The Somme Read online

  III

  On 24 June the preliminary bombardment for the great battle commenced with the field artillery concentrating on the German wire. For the next two days the weather continued fine, wire-cutting progressed, the heavier guns were registered on their targets, and counter-battery fire commenced.20 But on the 26th just as the full bombardment started, the weather deteriorated, with low cloud and showers hampering aerial observation.21 This was a serious matter because only RFC spotter planes could record if the heavy guns were hitting their targets – the enemy batteries, trenches, and wire. On the 28th the conditions were so bad that Rawlinson was forced to postpone the attack for 48 hours in the hope of better weather.22 Even then the weather did not fully oblige. Both the 29th and 30th saw periods of low cloud and rain but the ammunition supply would allow for no further delays. The attack would go in at 7.30 a.m. on 1 July.

  What effect the weather had on the effectiveness of the bombardment is difficult to estimate. Certainly, given the state of artillery accuracy prevailing at this time, any periods of unobserved fire were in the nature of a lottery. But during the course of the bombardment an unanticipated factor revealed itself which acted to reduce its effectiveness even further. This consisted of the various flaws in the guns and shells employed in the attack. These were the result of the haste with which Britain had been forced to improvise a large munitions industry. Under Lloyd George the Ministry of Munitions discarded quality control to meet production quotas. In addition orders placed externally (mainly for shells from the United States) were given to establishments with little or no experience in munitions production.

  Consequences can be illustrated by looking at the experience of X Corps. Regarding their heavy artillery on the first day of the bombardment,one of their 2 X 9.2-inch howitzers had to be condemned when the rifling in the barrel twisted.23 On the following day both of these howitzers were put out of action as a result of the premature explosion of a shell in No.2 gun. They remained unserviceable throughout most of the bombardment. That same day two lighter howitzers from other batteries had to be withdrawn because of faulty equipment or premature explosions.24 The next day (the 28th) passed without incident but on the 29th three guns from one battery succumbed to equipment failure and on the 30th a 6-inch howitzer collapsed with a faulty barrel.25

  Nor were things much better with the field artillery. A single division (32) from the corps reported that during the bombardment

  about 20 X 18Pr and 6 X 4.5"Pr [howitzers] were out of action at one time or another with spring or buffer problems or prematures in the case of 4 X 4.5"26

  The equipment and ammunition problems were not confined to X Corps. Almost all corps reported problems with their 18-pounder guns.27 XV Corps also had two of their 9.2-inch guns explode. Many of the shells for this calibre of gun, by contrast, did not explode at all owing to fuse problems.28 Similar problems were reported with 8-inch howitzer shells, 60-pounder ammunition, and 18-pounder ammunition (an entire consignment from America contained faulty fuses).29

  Other problems concerned gun design. For example all of the 66 X 8-inch howitzers were makeshift weapons – old 6-inch coastal defence guns with the barrels rebored. All shells fired from them tended to fall short. They also had improvised recoil mechanisms which meant that it was difficult to return the guns to exactly the same position after each firing.30

  What these defects meant in one instance is described by a German defender, Lt F.L. Cassel, located just north of Thiepval:

  One afternoon while I was lying on my wire bedstead heard the ... boom of a heavy gun, the awesome whiz and swish of a rising heavy missile, then the earth was quaking, and while dust was falling through the boards I saw the beams above me bend and slowly descend by about 10 cm. My heart seemed to stop; now comes the end. But the catastrophe did not come. After the momentary paralysis was gone I left my bed and went into the trench ... [I] found a crater with a diameter of several metres made by a 21cm [9.2-inch shell], a dud! Had it exploded whoever was in the dugout would have seen daylight not before the day of resurrection.31

  How well, despite these many defects and limitations, did the British artillerymen perform? It will be convenient to divide this discussion into the three objectives of the bombardment – cutting the wire in front of the German trenches, destroying the German trench system and its inhabitants, and over-whelming the German batteries in the area of the attack.

  Wire-cutting was seemingly the most likely of the three tasks to be accomplished. First, the overwhelming proportion of British guns (1,000 out of 1,500) and shells (1 million out of 1.6 million) were devoted to this task.

  Moreover, the wire protecting the enemy's front line was the closest target to the British guns and therefore the most easily observed by the Forward Observation Officers. In addition the success achieved in this task could be checked (and re-checked) by raiding parties sent out at night to inspect the results.

  Nevertheless there were some difficulties. Regarding observation, extensive areas of the front were shielded from direct view by sudden folds in the ground. This seemed a particular problem for X Corps, which constantly reported that the exact effect of the guns on the wire could not be seen.32 Bad light could also hamper observation and this was recorded as a problem by several of the corps during the preliminary bombardment.33 Finally, such a mundane factor as long grass could raise doubts about the effect of the shelling or even if the wire was being hit.34

  Then there were problems with the types of shell used. Most wire-cutting guns fired 18-pounder shrapnel or high-explosive shells. If shrapnel was used the degree of accuracy had to be very high. On bursting, a shrapnel shell propels steel balls forward and downwards. So to penetrate the wire at the high velocity needed to cut it, the shell had to explode first a few yards short of and above the target. It is a reasonable supposition that at least a proportion of the British gunners at the Somme had not the experience to achieve consistent accuracy of this sort. High-explosive 18-pounder shells required less accuracy but the problem here was that many shells travelled through the wire and only exploded on impact with the ground. This tended to throw the wire into the air and down again without cutting it.

  The distant wire presented a particular difficulty. Here the results could not be checked by patrols, and aerial photographs, which in the case of wire were notoriously difficult to interpret, had to be relied upon. Most gunners considered wire-cutting at 5,000 to 7,000 yards a matter of luck. In III Corps the artillerymen warned that, while they were willing to try to cut a few lanes, ‘favourable results are not anticipated’.35

  Finally the overall task was, despite the number of guns employed, too great for some corps. III Corps calculated that to cut all the wire within 3,500 yards of the front line would require quantities of ammunition which were simply not available. Their only solution was to suggest that the infantry provide a priority list of wire whose removal was essential.36

  As noted, the only sure way to check on the state of the wire was to send raiding parties or patrols across no man's land at night. Even then the reports presented problems of interpretation. Each patrol could cover only a short length of front in the limited time they could remain in this hazardous area. On a good night parties might assess 100 yards of front; if they encountered hostile troops they might not get close enough to the wire to file a report at all. And difficulty arose in knowing whether these reports were typical of the entire divisional front.

  In all, the records of 50 patrols exist for the period of the preliminary bom-bardment. At best these would have covered just 5,000 of the 24,000 yards of enemy front facing the Fourth Army. The picture they conveyed was decidedly ambiguous. Of the 50 patrols, 24 reported that the wire in their section was not cut, 20 reported that it was cut, and six that it was cut in some places but not others. Nor did the overall picture become any clearer as the preliminary bombardment progressed. Patrols for each night from the 26th–27th to the 29th–30th recorded almost exactly the same proportio
n of negative, positive, and indeterminate results.37

  The picture does, however, become clearer if the figures are split into individual corps. In the south, XIII Corps consistently recorded far more positive than negative reports; and XV Corps (for which few reports survive) were confident from a major raid on the night of the 26th–27th that the wire facing them was almost totally destroyed. In the north the picture was also reasonably clear. VIII Corps consistently produced far more negative than positive reports. And on the night before the attack the position was made yet clearer by the 10 raids conducted. The wire was intact on the front of 31 Division, was reasonably well cut on the front of 4 Division, and varied from non-existent to strong on 29 Division's front. The two centre corps (X and III), are the most difficult to analyse. Here the reports showed no consistency and were almost evenly split between positive and negative results.

  The patrol reports were collected at Fourth Army HQ, and Rawlinson should have been aware, at least in general terms, of the variable effect of the wire-cutting. Nevertheless, the overall picture eluded him. He directed all his attention to the situation on the front of VIII Corps, even going so far as to discuss it with Haig.38 Certainly the situation in the area as revealed by the raid reports was not encouraging. But neither was the situation on the III and X Corps front and this elicited no response from Rawlinson. On the eve of battle he pronounced himself entirely satisfied with wire-cutting, ‘except in VIII Corps front which is somewhat behind-hand’.39

  The next aspect of the bombardment was trench destruction. From 25 June to zero hour on 1 July Rawlinson's heavy guns threw 188,500 shells weighing 34.5 million pounds at the German defences.40 Two points mentioned earlier about the evolution of the Somme plan deserve repetition here. First, this was the heaviest Allied bombardment of the war so far and bound to cause much destruction. Second, for the area it had to cover and the type of defences it had to destroy, it was woefully inadequate.

  No methods for assessing the effectiveness of the bombardment on the German trenches were available to Rawlinson. From the air it was difficult to assess the state of an enemy trench and even aerial photographs were difficult to interpret. As for trench raids, these were decidedly hazardous. The raiding parties actually had to enter the German trenches and, if possible, the dug-outs underneath them (where it was known that Germans might shelter during a bombardment).

  In the north and centre (VIII, X, and III Corps) information was scarce. As noted, in some areas the wire had not been sufficiently cut to allow raiding parties through. In other areas patrols found the German defences manned in strength and were driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire.41 One patrol (that of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers from 29 Division) managed to fight its way through the wire. The men were close enough to observe that the German front trench was totally destroyed. But they were unable to proceed further because ‘fire from a line or lines in rear very effectively sweeps the ground in front of the first line’.42 Only in one instance was a patrol from any of these corps able to inspect a dug-out. By chance it had collapsed.43

  None of this provided warrant for confidence. If trenches were being manned in strength, either the majority of dug-outs were providing sufficient shelter or the bombardment was missing the trenches holding most troops. And as the Dublins found, it was insufficient merely to render the front line uninhabitable. Any trench from which machine-gun fire could be brought to bear on no man's land had to be dealt with, otherwise the attacking troops stood no decent chance of success.

  In the south (XV and XIII Corps) there was some reason for optimism. Raiding parties from both corps were frequently able to enter the enemy trenches. They reported that many dug-outs had been destroyed. Even in this area, however, on the night before the attack many patrols were driven back by heavy fire, indicating that a reasonable number of enemy soldiers had survived the bombardment.44

  What of prisoners' reports? For one reason or another the raiding parties found prisoners hard to capture during the preliminary bombardment. In the north this was because the raiders hardly managed to penetrate the enemy wire, let alone enter the hostile trenches. But even in the south capturing prisoners was no easy matter. In this area the Germans at night evacuated their front line, and even on occasions their second and third lines, so placing their forces beyond the range of the fiercest bombardment and the raiding parties.

  So in all just twelve prisoners were interrogated by Fourth Army Intelligence between 25 and 30 June.45 And they were not just few in number but unrepresentative of the front as a whole. Nine of the twelve were captured by XV Corps; of the remainder one came from the X Corps area, one from III Corps, and one from XIII Corps. Their stories, which anyway should have been treated with caution because of a well-known tendency for prisoners to say what they expect their captors to want to hear, were extremely variable. Of the XV Corps group, three claimed that the dug-outs were being badly damaged, two claimed they were little damaged, and four made no comment on dug-outs. Thus we can contrast prisoner Gregor's statement:

  The dug-outs are still good. The men appear to remain in these dug-outs all the time and are completely sheltered46

  with that of an unnamed prisoner who commented that his company

  has suffered heavily, most of the casualties being due to the destruction of the dug-outs by our heavy artillery, the occupants being buried.47

  One of the more interesting comments came from a soldier who had recently been transferred from the Ovillers sector (III Corps) to the XV Corps sector. He too noted that the dug-outs in his new area were being destroyed but stated that these were of much less robust construction than those around Ovillers.48 Whether this qualification was picked up by Fourth Army or passed on to III Corps is not known.

  The evidence from prisoners in the other areas was either unilluminating (XIII Corps) or contradictory. Prisoners in X Corps area, for example, reported that the entrances to the dug-outs were being caved in but that casualties were slight.49 Prisoner Hornung (III Corps area) noted that new dug-outs were being constructed in the support lines but did not say whether that was because the front line was being destroyed or whether the garrisons were being pulled back to a slightly safer area.50

  A cautious interpretation of these statements might have concluded that anyway in the south some but by no means all dug-outs were succumbing to the bombardment, whereas in the north the position was too obscure to warrant any firm conclusion. This was not the conclusion reached by Fourth Army Intelligence. On the eve of battle they confidently stated that

  From the examination of prisoners it is apparent that our artillery fire has been most effective. Most of the dug-outs in the [enemy] front line have been blown in or blocked up. Even the deep dug-outs of a Battalion H.Q. were not proof against our big shells.51

  As an extrapolation from the evidence of twelve prisoners this sweeping statement borders on the irresponsible.

  The third element in the bombardment programme was counter-battery fire. In 1916 the problem of firing at distant and precise targets with any accuracy had yet to be resolved.52 In the event a number of factors told against the effectiveness of Haig's counter-battery programme. The major deficiency was simply a lack of guns. This has been touched on already but it is worth emphasising.

  Rawlinson had just 180 counter-battery guns and some of these were old and inaccurate. Some corps were forced by the extension of the objectives to divert guns from counter-battery to cutting distant wire and bombarding trenches. XV Corps suffered an additional disadvantage. Their staff allocated to counter-battery the lowest of priorities. On some days just four batteries (16 guns) were attacking the enemy artillery.53

  There was one exception to this picture and it reveals how much might have been accomplished had Rawlinson paid more attention to counter-battery. XIII Corps gave counter-battery a high priority and not only allocated their 60-pounders and 4.7-inch guns to the duty but added some heavy howitzers as well. Outstanding results were achieved. Most Ger
man batteries in the valleys north of Mametz and Montauban were destroyed. By the eve of battle the Germans could bring only a handful of guns to bear against the southern corps, so cancelling out the failings of XV Corps and ensuring that the troops of XIII Corps had a reasonable chance in their attack.54

  A further factor was the state of the weather during the preliminary bombardment. This negated a recent improvement in artillery technique. By the time of the Somme the importance of aerial spotting for the artillery had been well recognised. For the preliminary bombardment 20 planes were allocated to this task, a number well in excess of those available in 1915. In addition nine planes were utilised to take photographs of likely enemy battery concentrations. Other photographs could be used to check on results. Unfortunately for the British, most of this went by the board when the weather closed in on the 26th.55 Of the projected five days of the bombardment only one was fine. The others were plagued by low cloud and rain. Even the two-day extension (the 29th and 30th) had periods when visibility was poor.56 Deprived of their ‘eyes in the air’, the counter-batteries had to resort to shooting at previously identified battery positions from map references. Later it was discovered that the maps used were so inaccurate as to render these endeavours useless. Anyway the Germans were quite adept at moving their batteries to new locations to thwart the British gunners.