl.

  Hitler came completely apart and, screaming, ordered Dietl’s withdrawal from Narvik (after promoting him to lieutenant general). Jodl’s staff was astounded. Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg, of the OKW planning staff, refused to send the order to Dietl, and Jodl confronted the Fuehrer directly. Pounding the table with his fist, Jodl told Hitler that Dietl’s group should fight where it stood and not give up. Jodl emphasized that the position had not been lost and should not be passively surrendered. Hitler finally succumbed to Jodl’s stubbornness and allowed Dietl to remain at Narvik. By the end of the month, it was clear that Jodl had been correct and that the Germans were winning the Norwegian campaign. Hitler was pleased and asked Jodl to join him for lunch. For the next two years, Jodl sat at Hitler’s table for meals. The Fuehrer had great confidence in Jodl’s military judgment as a result of Operation Weser, and, for his part, Jodl’s faith in Hitler remained unimpaired.

  Alfred Jodl thus became invited into the so-called inner circle of Adolf Hitler. This entourage consisted primarily of civilians; furthermore, as Albert Speer told Dr. Mueller, all were silent, loyal admirers who would listen for hours on end to the Fuehrer’s monologues. Jodl’s participation caused the OKW general considerable grief, for it separated him from his staff; and, since he was a soldier, Jodl considered himself to be merely a “guest.”21 Nonetheless, he basked in the glory of Germany’s victories in 1940.

  Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia, added another front for the German armed forces. Jodl was skeptical of the prospects for success (Keitel openly objected to the attack), but the OKW chief of operations believed the Fuehrer’s genius would defeat the hated Bolshevist empire. Barbarossa was an OKH theater, while OKW’s task was to make certain that Hitler’s directives were followed. At the situation conferences Hitler turned more and more to Jodl for advice, rather than to General Franz Halder, the OKH chief of staff, even though OKH directed operations in the campaign. A Byzantine atmosphere emerged at Hitler’s headquarters with Jodl and other staff officers on center stage with Hitler. As a result, Jodl “became divorced from his own staff” and even “contrived to bypass Keitel and establish a direct relationship with Hitler.”22 Jodl was drawn to Hitler by the Fuehrer’s willpower, revolutionary thinking, and initial successes. Jodl believed Hitler had a “sixth sense” and would continue to achieve great victories.23

  The strategic decisions regarding the Eastern Front brought about the first crisis between Hitler and Jodl. In August 1942, when Jodl defended Halder against Hitler’s criticisms, Hitler flew into an almost uncontrollable rage and never again joined Jodl at meals or shook hands with him. A second, more serious crisis occurred in September, when Hitler became impatient with the lack of progress of Field Marshal Siegmund Wilhelm List’s Army Group A in the Caucasus sector. The Fuehrer sent Jodl to List’s headquarters to investigate the situation and to press for a faster advance. To Hitler’s surprise and anger, Jodl returned and defended List’s analysis of the situation. An argument ensued between the two men, resulting in Hitler’s decision to replace Jodl with General Friedrich Paulus after the expected victory at Stalingrad.24 This victory, of course, never came. Paulus surrendered to the Russians, and Jodl remained at OKW.

  Although Hitler treated Jodl with a cold shoulder for a while, the Fuehrer came to realize that Jodl was
indispensable. For his part, Jodl remained loyal to Hitler and continued to carry out his orders. Indeed, the relationship between the two strengthened during the remainder of the war. To his credit, however, Jodl flatly refused to issue Hitler’s Commando Order, which called for the execution of captured enemy commando troops. Nonetheless, even though he realized that after Stalingrad the war could not be won, Jodl believed he must continue to obey and support his supreme commander.

  The spring following the Stalingrad disaster Jodl suffered a personal tragedy. His loving wife went to Koenigsberg to undergo major spinal surgery. In part, the Jodls picked this city because it was farther from Allied air bases than any other German city and had not been attacked by enemy bombers. When the Allies launched their first major bombing raid against this East Prussian city, Frau Jodl was forced to seek protection in a cold and damp air raid shelter. As a result, she contracted double pneumonia, which, in her already weakened condition, proved fatal shortly thereafter.25

  Later that year, in November, Jodl married Louise von Benda, who had admired him for some time. She stood by him throughout his agonizing postwar trial at Nuremberg and took it upon herself to successfully vindicate her husband at the Hauptspruchkammer proceedings in Munich in 1953.26

  During the final 18 months of the war, Jodl continued to labor at Fuehrer Headquarters. The general suffered minor injuries during the July 20, 1944, explosion at the Rastenburg headquarters when Count von Stauffenberg narrowly missed assassinating the dictator. The blast drew both Keitel and Jodl closer to the Fuehrer. Jodl remained with Hitler in Berlin until late April 1945, when he left for Admiral Doenitz’s command post. Ironically, one of the last orders Hitler issued (April 25) placed supreme command authority in the hands of OKW. It came too late and was a clear reminder of how the dispersion of authority hampered the German war effort. By then defeat was certain, and Hitler recognized that his loyal commanders were, as he told Goebbels, exhausted.27

  The end came soon after Jodl left the Fuehrer Bunker. Colonel General Alfred Jodl bore the responsibility of signing the document by which Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. He did so at Rheims on May 7, 1945, with tears rolling down his face.

  Jodl (along with Doenitz and his government) was arrested on May 23, 1945, and held for trial at Nuremberg. His defense was honest and befitting a soldier who carried out his duties. As Albert Speer wrote, “Jodl’s precise and sober defense was rather imposing. He seemed to be one of the few men who stood above the situation.”28 Under interrogation, Jodl insisted that a soldier cannot be held responsible for political decisions and stated that Hitler’s decisions were absolute. He faithfully followed the Fuehrer, he said, and believed the war to be a just cause. The tribunal, however, rejected his arguments, found him guilty, and sentenced him to death by hanging. While at Nuremberg, Jodl dictated a letter to the wife of his defense counsel, concluding with the following words: “He [Hitler] had himself buried in the ruins of the Reich and his hopes. May whoever wishes to condemn him for it do so—I cannot.”29 At 2 a.m. on October 16, 1946, Colonel General Alfred Jodl was hanged. Later that morning his body was cremated, and his ashes were secretly scattered beside an anonymous stream somewhere in the German countryside. Despite this fact, a cross bearing Jodl’s name and rank may be seen in the family plot at the Fraueninsel Cemetery near the Chiemsee. His first wife is buried to the right of his empty grave; his second wife (who died in 1998) lies on the other side.

  bernhard lossberg, who was described by David Irving as “a towering figure with a game leg and a fearless nature,”30 was born in Berlin-Wilmersdorf on July 26, 1899. His father was General of Infantry Friedrich-Karl “Fritz” von Lossberg, who had a brilliant career as a General Staff officer in the Kaiser’s army, ending up as chief of staff of the 4th Army in Flanders in 1918.31 Educated in the gymnasiums at Eisenach and Stuttgart, Bernhard entered the service in 1916 (just before his 17th birthday) and saw action in the Great War as a member of the elite 2nd Grenadier Regiment in Russia and France, and was wounded three times. One of these wounds left him with a permanent limp. He was commissioned second lieutenant in 1917.

  Selected for the Reichsheer, young Lossberg served in the Prussian 5th Infantry Regiment at Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland) from 1920 to 1927, where he commanded a signals platoon at Prenzlau and served as a battalion adjutant. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1925, joined the staff of the 3rd Infantry Division in 1930 at Frankfurt/Oder, and later Group Command 2 (1932). Lossberg was then posted to the staff of Wehrkreis III in Berlin,32 and while there, he received his promotion to captain on January 4, 1933. Recognized for his hard work and ability to assimilate data into meaningful military strategy, Lossberg was assigned to the operational planning department of the Defense Ministry and was promoted to major in 1936. (Lossberg was also a noted bridge player.)

  With the expansion of the Wehrmacht in Hitler’s Reich, Lossberg was transferred to the 44th Infantry Regiment at Bartenstein, East Prussia, where he commanded a company. He continued to impress his superiors and in 1938 was attached to the OKW to plan joint service maneuvers. In the fall of 1938, he was sent to Spain, where he worked with Special Staff W, which recruited volunteers and transported war material to the Condor Legion. On January 2, 1939, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and later that month assumed duties with the OKW Planning Staff, where he remained for much of World War II.

  Early on, Lossberg (along with Warlimont, Jodl, and others) envisioned a unified command structure for the armed forces. Although Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of OKW, supported this very rational concept, Hitler rejected it; indeed, the Fuehrer treated the armed forces as he did other state organizations, by dividing authority and power. In any event, Lossberg continued his work on operational plans for OKW, including Case White—the invasion of Poland. In August 1939, Lossberg and Keitel were invited to Hitler’s home in Munich. The Fuehrer assured both officers that Case White would “never” be cause for a world war. Events were to prove otherwise.

  The first major challenge for the OKW was the Norwegian campaign. Serving directly as Hitler’s personal staff, the OKW operations staff planned the invasion, with Hitler acting as commander-in-chief of the operation. While the Germans successfully landed forces in Narvik in early April 1940, the British sank all the German Navy’s destroyers there and threatened Dietl’s combat group at Narvik with defeat or with internment in Sweden. Hitler was on the edge of despair. For the first time he exhibited the panic and indecisiveness that he sometimes showed later. On April 14, a nervous and agitated Fuehrer told Keitel to order Dietl to evacuate Narvik. “The hysteria is frightful,” Jodl wrote in his diary. The coded message was given to Lossberg, who angrily refused to send it. Instead, he visited Jodl, who sent him to see Colonel General Walter von Brauchitsch, the commander-in-chief of the army. Lossberg wanted him to appeal to Hitler to reverse this decision, but the weak-willed Brauchitsch refused on the grounds that he had nothing to do with the Norwegian campaign. He did, however, sign another message to Dietl (apparently drafted by Lossberg), congratulating him on his promotion to lieutenant general and stating: “I am sure you will defend your position [i.e., Narvik] to the last man.” Lossberg then returned to Jodl and tore up Keitel’s handwritten message before his eyes.33

  Adolf Hitler, however, still paced nervously. He sent Lossberg to General von Falkenhorst’s headquarters near Oslo to observe the situation. Lossberg returned on April 22 and reported that the British had landed only five thousand troops. Once again Hitler panicked and suggested how Falkenhorst should move his forces. Lossberg rejoined that the general controlled all the key points and Hitler should leave everything in Falkenhorst’s hands—in other words, Hitler should mind his own business. The Nazi dictator did not enjoy being lectured to and for weeks afterward would not allow Lossberg into his presence. The colonel’s analysis, however, proved correct, and Falkenhorst’s forces seized control of the entire country.

  Meanwhile, Lossberg returned to hi
s operational planning duties at OKW, and his next task was a significant one indeed. He carried out a feasibility study of a Russian campaign. Lossberg finished his 30-page report in July 1940, and gave it the code name Fritz, his son’s name.34 Lossberg stated that for Germany to defeat Russia, the Berlin and Silesian industrial areas would have to be protected from enemy bombing. Hence, the invasion must penetrate deep into the Soviet Union, allowing the Luftwaffe to devastate important rear areas.

  The primary targets in the Russian campaign, Lossberg concluded, should be Leningrad and the north, where better roads and railroads existed (or at least the Abwehr reported them to exist). German success there would also remove Soviet influence from the Baltic region and would bring both Leningrad and Moscow under German artillery fire. Furthermore, the push north would be bolstered by Group XXI, operating from Norway via Finland. He proposed the thrust north as follows: “An attack by two army groups from the general line east of Warsaw to Koenigsberg, with the southern group the more powerful [the group assembling around Warsaw and southern East Prussia] and being allocated the bulk of the armored and mechanized units.”35