The Somme Read online

  Notwithstanding its later evil reputation, the Somme area seemed reasonable campaigning country. Its undulating nature kept the soil well drained and the only swampy areas were around the river banks. It had no industrial wildernesses such as the British had encountered at Loos. Nor had it yet suffered the effects of continuous fighting. Indeed, the area had seen little conflict since1914. In late August of that year part of Kluck's Second Army passed through it on the way to Amiens and (as they imagined) Paris. After the Marne the same army fell back to the Somme, followed cautiously by the French. Gradually trench lines became established which remained virtually unchanged until the summer of 1916. Throughout 1915 there was the occasional trench raid and intermittent shelling, but this sector escaped all of the major battles of 1915 and remained one of the quietest sections of the Western Front.

  During this period of 21 months the Germans had not been idle. At the end of 1914 their defences had consisted of a single trench. By the opening of the Somme campaign this one trench line had been converted into a front system consisting of three lines of trenches 150 to 200 yards apart. Moreover, the defensive power of the system had been greatly enhanced. In front of the trenches the Germans had placed two belts of barbed-wire entanglements, each from 15 to 30 feet wide, all tied to iron stakes to prevent their easy removal. Deep under the trenches the Germans had constructed a series of dug-outs in the chalky soil. (It is this chalk that gives the Somme trenches their distinctive white ribbon effect). These dug-outs were 20 to 30 feet below the level of the trenches, deep enough to give protection to their garrisons (usually of 25 men) from all but a direct hit by the heaviest calibre of shell. The dug-outs were often inter-connected to guard against a single exit being blocked.

  To strengthen the front system further, the Germans had incorporated into it a number of defended villages. Beaumont Hamel, Thiepval, Ovillers, La Boisselle, and Fricourt consisted of solid stone houses with cellars which could also shelter small garrisons of troops and machine-gunners. To enhance their natural strength the German command provided them with all-round trench defences protected by barbed-wire entanglements

  Not content with the considerable strength of this front system, the Germans had both set about building a second line some 2,000 to 4,000 yards behind the first and had placed a series of strongpoints between the lines. The strongpoints (of which Nordwerk and the Schwaben Redoubt were the best known) consisted of a maze of trenches with the capability of all-round defence, incorporating dug-outs and concreted machine-gun posts. These were sited to take heavy toll of troops advancing from the first trench system.5

  Certainly the second line was not as strong in construction as the first. Its dug-outs were not as extensive and only the occasional village (such as Longueval) had been incorporated into it. Nor was its protecting wire as formidable. Nevertheless, it had its own strengths. Much of it could not be observed from the British front line and was out of range of British field artillery. And a section of it had been placed on the highest ground on the ridge around Mouquet Farm and Pozières.

  To complete their defensive system the Germans had begun construction of a third line approximately 3,000 yards behind the second. But this was still in a rudimentary state when the battle commenced.

  The garrisoning of these defences was variable. But it was usual to dispose two battalions of a regiment of 3,000 in or near the front system, with the remaining battalion in the intermediate strongpoints or in the second line.6

  Despite their formidable nature (Churchill called the German defences at the Somme ‘undoubtedly the strongest and most perfectly defended positions in the world’),7 there were some weaknesses in the German defensive arrangements. The front system had been largely constructed in 1914 and 1915 when the overriding concern was for a long, uninterrupted field of fire with good observation for the forward artillery observers. What this meant was that the Germans had placed most of their front system on a forward slope which made it directly observable from the British front line. Consequently, in daytime both relief of troops and repair of wire and trenches were almost impossible for the Germans, and the British could direct artillery fire on to the enemy front system with some ease.

  It was the weaknesses of the German position which impressed themselves on Rawlinson after his first tours of inspection. He wrote to Kitchener in surprisingly optimistic terms:

  In this new area which I have taken over there are great possibilities – The artillery observation is excellent; there are an unlimited number of artillery positions well covered from view – within 2000 yds of our present line & the facilities for assembling the assaulting infantry columns behind the trench line are the best I have seen anywhere.8

  He acknowledged to Kitchener that the wire protecting the German line was good but thought the distant wire ‘weak’ and that the possibilities for enfilade artillery fire were ‘great’.9

  This mood of optimism did not last. Shortly after writing to Kitchener, Rawlinson contracted the flu and betook himself to Nice for two weeks' rest.10 On his journey back to the Somme he stopped in Paris where the War Minister was planning strategy with the French. Rawlinson took the opportunity to discuss the coming offensive with him. He found Kitchener in a gloomy mood. He was despondent about the refusal of the French to wind down the Salonika operation and was convinced that they wanted to shift the main burden on the Western Front to Britain.11 He warned Rawlinson about the demands likely to be made on British manpower and told him that an attack au fond in the summer might cause 50,000–60,000 casualties ‘which could not be replaced’.12 Rawlinson, perhaps taking his cue from Kitchener's despondency, immediately pronounced himself in favour of a strictly limited offensive. He warned Kitchener, however, that this was not Haig's view and that he (Rawlinson) ‘would have to talk strongly to D.H. who has set his mind on a large offensive here north of the Somme’.13

  When he returned to the front two other factors confirmed Rawlinson's new-found caution. The first was a talk with his corps commanders, all of whom pronounced in favour of an attack with limited objectives. Indeed, Hunter-Weston, the commander of VIII Corps and not generally known for his reluctance to attack au fond, emphasised to Rawlinson that he was ‘strongly opposed to a wild rush ... for an objective 4,000 yards away'. He reminded the Fourth Army commander that ‘to lose the substance by grasping at the shadow is a mistake that has been made too often in this war’.14

  The Haig/Rawlinson Plans, April–May

  A second factor encouraged this mood of caution. In his absence his Chief of Staff, Archibald Montgomery, had drafted a plan which was also for a strictly limited offensive. Supported by this convergence of opinion, the originally optimistic Rawlinson decided to submit to Haig the Montgomery plan with only minor amendments. Yet he was not unaware of the reception it might receive from the Commander-in-Chief:

  I daresay I shall have a tussle with him over the limited objective for I hear he is inclined to favour the unlimited with the chance of breaking the German line.15

  II

  Rawlinson sent the Montgomery plan to Haig on 3 April. Essentially it envisaged a two-step ‘bite and hold’ operation by 10 divisions with seven in reserve. Its aim, Rawlinson stated, was not to gain ground ‘but to kill as many Germans as possible with the least loss to ourselves’ – a concise definition of a true attritional battle which implied no great penetration of German-held territory.16 The front of attack was to be 20,000 yards long, ranging from Serre in the north to a point just east of Mametz in the south. This secured the attack on two defensible flanks and required each assaulting division to attack a length of front of 2,000 yards. In addition 20,000 yards constituted the maximum length of front Rawlinson considered could be dealt with by the 200 heavy howitzers (defined by him as 6 inches and above) he had been assigned.

  Rawlinson then turned to the proposed depth of advance. Here he saw two alternatives:

  An attack to rush the whole of the enemy's defences in one rush as was attempted at Loos
: An advance in two stages, the first to include the enemy's front line system of defences and certain important tactical points [beyond] which are essential to the success of a further advance [to the second German line]. The second to be undertaken as soon as preparations can be made.17

  He went on to indicate the considerable advantages of this first alternative; namely that experience had shown most ground gained in an attack was secured by the initial rush and that it was important to take advantage of enemy disorganisation and panic, which were also at their maximum in the early moments of an attack. Moreover, he claimed, the 200 howitzers possessed by the Fourth Army were sufficient to deal with the enemy defences to the depth of their second line.

  Nevertheless, this first alternative proved not to be where his preference lay. He went on to give six reasons why the second, more cautious, option was to be preferred. Three of these concerned the infantry. First, the New Army troops at his disposal could not be expected to maintain cohesion over the long distance between the British front line and the German second line. Second, once they became disorganised it would prove difficult to put them into a state to meet a counter-attack. Third, if the troops holding the German second line were well prepared, as there was every reason to expect, such a counter-attack might result in a rout.

  Other reasons to prefer the second option concerned the artillery. He noted that much of the German second line was hidden from direct observation, and argued that this would make it difficult to establish whether the wire in front of it was actually being cut. Second, the deeper the penetration aimed for, the greater the number of targets the artillery would need to subdue. Third, because of the observation problem, it would be difficult for the gunners to protect from counter-attack troops advancing on the second enemy line.

  There is an anomaly here. Rawlinson had argued early on that his artillery could deal with the Germans' trench defences to the depth of their second line. He was now saying that it could not. In particular it could not with certainty cut the distant wire or protect troops advancing on it. Moreover, on the vital matter of destroying trenches and fortified villages and strongpoints, he had implied (although, considering its importance, in a rather oblique manner) that these might constitute more targets than his guns could manage.

  The upshot of all this was the conclusion by Rawlinson that he should divide his advance into a succession of small steps. These would set realistic objectives that could be achieved by his green troops, and would make good observation of the German second line possible for his artillery. It may also be noted that, having stated that his purpose was to kill Germans rather than gain territory, his proposed deliberate approach would provide a more certain way of accomplishing the required slaughter.

  The next issue dealt with in his plan concerned the length of the artillery bombardment preceding the attack. Rawlinson acknowledged that a short, intense bombardment would aid surprise, might cause a rapid lowering of enemy morale, and would deny the Germans time to bring forward guns and reserves. However, he felt that he had no choice but to opt for a lengthy preliminary bombardment, of 50 to 60 hours. His main reason was that the extensive German wire could not be cut in any less time with the guns available.

  Finally, Rawlinson discussed the use of gas. Remembering his experience at Loos where gas had drifted back on the British troops, he considered that the likelihood of a suitable wind to propel the gas towards the enemy line exactly at zero was so small as to constitute an unacceptable risk. So he ruled out gas except to isolate strongpoints such as fortified villages that were not to be assaulted directly. But, also remembering Loos, Rawlinson proposed to employ smoke ‘to the fullest extent possible all along both defensive fronts and the fronts to be attacked’ as a means of concealing the advance of his troops across no man's land.

  Haig received Rawlinson's plan on 4 April. During the next ten days he commented on it in his diary, scribbled notes on his copy of it, discussed it at a meeting with Rawlinson, communicated with Joffre, and finally responded formally in writing to the Fourth Army commander.18

  The gist of his comments did not vary. Rawlinson's plan made no attempt to achieve surprise; it was too cautious; it paid no attention to the need to assist the French; and there was no role for the cavalry.

  Haig deprecated Rawlinson's insistence on a long bombardment, which would obviously remove any chance of launching an unexpected attack. He also considered that Rawlinson was overlooking the effect that a short intensive bombardment would have on enemy morale. He instructed him to reconsider this matter.19

  Turning to the objectives to be achieved in the first instance, Haig stated that the Fourth Army ‘could do better’ than Rawlinson anticipated. In particular he suggested that north of Pozières Rawlinson should aim to capture the entire German second line in a single advance. The new ‘tanks’ would be of great assistance in keeping this northern flank secure. Further south he also considered that the Fourth Army plan was too cautious. Here, the objectives should be extended to the high ground around Montauban and the Briqueterie.

  Haig had noted Rawlinson's objections to this course of action: namely the difficulty of providing distant troops with artillery support and the risk in any case of their becoming disorganised after advancing such distances. But he believed these difficulties could be overcome.

  The risks to be incurred can be foreseen and to a great extent guarded against by previous arrangements for providing artillery support, for throwing in reinforcements as required to fill gaps in the line and to cover flanks that become exposed ... and generally, for providing the means of holding what may be gained.20

  The dialogue between Rawlinson and Haig on this last point is extraordinary. Rawlinson claimed that the artillery could not support distant troops. Haig stated that it could. Rawlinson argued that his troops would become disorganised. Haig said that this could be overcome. Nowhere did Haig engage with the actual problem of how the gunners were to support troops they could not see, or how reinforcements were to be fed to exactly the correct points on a moving and chaotic battlefield, where accurate information was bound to be difficult to obtain.

  But there is another, even more extraordinary, feature about this exchange. It is the fact that neither Haig nor Rawlinson was confronting the central issue concerning the capture of the German second line. By setting a more distant objective, Haig was decreasing by a large factor the intensity of the bombardment which could be brought to bear on the defences under attack. The point was that Haig had just about doubled the number of yards of trench to be bombarded by the heavy howitzers. Yet he was not proposing to increase the volume of guns or shells employed. Thereby, he was creating the danger of so diluting the bombardment everywhere that it would be inadequate to quell even the first German positions, in which case his forces would be denied any success at all. This might be thought a matter of the first importance, yet in the Haig–Rawlinson dialogue on the plan it went unremarked.

  Haig also raised other concerns. He noted that Rawlinson had paid no attention to the fact that his operations were part of a larger scheme to assist the French. As it happened, there is no evidence that Rawlinson had ever been informed by Haig of the details of the French plan. That is, no attention was being paid to the fact that, at this stage of planning, the Somme operation was still largely a French affair. Joffre was to attack with 39 French divisions, with the aim of crossing the river in the vicinity of Péronne. Haig's attack would be made with just 14 divisions, with the purpose of assisting the French in their larger undertaking. Haig explained to Rawlinson that this could best be done by seizing the Thiepval–Ginchy Ridge from where the Germans would otherwise overlook French operations on the north bank of the Somme. After the first objectives had been captured Rawlinson should swing his main effort south-eastwards down the ridge with the aim of rolling up the German second line south of Pozières. This process would be aided by a simultaneous attack from around Montauban which would catch the Germans between two fires.21
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  As for further operations, Haig was not prepared to speculate. He had already told Joffre (perhaps unnecessarily) that his further actions would be ‘directed against the enemy's forces’.22 More to the point, he assured Rawlinson (if not quite felicitously) that he was not attempting ‘to rush the whole of the enemy's defences in one rush’, against which the Fourth Army commander had strongly warned. He noted on his copy of Rawlinson's plan that ‘I think such a plan wd be impracticable agst. this position.’23 And he told Rawlinson that he expected operations to be conducted in distinct phases after artillery preparation had been carried out, even though he believed that cavalry might find opportunities to capture advanced positions at any time.24

  So was Haig opting for an unlimited offensive? Certainly in its detail Haig's amendments to Rawlinson's plan did not amount to converting a ‘bite and hold’ plan into an attack au fond. Haig is plainly proposing a manoeuvre battle, but not yet a breakthrough battle by British forces. His objectives, that is, are more distant than Rawlinson's but not unlimited. His overriding aim was to assist the French. However, there are two references in Haig's plan which perhaps indicate that he was aiming for bigger things. Thus although the operation would be a phased one it is clear that he expected Rawlinson to pass from one phase to the other with minimum delay.25 And more directly, while agreeing with Rawlinson's object of ‘killing Germans’, he thought that this could be best accomplished ‘if we can get the enemy out of his trenches’,26 so implying that he expected to overrun in fairly short order the entire German defensive system. Perhaps Rawlinson's view that Haig was hankering after a breakthrough was not very wide of the mark.