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  To the people of Bangladesh, who fought and won a heroic battle against extinction. The inheritors of Sonar Bangla, the land of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s dreams.

  In Memoriam

  Captain M.N.R. Samant, Maha Vir Chakra (1930–2019)

  Sailor, submariner, covert warrior, war hero

  CONTENTS

  FOREWORD

  DRAMATIS PERSONAE

  PROLOGUE

  1. GENERAL GENOCIDE

  2. THE EMPEROR, KING COBRA AND THE WATER RAT

  3. CAMP PLASSEY

  4. NO MAN LIKE SOMAN

  5. SECTOR X

  6. JACKPOT

  7. GUNBOATS ON THE GANGA

  8. BEHIND ENEMY LINES

  9. SAMMY’S TURTLES

  10. FORCE ALFA

  11. LAST BOAT SAILING

  12. JOY BANGLA

  NOTES

  EPILOGUE

  TIMELINE 1971

  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

  PHOTOGRAPHIC INSERTS

  ABOUT THE BOOK

  ABOUT THE AUTHOR

  Copyright

  FOREWORD

  Much is known about the excesses of the Pakistan Army in 1971 in what was then the eastern half of the country. This was a period when an estimated three million Bangladeshis were killed during the Pakistan Army’s onslaught on its own citizens in East Pakistan. The Bangladesh military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1971 was the inevitable consequence of this genocide and the pressure of tending to the over eight million refugees who had fled to India. The war finally resulted in the formal surrender by the Pakistan Army on 16 December 1971, and close to 93,000 Pakistani nationals surrendering as Prisoners of War to a joint command of the Indian Army and the ‘Mukti Bahini’ Bangladesh freedom fighters.

  While much has been written about the land and air battles that led to the liberation of Bangladesh, there has been an impression that, except for operations by carrier-based aircraft in the Bay of Bengal and an attack on Karachi during the conflict, the Indian Navy had little or no role in the developments leading to the liberation of Bangladesh. More than four decades after Bangladesh was liberated, this impression has finally been corrected, thanks to this book written by Captain M.N.R Samant, who was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for exceptional bravery in the conduct of covert commando operations in Bangladesh. These operations were undertaken well before the actual declaration of war in December 1971. The book is co-authored by Sandeep Unnithan, who has been one of India’s foremost writers on issues related to defence and national security. It also sheds light on how Prime Minister Indira Gandhi personally approved and regularly monitored the covert naval operations in Bangladesh, which were undertaken under the supervision of the then naval chief, Admiral S.M. Nanda and the director of naval intelligence, Captain (later Vice Admiral) M.K. Roy.

  The case for a naval role in the developments within Bangladesh emerged on humanitarian grounds. But what gave the idea impetus was a virtual rebellion within the Pakistan Navy just after the Bangladesh uprising commenced. Eight Bengali naval personnel deployed in a recently acquired French built submarine, the PNS Mangro, decided to desert the Pakistan Navy and join the freedom struggle after hearing horrific details of the Pakistan Army’s brutal killings in East Pakistan. The submariners found their way to the Indian Embassy in Madrid, seeking India’s help in returning to their homeland. These sailors formed the base upon which the Indian Navy built its whole offensive, and played a key role in contacting and providing local support for the covert Indian operations that were aimed at destroying logistical facilities across the coastal areas of Bangladesh, weeks before actual military operations by India began.

  The book spells out how covert operations on foreign soil are conducted and the constant danger that those involved in these operations face to their lives, every moment they are operating on foreign soil. That, for me, is what makes this book such a gripping read. I was also happy to see that it is able to place the whole situation in an international setting by defining the contours of the difficult diplomatic situation that India’s leadership faced in dealing with the emergence of a virtual US–China alliance which had been built with Pakistan acting as the intermediary. US President Richard Nixon’s aversion for India and its leadership, and the US’s keenness to turn a blind eye to the brutal suppression of the Bangladeshis – despite the superpower’s avowed love for democracy as well as Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s rightful claim to power – failed to make matters easier for India.

  The entire strategic scenario across India’s eastern borders has changed after the epochal conflict of 1971. Bangladesh, which was then virtually written off as a potential economic basket case, forever leaning on international aid for its existence, has proved the sceptics wrong. Largely self- sufficient in meeting its food needs, the country has now emerged as a leading player in exports worldwide of textiles and textile products. While its military did play a role in the initial years after independence, Bangladesh is today a vibrant democracy. Even long-standing differences with India over its land and maritime borders have been amicably resolved.

  The reality today is that it is not Bangladesh, but Pakistan that has emerged as an ‘international basket case’, heavily dependent on foreign aid to make both ends meet. Already one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies, Bangladesh is poised to overtake Pakistan’s GDP in the next few years.

  Captain Samant was given a hero’s welcome whenever he visited Bangladesh and met friends and admirers who looked back on what happened in 1971 with justifiable pride. He lived a full, heroic life, and it pains me immensely that he could not be here to witness the adulation this wonderful book would receive. However, it gives me satisfaction that he was able to recount to readers the real story of the covert naval operation that birthed Bangladesh, and to finally give us a glimpse into the lives of the unknown heroes who made the bigger campaign possible.

  While this book is a celebration of the Indian heroes, it would be remiss of us if we forgot the role of the eight brave Bangladeshi submariners – M. Rahmatulla, S.M. Hussain, Aminullah Sheikh, A.W. Chowdhury, M.B. Alam, M.A. Rehman, A.R. Mian and M. Ahasanullah – who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the cause of freedom and dignity of their fellow countrymen.

  G. Parthasarathy

  New Delhi

  May 2019

  DRAMATIS PERSONAE

  INDIAN NAVY

  OFFICER DESIGNATION

  Admiral Sardarilal Mathradas ‘Charles’ Nanda Chief of the Naval Staff

  Capt Mihir Kumar ‘Micky’ Roy Director Naval Intelligence

  Commander M.N.R. ‘Sammy’ Samant Staff Officer (Naval Operations X)

  Lt Cdr George Martis Officer in Charge, C2P, Plassey (June–Nov 1971)

  Lt Vijai Prakash Kapil Officer in charge, C2P (April– June), Second-in-Command (June– Dec 1971)

  Lt Samir Das Instructor, Training Coordinator C2P Plassey

  Lt Cdr Ashok ‘Aku’ Roy Officer in Charge Naval Detachment, Delta Sector (July– Oct 1971)

  Lt Cdr Jayanto Kumar Roy Choudhury Commanding Officer MV Palash, Squadron Commander C2H

  Lt Suvesh Kumar Mitter Commanding Officer MV Padma

  Lt Cdr Vishnu Kumar Raizada Chief Squadron Technical Officer, C2H (Electrical)

  Lt Cdr C.S. Menon Staff Officer to Cdr Samant (May– Oct 1971)

  Lt Cdr G.D. Mukherjee Staff Officer to Cdr Samant (Oct– Dec 1971)

  Commodore R.P. ‘Squeaky’ Khanna Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC) Calcutta

  Lt J.V. Natu Squadron Engineer Officer C2H

  Sub Lt A.K. Bandopadhyay Junior staff officer to Cdr Samant (November-December 1971)

  Sub Lt B.S. Thakur Replaced Lt Samir Das as instructor, training coordinator in C2P, Oc
tober 1971

  Vice Admiral N. Krishnan Commander-in-Chief Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam

  Vice Admiral S.N. Kohli Commander-in-Chief Western Naval Command, Bombay

  Pandurang K. Dhole Petty Officer, CD-3, Chief Instructor C2P

  Madhusudhan Gupta Leading Seaman, CD-3, Senior Instructor C2P

  Karan Singh Leading Seaman CD-2, Instructor C2P

  E.J. Princhan Leading Seaman, CD-2, Instructor C2P

  Chiman Singh Leading Seaman, CD-2, Instructor C2P

  Lt S.V. Chitale Fleet Air Arm Engineer, Air-dropped ordnance specialist

  INDIAN ARMY

  OFFICER DESIGNATION

  Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Army Command

  Major General J.F.R. Jacob Chief of Staff, Eastern Command ,

  Director Ops (X) Oct-Dec 1971

  Major General B.M. ‘Jimmy’ Sarkar Director Ops (X) August- Oct 1971

  Brigadier N.A. Salik Sector Commander, Charlie Sector, West Bengal

  Brigadier Shabeg Singh Sector Commender, Delta Sector, Tripura

  Brigadier Joginder Singh Gharaya Brigade Commander, 42nd Brigade, Krishnanagar

  Lt Col A.B.C. D’Mello C.O. 2 Sikh LI, Krishnanagar

  MUKTI BAHINI

  OFFICER DESIGNATION

  Colonel M.A.G. Osmani Commander-in-Chief Bangladesh Armed Forces

  Abdul Wahed Chowdhury Leading Telegraphist PNS Mangro, later Commander Task Unit 54.1.2 Chittagong

  Mohammad Jalaluddin Leading Seaman, Pakistan Navy; Later chief bosun mate MV Padma

  Captain Rafiqul Islam Commander, Mukti Bahini Sector One

  Badiul Alam Petty Officer PNS Mangro, Commander Task Unit 54.1.2 Chandpur

  Mohammad Ahsanullah Ex-PNS Mangro, Commander Task Unit 54.1.3 Narayanganj

  Mohammad Rahmatulla Ex-PNS Mangro, Commander Task Unit 54.1.14 Khulna

  Atharuddin Talukder Naval Commando

  Humayun Kabir Naval Commando

  PAKISTAN NAVY

  OFFICER DESIGNATION

  Rear Admiral Muhammad Shariff Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan (FOCEP), Dacca.

  Captain Zamir Ahmed Chief of Staff, Eastern Naval Command, Dacca

  PROLOGUE

  PLASSEY, 23 June 1757

  Plassey. A nondescript village on the banks of the Bhagirathi, named for Butea monosperma, the bright orange–red spring flower native to the region. The red bloom on the riverbank that day, however, wasn’t from ‘The Flame of the Forest’ Palashi flowers. It was from the scarlet woollen coats of the over 2,100 infantrymen of Colonel Robert Clive, commander of the ground forces of the East India Company. The sepoys cradled their long Brown Bess muskets tipped with gleaming socket bayonets as they found shelter in the mango grove sprawled along the riverbank. The Laksha Bagh, as the grove was called, brought temporary relief from the damp, enervating Bengal heat. Perspiration trickled down the backs of the sepoys, while the wet mud sucked greedily at their boots – the woollen uniforms were meant for the cold plains of Britain, not the oppressive heat of the Indian summer. The orchard was also a natural stockade that would shelter the sepoys from the enemy’s cannonade. The white puffs of smoke in the distance were a sign that Siraj-ud-Daulah’s gunners had commenced their bombardment. Cannon balls hit the trees, scattering leaves and splintering wood. But the sepoys were safe. The Nawab’s army, which they counted as 50,000 strong – 35,000 foot soldiers and 15,000 cavalry waited in the distance to overwhelm them, just as they had the English garrison at Fort William the previous year. That campaign led to the infamous Black Hole of Calcutta, where some 146 English prisoners were confined to a tiny twenty-square metre dungeon by the Nawab’s men, with only twenty-three emerging alive the next morning.

  Clive’s army had been sent to re-establish the British factories in Bengal. In January, he had recaptured Calcutta (Kolkata now) and, by March, captured Chandernagore from the French. Now he marched to face Siraj-ud-Daulah who had set out at the head of a huge army from his capital Murshidabad, determined to teach the British another lesson. Clive’s infantry – 600 Europeans and over 2000 native infantry drawn from Bombay, Madras (Mumbai and Chennai now) and Bengal – had marched through heavy rain and flooded fields to reach Plassey. The colonel had turned the Nawab’s impressive brick hunting lodge, surrounded by a high wall, into his field headquarters – Plassey House. At sunrise, he had watched, from atop the roof of the lodge, all three divisions of the Nawab’s army encircle his position. The battle had started at around 8 a.m., when the Nawab’s French gunners opened fire on his positions. Clive ordered his men to take shelter behind a mud bank in front of the grove.

  The stench of impending defeat hung on the riverbank, but whose defeat, it wouldn’t become clear until a few hours later. The treacherous, shape-shifting sandbanks, which could alter the course of the deceptively calm Bhagirathi river twisting through the Bengal plain, held a clue. Mir Jafar, who commanded a third division of the Nawab’s army, watched impassively, opting not to join the battle.

  The Nawab’s guns continued firing for nearly four hours and a worried Clive gathered his men around for a war council when a thundercloud and the Bengal monsoon beat down on the battlefield and soaked Siraj-ud-Daulah’s ammunition. The British were better prepared. They had brought tarpaulins which they threw over their guns and ammunition. With their artillery rendered useless, Siraj-ud-Daulah’s army began an orderly retreat to their camps by 3 p.m. Clive spotted his opportunity and ordered an advance. His artillery began taking a toll on the Nawab’s army. Bakshi Mir Madan, the Nawab’s most trusted general and chief of the artillery, was killed, as was Bahadur Ali Khan, chief of the musketeers, and captain of the artillery, Nauwe Singh Hazari.

  As the British infantry surged forward by 5 p.m., their Brown Bess muskets discharging volleys of shot, it was all over. The twenty-four-year-old Nawab, his worst nightmares having come true, mounted a camel and fled the battlefield. His army followed suit. Siraj-ud-Daulah was captured and executed days later, and his treacherous general, Mir Jafar, was appointed the puppet Nawab of Bengal.

  Neither Clive nor the hapless Siraj would realize the significance of that battle. Palashi – like the hot, dusty village of Panipat, where Mughal invader Babar routed the forces of Ibrahim Lodhi on the north Indian plains on 21 April 1526, would be a pivot in world history. It marked the birth of an empire. With the defeat of Mir Jafar’s successor, Mir Qasim, in the Battle of Buxar in 1764, Clive had unlocked a booty beyond the wildest dreams of the board of directors ensconced in East India House on London’s Leadenhall Street. The Company transitioned from being merchants to conquerors and administrators of a province that was created by geographical features. The landmass bound by the Himalayas in the north, the province of Bihar in the west and the Purvanchal mountains in the east, was born out of the massive silt and debris – flowing down from the mighty Himalayas mountain range that had risen thanks to the collision of the Indian and the Eurasian plates – carried down over millennia by the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. Towards the south, the confluence of the two rivers in the province created the world’s largest delta – approximately 354 kilometres wide – as they emptied into the Bay of Bengal. The year-round irrigation and fertile soil saw agricultural surpluses that led to prosperity and a geopolitical maxim, voiced succinctly by historian Vincent Smith in The Oxford History of India: ‘Whichever power controls the lower Gangetic valley, ultimately rules north India.’

  Before Clive’s victory, Bengal was the richest Mughal suba or province, delivering nearly half of the empire’s revenues. The military occupation of the province in 1576 allowed Babur’s progeny to tighten their grip over India. Now, over two centuries later, Bengal was once again a war chest, open to conquest. Less than a century after Plassey, the British would – using a combination of intrigue, infantry and incomes from a province the combined size of Germany and France – grind down the empires of the Sikhs and Marathas. The other native princes meekly fell in line. Plassey usher
ed in a hundred-year reign of the Company.

  Calcutta, which grew around their walled trading settlement, Fort William, became the Company’s capital for 132 years. From their three bastions – Calcutta, Bombay and Madras – the Company’s armies engulfed the Indo-Gangetic plains, the land of five rivers and the Deccan, in a spate of conquest until the mutiny by the scarlet-coated sepoys of the Bengal Army in Kanpur in 1857 rang the curtains down on it. Company rule was followed by ninety-nine years of Crown Rule, when India glittered as the Jewel in the Crown.

  After the political awakening among the Hindu Bengali middle class in the late 19th century challenged British rule, the province also became the laboratory for another British tool of subjugation – divide and rule. In 1905, Bengal was partitioned between the Muslim majority eastern part and the Hindu-dominated west, an event that would be mourned with the immortal words ‘Amar shonar Bangla’ (my Golden Bengal), by the anguished poet and Nobel laureate, Rabindranath Tagore.

  The British undid the partition in 1911 even as they shifted their capital to New Delhi. But Tagore would not live to see the single worst depredation of colonial rule – the starvation deaths of three million Bengalis in 1943, when the British stockpiled rice and wheat to feed themselves through World War II, even as they continued to export rice from Bengal. The food shortage led to India’s worst famine. Millions swarmed the cities of Bengal looking for food. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill blamed Indians for the famine. It was their fault, he said at a briefing of the war cabinet ‘for breeding like rabbits’. He later told Secretary of State for India, Leopold Amery, that he hated Indians because ‘they are a beastly people with a beastly religion’.

  For many Indians, the Bengal Famine was the proverbial last straw. The twist of the knife that had been plunged in at Plassey. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the future prime minister of Bengal recounted in his memoirs in the 1960s:

  When the East India company had annexed Bengal following Mir Zafar’s betrayal in the 18th century, Bengal was so rich that a wealthy businessman of Murshidabad had enough money to buy the city of London … And now I saw what we were reduced to: mothers dying in the streets while their babies still suckled; dogs competing with people for leftovers in garbage dumps; children abandoned by their mothers who had run away or sold them, driven by hunger. At times, they failed to do even that since there would be no buyers.