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  To appease Freitag, Himmler agreed to the introduction of a number of measures designed to substantially increase the Division’s ‘reliability’ including the assignment of a further one thousand German officers and NCOs to it.11

  The first official notification that the Division was to be rebuilt was actually given by Himmler to SS-Brigadeführer Hans Juttner on 7 August 1944.12 In this document, Himmler stated that [during the encirclement the] ‘Division commander and the German commanders behaved and fought outstandingly’. It also identified Juttner in his capacity as the Chef SS-Führungshauptamt as being one of those responsible for the proposal to rearm and equip the Division.13

  The Military Board which had played an active part in the Division’s original formation, was not consulted or informed of the decision until three days later when it received the news under the cover of a letter from Governor Wächter dated 10 August 1944.14

  From Berlin, SS-Brigadeführer Freitag and his I(a) travelled directly to Neuhammer to arrange accommodation for the remnants of the Division. Having done so Freitag took the opportunity to visit the SS-Panzer Grenadier Schule Kienschlag in Bohemia where the course for Ukrainian SS-Untersturmführers was coming to an end. In the afternoon all Ukrainians who were in attendance on the day of his arrival were gathered in the lecture hall of the main building and presented to Freitag (standing) whereupon he delivered an address. In a speech seemingly calculated to humiliate the Ukrainians and vilify their fighting reputation, Freitag emphasised the most unfavourable aspect of their conduct at Brody and sought to apportion the full responsibility for the crushing defeat of XIII AK. on them. This embarrassing and tactless tirade ultimately achieved little save for unnecessarily antagonising his audience who would soon be serving as officers in the Division which he commanded. The school’s German course commander SS-Sturmbannführer Rudolf Klotz who was fully cognisant of the circumstances under which the battle had been fought, also took exception to Freitag’s unprofessional conduct and, offended by this apparent display of acute xenophobia, he later made a point of speaking out in their defence.15

  On 13 August Major Heike flew to rejoin the remnants in Trans Carpathia, bringing with him news that the Division could not be liquidated because of ‘political considerations’.16 A few days later open topped freight wagons arrived and the transfer of the first groups via Budapest and Vienna to Neuhammer began.

  Decorations and Debasement

  By the end of August the last of the survivors of Brody had been transferred back to the training facility at Neuhammer. At this point as the regular accommodation at the camp was occupied by other formations, the Galician Division including it’s Training and Reserve Regiment and returnees from Brody were therefore temporarily quartered in nearby Stalag VIIIE Neuhammer (Swietoszow). This former prisoner of war camp which was standing empty was surrounded by a two metre high barbed wire fence and had extremely primitive wooden barracks.17 Under the circumstances, from a psychological point of view, placing the Ukrainians in a former POW camp, was about the most injudicious thing the Germans could possibly have done. Although the Ukrainians were not in fact being held prisoner, the accommodation arrangements coupled with the hostile atmosphere and bad feeling between the Germans and the Ukrainians, convinced some that this was indeed the case.

  Waffen-Unterscharführer Jurij Ferencevych of 13./WGR 31 who had just returned from Brody, recounted some of the difficulties experienced at this time:

  […] When we came back from a village called Lintsi north of Serednje in Carpatho-Ukraine to Neuhammer, all of us were in Swietoszow lager (camp) for some time. Later they moved us to Hindenburg lager where new units were formed. I was assigned a barrack for my company and we moved in. There were double bunk beds. The first night we could not sleep because thousands of hungry bed bugs were dropping on us. The next day I organised some pails and brushes and all day we were washing walls, ceilings and floors with cold water. Next night we had the same. All the recruits received Zeltbahnen18 (German shelter quarters), which were triangular pieces of fabric which served as a poncho and which could be joined together to make a larger shelter. 4 joined together made a tent. I asked the recruits to build tents alongside the barracks. The soldiers then slept in tents on the [bare] earth. About 3 days later we were assigned to a new clean barrack.

  All soldiers received straw mattresses but no straw. I went to the regiment headquarters, Abteilung III (Supplies) to ask for straw. There I met there a Ukrainian supply officer, probably twice my age who was a Waffen-Ustuf. or Waffen-Obstuf. dressed in a very elegant uniform. I told him what I needed. He was in a hurry and said that he could do nothing for me. Then he opened a door to a room where the chief supply officer, a German Hstuf. was sitting at a desk. He asked him what kind of wine he would like to have for his meal and left. It pissed me off. I knocked at the door of this German officer, entered and told him what my problem was. He was very friendly and told me that next day we will receive the straw. He kept his word and the next day my company and all others in the regiment received straw.

  Kitchen. There was at this time one outdoor kitchen that was serving meals to many companies. The soldiers were arriving in groups at the same time from all directions and there was a lot of pushing, because every soldier wanted to receive their meal first. The cooks were fat Germans and they were making very nasty sarcastic remarks about the Ukrainians in the German language referring to them as ‘a bunch of cattle’. This made me very mad. I could not find anybody who was in charge of these men from different companies who would bring them to order. Starting next day, I came to the kitchen before meal time to instil some order in this mess. It took me 6 days before I could get the companies to stay in order as they came and went to receive meals one company after another.19

  Another new arrival fresh from graduating from an NCO course was Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun:

  […] When we arrived in Neuhammer from Carpatho-Ukraine all our comrades from Lauenburg, that arrived earlier were already engaged in training the recruits. I was pleased to meet Lischynsky, who left Lauenburg to train as an officer, but didn’t pass the Zwischenprüfung (interim exams). He managed to get me into the company that he was in, [12./III./WGR.30] and I was made Zugsführer. I was acknowledged as a good technician and lecturer but too soft to be a drill master.

  In Lauenburg we had to take charge of the company in turn and put it through drill paces. When Ziemba’s turn came we all dreaded it because he enjoyed it so much, that he overdid it a bit, or should I say a lot. So I asked for Ziemba to become our recruits drill master. You see the problem was that recruits were kow-towing to the lowest ranking Germans, but would not obey our orders because they said that we were the same as them. In Ziemba’s hands in a few weeks the company started to look more like an organised unit. For disobedience he just stopped their privileges in their spare time, or withheld their Soldbuchs so they could not leave camp to visit town.

  Although training new recruits progressed slowly you could feel friction among three fractions in the command system; us from first Division, who had been through Prussian like strict training; those that arrived from the Schutzpolizei, or other training locations; old timers from the First World War, former officers from the Polish Army and Red Army, or deserters from the Red Army .[…]20

  After several days, many complaints and repeated petitioning by the Division’s command, as space became available, all its soldiers were able to move into the better accommodation within the main camp compound. The only exception was the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillion which remained in place until the end of September. The unfriendly attitude cultivated by some of the Germans, especially the NCOs, towards the Ukrainians continued to permeate and taint the atmosphere21 as Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Dmytro Ferkuniak noted: ‘[…] Here we experienced hostile treatment by the Germans. The word ‘traitor’ was heard daily. We were forbidden to sing Ukrainian songs. Our rations were cut, only two cigarettes per man were given daily. Our rations were the lo
west that existed’ .[…]22

  Crosses of Iron

  On the 1 September 1944, after Holy Mass, a parade was held for the bestowal of decorations and the announcement of promotions for those who had won them at Brody. For the presentation the Germans received appropriate ration cards for replacement uniforms, while the Ukrainian officers wore the same uniforms in which they returned from the battle.23

  Eleven Germans received the Iron Cross I. Class. These were: Stuf. Oskar Kopp, Obstuf. Rudolph Michel (Div.-Stab), Staf. Friedrich Dern, Obstuf. Hans Ditze, Obstuf. Adolf Bruderhofer (Gren.Rgt.29), Hstuf. Siegfried Klocker (Gren.Rgt.30), Obstuf. Karl Kärgelein, Ustuf. Heinrich Dumke (Gren.Rgt.31), Ustuf. Richard Braun, Ustuf. Anton Stec (Art.Rgt.14) and Hschaf. Josef Hietmann (San.Abt.14).24

  Although many were undoubtedly deserved, significantly not a single Ukrainian was awarded the Iron Cross I. Class for their participation in the battle of Brody.25

  On 1 August 1944, a total of one hundred and one Iron Crosses II. Class were conferred on soldiers serving with the ‘14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr.1). Of these 78 were awarded to Germans.26 The remaining 23 were awarded to Ukrainians of which the highest proportion went to members of both WGR 29: (five) and Art.Rgt.14, (five). From WGR 29 they were: W.-Ostuf. Volodymyr Kosak,27 W.-Ustuf. Father Michael Levenetz, W.-Uscha. Lubomyr Bodnar, W.-Uscha. Jaroslav Kinasch, W.-Ustuf. Roman Czuczkewycz: from WGR 30:W.-Uscha. Jaroslav Bobinsky, W.-Gren. Jarema Lechniuk: from WGR 31: W.-Uscha. Olesj Gardetsky, W.-Rtf. Josef Damkovytsch, W.-Strm. Myron Paschytzny, W.-Gren. Jurij Kondur: from Waffen-Fus.Batl.14: W.-Obstuf. Roman Bojcun, W.-Strm. Nikolaus Fylypovytsch, W.-O.Fus. Wasyl Janko: from Waffen-Art.-Regt.14: W.-Ustuf. Michael Dlaboha, W.-Uscha. Eugen Dzundza, W.-Strm. Marian Gurnisvytsch, W.-Kan. Roman Butschvnsky, W.-Kan. Wasyl Palijenko: from Pz.Jg.Abt.14: W.-Uscha. Myron Schtschudluk, W.-Strm. Gunter Lofi: from Waffen-Nachsch.Abt.14: W.-Strm. Volodymyr Martschuk, W.-Funk. Stefan Batko.28

  On 21.09.1944, W.-Obstuf. Stefan Hulak (Füs.Btl.) was added bringing the total to 24.

  Along with a variety of lesser decorations and awards29 132 members of the Division received the Kriegsverdienstkreuze (War Merit Cross) II. Class, of which 32 were Ukrainians. They were:

  W.-Obstuf. Dmytro Ferkuniak, W.-Strm. Michael Vankevych, W.-Hstuf. Eugen v.Nikitin, W.-Oscha. Alex Maslak, W.-Uscha. Myron Loscynsky, W.-Uscha. Mikola Schkira, W.-Gren. Ivan Cypuch, W.-Gren. Jaroslav Iwaneckyj, W.-Gren. Michael Mamalyga, W.-Uscha. Roman Dmytruk, W.Obstuf. Julian Temnyk, W.St.O.J. Bohdan Tesluk, W.-Uscha. Vladimir Kultschitzkyj, W.-Kan. Eugen Kopijtschuk, W.-Kan. Demeter Sadowij, W.-Kan. Bohdan Swarytsch, W.-Kan. Vladimyr Andruschtschak, W.-Strm. Jaroslav Gaba, W.-Oscha. Volodymyr Slipak, W.-Uscha. Theophil Mazur, W.-Hstuf. Porfiri Sylenko, Ustuf. Bohdan Panasiuk, W.-Hscha. Dr Alexander Fahrion, W.St.O.J. Dr Roman Rak, W.-Oscha. Stanyslav Sendeckyj, W.-Hstuf. Leonid Martyniuk, W.-Ustuf. Theodor Vynnyk, W.-Oscha. Paul Baklatsch, W.-Oscha. Andrij Ivaniv, W.-Strm. Stanislav Kusyk, W.-Ustuf. Dr Volodymyr Kischko and W.-Uscha. Petro Sawatzkyj.30

  Several German officers were recommended to be advanced in rank by Freitag for their ‘valour’ at Brody with effect from 1 September 1944. These included two of the three surviving regimental commanders, Friedrich Dern and Friedrich Beyersdorff who commanded WGR 29 and the Artillery Regiments respectively, both of whom were promoted to the rank of SS-Standartenführer. Regarding Dern the commander of WGR 29 (whose promotion was effective from 1 July 1944) Freitag wrote:

  […] In the Brody pocket eastwards of Lemberg [L’viv] he led his Regiment in the most difficult situations with special prudence and determination. Thanks to his dedication and bravery the decisive breakthrough at the critical point of the XIII Corps (either side of the main road) Brody-Lemberg was maintained to the last hour. Here Dern was wounded. His promotion to SS Standartenführer is particularly preferential because of his bravery before the enemy.31

  His assessment of the commander of the Artillery Regiment Friedrich Beyersdorff was similar, despite the fact that during the battle he, like many other senior German officers, was noticeable by his absence. Freitag wrote:

  […] In the Brody pocket Beyersdorff led the Regiment prudently and successfully. Again and again Beyersdorff displayed personal bravery and readiness to face challenges in difficult situations. His promotion to SS Standartenführer is particularly preferential because of his bravery before the enemy.32

  The third surviving regimental commander Hans Forstreuter Freitag’s old comrade in arms from the 4 Polizei Division was not recommended for promotion, despite his significant efforts in organising his shattered regiment following its first commitment at the front.33 Freitag’s somewhat equivocal assessment stated:

  Forstreuter has an open and basically decent character. Tends to sometimes be influenced by moods. In combat as well as in rebuilding the Division as Regiment commander Forstreuter has proved [to be] good. F. is committed to replenishing the missing gaps in his military knowledge. Forstreuter fulfils his service position to my full satisfaction.34

  Unit commanders who received promotion included Karl Bristot the commander of the Fusilier Battalion whose unit was well led and utilised as a ‘fire brigade’ to tackle the most serious situations. His recommendation read:

  […] During the encirclement at Brody the Fus. Btl. was repeatedly ordered into critical [battle] points. Bristot exhibited outstanding leadership of the battalion. It is due to his personal bravery and readiness that in the heaviest fighting of XIII AK the important massif of Pidhirtsi remained in German hands up until the critical hour. His promotion to SS Sturmbannführer is particularly deserving because of his bravery before the enemy.35

  Other commanders included Hermann Kaschner (Panzerjäger-Abt.), and Johannes Kleinow (Feld Ersatz Batl.) both of whom were also promoted to the rank of SS-Sturmbannführer. It is noteworthy that Major Heike, the Division’s 1a was its only regular army officer, received neither decoration nor promotion.36 This is despite several witnesses who later testified that unlike Freitag and many of the senior German commanders, he remained with the Division throughout the battle directing actions,37 receiving a minor injury in the arm in the process.38

  A Margin of Certainty

  The Galician Division’s strength return as of 4 September 1944, listed 134 officers, 522 NCOs and 4,419 men totalling 5,075,39 while at the same time its independent Training and Reserve Regiment (A.u.E.Rgt.14.) recorded a total of an additional 8,835 men of all ranks.40

  On 5 September 1944, a secret circular order was finally issued by Hans Juttner chief of the SS-FHA, setting down the framework on which the new 14.Waffen-Gren.Div. der SS (galizische Nr.1) was to be rebuilt. This order which named SS-Brigadeführer Freitag as being responsible for its immediate re-formation, also gave instructions that all weapons, equipment, vehicles and horses necessary for this purpose were to be sent directly to its home base of Neuhammer. It further directed that the basis of the reconstituted Division was to be the three thousand survivors of Brody and that additional manpower was to be drawn chiefly from three sources; the approximately 8,800 men of its Training and Reserve Regiment (SS-Gren.Ausb.u.Ers.Rgt.14); the units ordered for use in the formation of the third battalions of the Infantry Regiments 29, 30 and 31; and the remaining soldiers of the 4 and 5 Galizischen SS-Freiwilligen Regiments which had not deployed at Brody. It went on to say that the training of specialists was to be completed by 15 November 1944, while the Division was to be ready for deployment in the field by 31 December 1944. This was an unrealistic deadline for battle readiness in view of the influx of new untrained recruits and prevailing chronic shortages of ordnance and equipment of all types at that time.

  Most importantly, the order also specifically stated that Ukrainians were to be debarred from the Divisional staff, regimental staff, communications section and other administrative positions which were to be reserved exclusively for Germans. The same applied to all battalion and department staff, commanders, adjutants and security officers as well as appropriate communications
personnel. The only exceptions were to be drivers and horse grooms etc (ultimately, Freitag was able to extend this order to the vast majority of technical posts such as harness makers and craftsmen which were also given to Germans—the Ukrainians were made their apprentices). In this way Freitag sought to preserve the Korsettstange or ‘German skeleton’ and maintain a ‘margin of certainty’.41

  A further detail contained within the document designed to address some of the difficulties encountered with communications during the battle of Brody, was that 60 per cent of all personnel assigned to the Signals Detachment (SS-Nachr.Abt.14), irrespective of rank, were to be Germans.

  Lastly, all units were to submit status reports by the 15 September 1944, the same day that refitting, reinforcement and retraining was to commence.42

  During September to further facilitate its reconstitution, at Freitag’s request as promised the SS-FHA sent a further 1,000 German officers and NCOs to the Division to make up for losses at Brody.43 However Freitag’s demand for more Reich Germans proved to be a doubled edged sword since as had been the case when it was first formed, they again included a number of men who were unwanted elsewhere and not suited to the Galician Division. On this issue SS-Oberscharführer Eric Kernmayr observed: