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  The Atlas of Reality

  A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics

  Robert C. Koons and Timothy H. Pickavance

  This edition first published 2017

  © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

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  Cover image: Atlas of Reality, graphite and ink drawing (2016), © Tim High, www.timhigh.com

  To our children, Emily, Betsy, and Ben Koons, and Lyle and Gretchen Pickavance.

  CONTENTS

  Acknowledgements

  Part I: Foundations 1: Introduction 1.1 A Brief History of Metaphysics

  1.2 Why Do Metaphysics?

  1.3 How to Use the Book

  2: Truthmakers 2.1 Introduction

  2.2 Five Arguments for Classical Truthmaker Theory

  2.3 The Challenge of Deflationism

  2.4 Truthmaker Maximalism

  2.5 Alternatives to Truthmaker Maximalism

  2.6 Conclusion and Preview

  Notes

  3: Grounding, Ontological Dependence, and Fundamentality 3.1 Is Grounding Real?

  3.2 Relation between Grounding and Truthmaking

  3.3 Relation between Grounding and Ontological Dependence

  3.4 Conceptual vs. Extra-Conceptual Grounding

  3.5 Alternatives to Grounding?

  3.6 Can Grounding Relations be Grounded?

  3.7 Connections between Grounding and Entailment

  3.8 How is Grounding Different from Causal Explanation?

  3.9 Conclusion: Grounding and Ontological Economy

  Notes

  Part II: Dispositions 4: Conditionals 4.1 Counterfactual Conditionals: Semantics, Logic, and Metaphysics

  4.2 Hypotheticalism

  4.3 Anti-Hypotheticalism and Laws of Nature

  4.4 Strong Hypotheticalism: Counterfactual Accounts of Powers and Dispositions

  Notes

  5: Laws of Nature 5.1 Strong Nomism: The Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley (DAT) Theory of Laws

  5.2 Neo-Humeism: Reduction of Conditionals, Laws, and Powers

  Notes

  6: Powers and Properties 6.1 Advantages of Strong Powerism

  6.2 The Individuation of Properties

  6.3 Objections to Strong Powerism

  6.4 Conclusion

  Notes

  Part III: Universals and Particulars 7: Universals 7.1 Introduction

  7.2 Realism

  7.3 Universals and the Problem of Intentionality

  7.4 Properties as the Ground of Causal Powers

  Notes

  8: Reductive Nominalism and Trope Theory 8.1 Reductive Nominalism

  8.2 Trope Theory

  8.3 Conclusion

  Notes

  9: Particulars and the Problem of Individuation 9.1 Introduction

  9.2 Facts

  9.3 Substances

  Notes

  10: Relations, Structures, and Quantities 10.1 Accounts of Relational Facts

  10.2 Non-Symmetrical Relations and the Problem of Order

  10.3 Structural Universals and Constituent Ontology

  10.4 Determinables, Quantities, and Real Numbers

  10.5 Conclusion and Preview

  Notes

  Part IV: The Nature of Reality 11: Nihilism and Monism 11.1 Nihilism and Aliquidism

  11.2 Monism

  Note

  12: The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existing 12.1 Does Everything Exist?

  12.2 Ontic Vagueness

  12.3 Conclusion

  13: Solipsism, Idealism, and the Problem of Perception 13.1 Defining the Mental and the External

  13.2 Solipsism and Phenomenalism

  13.3 Theories of Perception

  13.4 Arguments against Phenomenalism

  13.5 Arguments against Solipsism

  13.6 Conclusion and Preview

  Notes

  Part V: Modality 14: Possibility, Necessity, and Actuality: Concretism 14.1 Introduction

  14.2 Concretism: Worlds as Universes

  14.3 Problems for Concretism

  14.4 Conclusion

  Note

  15: Abstractionism: Worlds as Representations 15.1 Magical Abstractionism

  15.2 Structural Abstractionism

  15.3 Aristotelian Theories of Possibility

  15.4 Conclusion

  Note

  16: De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge 16.1 Modality De Re: Transworld Identity and Counterpart Theory

  16.2 Modality and Epistemology: Possibility and Conceivability

  16.3 Conclusion

  Notes

  Part VI: Space and Time 17: Is Space Merely Relational? 17.1 The Nature of Location

  17.2 Spatial Substantivalism

  17.3 Spatial Relationism

  17.4 Absences and Vacuums

  17.5 Conclusion

  Notes

  18: Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions 18.1 Constructing Points from Regions

  18.2 Points vs. Regions

  18.3 Arguments against Points as Fundamental

  18.4 Voluminism vs. Volume-Boundary Dualism

  18.5 Conclusion

  Note

  19: The Structure of Time 19.1 Is Time Composed of Instants or Intervals?

  19.2 Instants as Dependent Entities

  19.3 Does Time have a Beginning?

  19.4 Conclusion

  20: Time's Passage 20.1 Tensers and Anti-Tensers

  20.2 Varieties of Anti-Tensism

/>   20.3 Varieties of Tensism

  20.4 Presentism

  20.5 Arguments for Tensism

  20.6 Conclusion

  Note

  21: Arguments for Anti-Tensism 21.1 How Fast Does Time Flow?

  21.2 Truthmakers for Truths about the Past

  21.3 The Theory of Relativity

  21.4 Epistemological Problems for Tensism

  21.5 McTaggart's Paradox

  21.6 Brute Necessities of Time

  21.7 Conclusion

  Part VII: Unity 22: Material Composition: The Special Question 22.1 The Existence of Composite Things

  22.2 Are Composite Things an “Ontological Free Lunch”?

  22.3 Redundancy

  22.4 Fundamental Heaps

  22.5 Fundamental Artifacts

  22.6 Living Organisms vs. Mereological Nihilism

  22.7 Finding an Intelligible Principle of Composition

  Notes

  23: Composition: The General Question 23.1 Formal Mereology: Leśniewski, Goodman, and Leonard

  23.2 Three (or Four) Answers to the General Composition Question

  23.3 Accounting for the Correct Principles of Mereology

  23.4 Parthood and Truthmaking

  Notes

  24: Change and Persistence 24.1 Does Anything Change? Does Anything Persist?

  24.2 How Objects Change Properties: Substratism vs. Replacementism

  24.3 The Metaphysics of Motion

  Notes

  25: The Persistence of Composite Things 25.1 Mereological Constancy and Inconstancy

  25.2 Coincident Things

  25.3 Conclusion

  Note

  Part VIII: Causation 26: The Existence and Scope of Causation 26.1 Are there Causes?

  26.2 The Scope of Causation

  Note

  27: Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths? 27.1 Causal Explanationism

  27.2 Causal Connectionism

  Notes

  28: Discrete and Continuous Causation 28.1 Is All Causation Discrete?

  28.2 The Nature of Discrete Causation

  28.3 Is All Causation Continuous?

  28.4 The Nature of Continuous Processes

  28.5 Processes and the Direction of Continuous Causation

  28.6 Are Processes an Exception to Hume's Epistemic Principle?

  28.7 Conclusion: The Consequences of Causation

  Notes

  29: Conclusion: The Four Packages

  Appendix A: Metaphysical Theses and Antithesis 2. Truthmakers

  3. Grounding, Ontological Dependence, and Fundamentality

  4. Conditionals

  6. Powers

  7. Universals

  8. Nominalism

  9. Particulars and the Problem of Individuation

  10. Relations, Structures, and Quantities

  11. Nihilism and Monism

  12. The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existent

  13. Solipsism, Idealism and the Problem of Perception

  14. Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity

  15. Abstractionism: Worlds as Representations

  16. De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge

  17. Is Space Merely Relational?

  18. The Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions

  19. The Structure of Time

  20. Time's Passage

  22. Material Composition: The Special Question

  23. Material Composition: The General Question

  24. Change and Persistence

  25. The Persistence of Composite Things

  26. The Existence and Scope of Causation

  27. Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths?

  28. Discrete and Continuous Causation

  Appendix B: Table of Principles I. Principles of Methodology

  II. Principles of Epistemology

  III. Principles of Truth

  IV. Principles of Metaphysics

  V. Principles of Natural Philosophy

  VI. Principles of Mereology

  References

  Index

  EULA

  List of Tables

  Chapter 2 Table 2.1

  Chapter 8 Table 8.1

  Chapter 10 Table 10.1

  Chapter 16 Table 16.1

  Chapter 29 Table 29.1

  Table 29.2

  Table 29.3

  List of Illustrations

  Chapter 2 Figure 2.1 The Correspondence Relation

  Figure 2.2 Propositions as Contents of Sentence Tokens

  Figure 2.3 Propositions as Contents of Attitude States

  Chapter 4 Figure 4.1 Comparing Powerism and Neo-Humeism

  Chapter 6 Figure 6.1 A Symmetrical Law-Book

  Chapter 9 Figure 9.1 Theories of Substances

  Chapter 10 Figure 10.1 A Two-Step Construction of a Binary Relational Fact

  Figure 10.2 A Pictorial Representation of the Two-Step Construction

  Figure 10.3 A Divided-Universal Construction of a Binary Relational Fact

  Figure 10.4 A Pictorial Representation of the Divided-Universal Construction

  Chapter 11 Figure 11.1 The Love Network

  Chapter 18 Figure 18.1 Two Perfect Spheres Lose Contact.

  Chapter 23 Figure 23.1 Mereological Transitivity

  Figure 23.2 Mereological Overlap

  Figure 23.3 Weak Supplementation

  Figure 23.4 Strong Supplementation

  Chapter 27 Figure 27.1 The Dowe Decay Case

  Acknowledgements

  We would like to thank our commissioning editor at Wiley-Blackwell, Deirdre Ilkson, our project editors, Roshna Mohan and Manish Luthra, and four anonymous reviewers. We would also like to thank Al Martinich, who got us started on this project by inviting us to contribute to the Fundamentals of Philosophy series. Our special thanks to Benjamin Koons for his help in proofreading the manuscript. We are grateful to Peter Forrest, L. A. Paul, Daniel Korman, Josh Parson, Graham Priest, and Trenton Merricks for comments on an early draft, Alexander Pruss and Josh Rasmussen for their help on causation and composition, and Robert Garcia for his insights on tropes and constituent ontology.

  We have both benefited greatly from the assistance of our students, including the students of eight sections of PHL 323K and 327 at the University of Texas from 2010 through 2015. Graduate students at both the University of Texas and Biola University have contributed much to this project, including Bryan Pickel, Nicholas Mantegani, Brian Cutter, Nora Berenstain, Richard Lawton Davis, Nicole Garcia, Trevor Nyman, Kate Ritchie, Travis Hobbs, Briggs Wright, Janice Chik, Matthew M. O'Brien, and Max Goss.

  RCK adds: I would like to acknowledge the support during the 2014-2015 academic year of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University (for a Visiting Fellowship) and the University of Texas at Austin (for a faculty research grant).

  THP adds: I would like to thank Scott Rae and Clint Arnold, as well as the administration at Biola University, for a Sabbatical during the Fall of 2015.

  Part I

  Foundations

  1

  Introduction

  Metaphysics, or first philosophy, is that branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of reality in its most fundamental aspects: existence, the part/whole relation, space, time, causality, possibility and necessity, similarity and dissimilarity. It includes ontology, the study of what exists, as well as the investigation of the most general features of reality. Metaphysicians seek to understand the real structure and the unity of the world and to catalog the ways in which its parts relate to each other.

  In this chapter, we begin with a short history of metaphysics (1.1), followed by a discussion of some reasons why metaphysics matters (1.2). We conclude with some guidance about how best to use this book (1.3).

  1.1 A Brief History of Metaphysics

  Metaphysics is the oldest branch of philosophy. The early, pre-Socratic philosophers of Ionia (off the coast of Turkey) and southern Italy proposed theories about the universal nature of things and about change an
d the explanations of change. Many of the early philosophers, including Empedocles (c. 490–430 BC) and Democritus (c. 460–370 BC), approached these questions from a materialistic point of view, assuming that wisdom comes primarily from understanding what things are made of. In the fourth century BC, the great Greek philosopher Plato (428/427 or 424/423–348/347 BC) developed a theory of “forms” as a deep explanation for what makes things of a kind similar to each other, as an alternative to the earlier materialism. Plato's student, Aristotle (384–322 BC), built upon the work of all of his predecessors in creating the first comprehensive and systematic metaphysical theory in a work that acquired (for the first time) the title Metaphysics. Aristotle describes his subject as “primary” or “first” philosophy and as the study of being as such. Aristotle examined the nature of change and of powers to change, and he built a theory of categories to use in classifying all of the constituents of reality. Like Plato, Aristotle rejected simple materialism and emphasized the qualitative and holistic features of the world, especially of living organisms.