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From the Associated Press came Don Weiss, a key lieutenant.
Jim Heffernan, later head of pr, was a Philadelphia beat writer.
At one point every league official in a policy- making position
was a former public relations expert, and the others in key jobs
had to been trained to think like Rozelle. “He brought them in,
trained them, and then shipped them out to play key roles around
the league,” Accorsi says.
He had an ability to attract good people and make them feel wanted
and important. I think each of us would have sacrificed our own
careers for him if he’d wanted that, but he didn’t.
I remember we had this meeting . . . Weiss, Pinchbeck, Harold
Rosenthal, myself, and a few others. We are sitting around this big
table. He wanted our opinion about something. He asked each one of
us, and he sat there and listened. Then he said, “I want you to know
I really appreciate your input. Now, here is what we’re gonna do.”
Well, none of us had even thought of the plan he came up with.
So we’re leaving the room, and I said to Rosenthal, who used to write
for the Herald Tribune and who knew Pete as far back as his usf days,
“How the hell did he come up with that when none of us had a clue?”
The Boy Wonder Takes Center Stage
59
And he laughed and said, “Because, Ernesto, he is smarter than the rest of us.”
Hell, he was smarter than anyone else we knew. But he never made
you feel that way. What he did was to listen . . . always listen. . . . Sometimes at owner meetings he would stop and say he wanted to take a
straw vote on some issue, and I knew that was because he wanted to
make sure when they took the real vote he would win and also because
that would tell him which owners he had to work on.
He hired and shaped the greatest pr staff and the greatest admin-
istrative staff any sports general ever had. But in the beginning
there was the man Rozelle always referred to as “my offensive and
defensive coordinator.” His name was Jim Kensil, and for sixteen
years he was the commissioner’s alter ego. In 1961 Kensil, who
was a jack of all trades in the Associated Press sports department,
also wrote a Sunday column on sports and television called “The
Sports Dial.” On this particular day he had scheduled an inter-
view with Rozelle to discuss what plans he had for the league and
expanded television. It was, indeed, an interview. What Kensil did
not know was that after the first five minutes, it was Rozelle who
was doing the interviewing. By the time they finished he stunned
Kensil by offering him a job.
From Pete’s top public relations guy, he rose to the title of the
nfl’s executive director. His hiring freed Rozelle to spend more
time getting to know his way around the halls of Congress. It
was there that he would score his first major victory. He needed
congressional approval for a plan so simple it would revolution-
ize the revenue stream that television’s sleeping giant could pro-
vide his product.
As a visionary Rozelle surpassed P. T. Barnum, but unlike Bar-
num he always sold reality, not illusion. He looked at the haphaz-
ard business model with which the league’s individual owners had
sold their television rights. Each team controlled its own destiny
in that area. None of them knew what their rights were worth, and
a few of them couldn’t even sell them. Who, for example, would
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The Boy Wonder Takes Center Stage
put up big money to televise the Green Bay Packers with their tiny stadium and their limited television territory?
He conceived of a package where everyone would make money;
everyone would sell their games, because everyone would sell out
of the same store to the same retailer. As always marked his style,
he knew how to identify and recruit just the key allies to serve as
the point men to make it possible. The men he needed to sell the
other owners on the plan were Jack Mara and Wellington Mara,
who owned and ran the New York Football Giants. “When Pete
approached me,” Wellington Mara told me,
individually we were making more money off television, little as it
was, than anybody else. After all, we were the only game in New York.
And New York was the key city in any sport.
Still, it was a gamble. But what he was saying was that it was good
for the league, and Jack and I always felt we had to consider that
because the league was more important than any one team. Without
the league what did we have? If other franchises were in trouble, then so were we. This was our philosophy, no matter what the issue was.
The brothers Mara immediately spread the gospel of tv as
Rozelle preached it. There were no holdouts. Now all he had to do
was get Congress to grant a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws. He lobbied hard, establishing relationships with senior con-
gressmen and senators that would benefit the nfl for years to come.
Once again that groundwork was helped by Rozelle’s time at
usf. The city- side reporter for whom he always left football tick-
ets had his own meteoric rise after both of them left the City by
the Bay. He was now John F. Kennedy’s press secretary. For years,
when asked if Pierre Salinger helped the new commissioner get the
votes and urged the president to sign the bill, Rozelle would con-
sistently reply, “Not really.” Perhaps. But as your mother used to
say when asked about the benefits of chicken soup for head colds,
“It might not help, but it couldn’t hurt.”
Kennedy signed the exemption into law and changed the way
all professional and even college leagues would eventually operate.
The Boy Wonder Takes Center Stage
61
5
How Do You Tel Vince?
You are made to feel special when you are very young. . . . And it’s often hard not to start believing it.
—Frank Tripucka, former Notre Dame and Denver Broncos
quarterback
Then we found this bar, and [Vince and I] sat there and we talked . . . and we drank scotch . . . We drank scotch for four hours.
—Pete Rozelle after he told Lombardi he planned to suspend Paul
Hornung from the nfl
It was 1963, and in his heart the commissioner knew he ought
to be concentrating on the challenge of the American Football
League. It was three years now since the ragtag “Don Quixotes”
of that other league had staggered off the drawing board and onto
America’s sports pages. They lacked both adequate playing fields
and liquid capital. Newspapermen favorable to the old- guard nfl
referred to the embryonic league’s contests as aerial volleyball
matches, a reference to both the lack of finesse and an incredibly
limited view of defense.
But they were still alive, with their own abc television con-
tract. Now the head- to- head war was about to move into a new
and ugly phase, one closer to home. When a group of shrewd
sports- oriented businessmen had picked up the bankrupt New York
Titans afl franchise for the price of its debts— a mere one million
r /> dollars— Rozelle knew the afl was moving into a new phase. The
new group was led by David Sonny Werblin, a show- business and
sports entrepreneur, whose Music Corporation of America’s (mca)
62
clients had included Guy Lombardo, Frank Sinatra, and Ronald Reagan. In addition, his television contacts (he had Wagon Train
and Bonanza at numbers one and two in national popularity at the same time) made his new team, the Jets, a formidable problem for
the hometown Giants.
It was April 1963, and Rozelle knew he should have been think-
ing about Werblin and the mounting legal costs of the interleague
battle. He should have been thinking about the college draft and
what share of the precocious heroes of America’s fumble factories
would sign with his league. He should have been thinking about
expansion and the moves he needed to make.
But “should have” and “could have” are very different animals.
“Could have” had become impossible with the impact of a well- kept
secret with which Pete Rozelle secretly grappled. He had known
for some time that the sort of problem that terrifies every commis-
sioner, every owner, every college president with a big- time athletic team and every coach, was dangerously hanging over his world.
And he knew that it had to be dealt with swiftly and decisively
to preserve the nfl’s integrity. Without integrity, the nfl could
have no product.
This is a country where gambling has always been a fever in the
national blood. I remember as far back as when I was a kid in New
Jersey, you could dial we 6- 1212, and a recorded voice would tell
you that this was a report from the National Weather Service and
that there was a 20 percent chance of rain. In what other country
on the planet did the national government make book on April
showers?
We are a country of gamblers. We always have been and always
will be. This is no secret. Just think back to Yeoman Pete Rozelle’s
Army— Notre Dame caper as an amateur bookmaker aboard the
uss Gardoqui.
We are also a country that will make an icon out of a young
man who can throw a football sixty yards, hit a baseball four hun-
How Do You Tell Vince?
63
dred feet, or dunk a basketball from a half- mile above the hoop.
That adoration can have a profound impact on how such gifted
athletes view themselves.
I grew up with a great quarterback named Frank Tripucka who
was an All- America under Frank Leahy at Notre Dame, an all-
league quarterback in the Canadian Football League, and the first
quarterback of the afl’s Denver Broncos. One day after he retired
we were discussing how hard it can be for young athletes to keep
themselves in perspective when the boys become men. “You are
made to feel special when you are very young,” he explained, and
he knew because he had been there.
Newspaper guys write terrific things about you. Boosters want to
give you things in college. Later when you are a pro, hometown fans
reach for your restaurant tabs. They all tell you how special you are.
And it’s often hard not to start believing it. For those who do, the
rules become something for someone else to respect.
When I was a pro, I knew one thing. Let someone buy you drinks
long enough, and he will probably want a favor. That favor could be
anything from going to a friend’s wedding or . . . well . . . The way
you avoid that is to eat and drink only with your teammates on the
road, and then nobody can put you in a compromising position of
any kind.
With the growth of football betting in America, an intrigu-
ing new form of merchandizing by bookmakers posed an escape
route to players who wanted to have things both ways. It was called
the point spread and established what the winning margin had to
be to win a bet if you took the favorite. By keeping a team under
that margin and still winning, a player could say and believe, as
a New York University basketball point- shaver said to me after a
major 1961 scandal, “Well, nobody got hurt except the bookies.”
Now the briber did not have to get a player to lose a game. All he
had to do was make sure his team did not cover the spread. With
that possibility it didn’t have to be a fact for rumors to cast doubt
on the game’s integrity. Proof positive that the betters believed
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How Do You Tell Vince?
this to be true came with the myriad of telephone calls they placed to the nfl switchboard on Monday mornings after some placekicker had missed a thirty- yard field goal and impacted the spread.
Rozelle knew all of this. And he knew that to permit a player
to gamble at all was to flirt with disaster. He understood how eas-
ily gambling debts or free drugs for players in the fast lane could
threaten the honesty of his games. He knew how it had happened
before and how the fix had materialized in big, bold headlines
about scores of college basketball games, hundreds of prizefights,
and, yes, even once in the National Football League.
He never met bookmaker Alvin Paris, a man short in stature
but huge in negative impact on the nfl. But he knew all about the
impact he had on the sport in 1946. Paris had been the kingpin
that made Bert Bell’s worst nightmare a reality. He also became
the very real ghost of things that could happen again if the lesson
were ignored. Ever since pro football’s mill- town days, people had
bet on football. It was more an exercise in chauvinism than greed.
Because gambling had always been there and because there never
was a confirmed shred of evidence that the nfl’s games were any-
thing but honest, the league paid little attention to what the man
on the street did to back his loyalties.
World War II had been over for a year. The boys came marching
home. New cars rolled off the assembly line. A bright, new day
was here, and with it a return to a form of normalcy long forgot-
ten. The Giants and the Bears, two of the most bitter rivals in pro
football, had earned their way into the title game. In the euphoria
of a postwar rush back to the future, 58,346 football fans would
pack the Polo Grounds.
It was then before the 1946 championship game that Alvin Paris,
a man who left no other major mark on society, brought pro foot-
ball face- to- face with its first horrifying moment of truth. That
would be on Sunday. But only after all hell broke loose on Saturday.
Bert Bell, the commissioner, had always been uneasy about what
How Do You Tell Vince?
65
could happen with a gambler determined enough and a couple of players venal enough. Paris planned to broker that marriage.
Shortly after three on that Saturday, Mayor William O’Dwyer
called Tim Mara, who owned the Giants. “Something has hap-
pened, Tim, and you and Steve [Owen, the Giants’ coach] should
know about it.”
Thus, with no warning, began the longest day in the life of
Tim Mara, a former legal bookmaker in the pre- tote- board days
and a pioneer in the nf
l’s stepchild era. He had seen his team rise
from the bottom to the top. He loved all things New York, and
his Football Giants certainly were. As his cab took him to Gra-
cie Mansion, the mayor’s residence, he had no way of knowing he
was on the threshold of the twenty- four cruelest hours of his life.
Arthur Wallender, the city police commissioner, was already
there. As Mara and Owen listened, he explained that Merle Hapes,
the Giants’ starting fullback, admitted he had been bribed by Paris
to fix the game. Hapes also claimed that teammate and tailback
Frank Filchock had also been approached. Each, Hapes insisted,
would get twenty- five hundred dollars, and, additionally, Paris
would bet one thousand dollars for each of them on the prop-
osition that the Bears would win by more than (remember the
point- spread school of betting) ten points. Filchock denied his
involvement. Bell agreed to let Filchock play, pending his own
investigation, but Hapes was immediately suspended for not report-
ing a bribe attempt.
The Sunday papers were filled with the story. As the Giants
clattered down the ancient stairs that led from clubhouse to field
the next day, Filchock was greeted with thunderous boos. He had
lied to Mara and Owen. Only he and Paris and Hapes knew that.
But the crowd was publicly commenting on the possible lack of
integrity of the game they were just coming to understand and
love. It was a barometer as to how quickly the public would believe
the slightest taint of scandal.
In an effort to redeem himself, Filchock played the best game
of his life— even after he broke his nose. The Bears won. Then
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How Do You Tell Vince?
Filchock confessed that he, too, had been offered money. Bell moved swiftly. He suspended both men. Neither ever played another game
of football in the United States.
History remembers only the bribe attempt and not the final score.
The gravity of that was not lost on Rozelle, who was a keen stu-
dent of history. And there was something else. Two years before
Rozelle became commissioner, the Colts had beaten the Giants in
a sudden- death overtime title game. It was the game that vaulted
pro football on its path to establishing itself as the new number-
one sport in America. But it was also a game that fed into that myth
of suspicion with which the commissioner now had to grapple.