Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Read online

  All these patterns of action can be observed in Azerbaijan, where Islamic branches are currently developing their modes of responding to the “threat” of diversity. There are a couple of distinguishable influential religious trends in the present religious market. One is neoorthodox Salafism, which adapts a position of exclusivism and draws strict symbolic boundaries inside Islam. A distinct secularized tradition encompasses weak religious requirements and an emphasis on morality. Secularized Muslims’ religious identity is mixed with cultural and national features in unique ways. Moreover, there is a vigorous modernist-reformist branch of Islam in Azerbaijan which is represented, among others, by the “Juma community” led by charismatic cleric and oppositionist Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, and there is also a group of Muslim intellectuals spreading their own interpretations of religion. Each of those groups represents one of the above-mentioned strategies of dealing with pluralism.

  Religious pluralism, in the aforementioned sense as a field of interactions and competition, also has an impact on the faithful. Among the main challenges for them are the problems of plausibility and choice. Faced with alternative truths, a modern person must be ready to make a decision in regard to religion and to find a proper legitimization of his own beliefs. Thus, the basic change for people is from the experience of fate to choice. Choices can be orthodox, liberal, fundamentalist, but they need justification—it’s no longer only tradition that can legitimize one’s religious affiliation. It is usually assumed that the faithful look for such religious options which can assure convincing plausible explanations. In such a process, a “universalization of heresy” emerges as a crucial contemporary cultural phenomenon. Even keeping attachment to one’s tradition means an act of choice, as Schleiermacher argued (Berger, 1979). This idea that nowadays a person is faced with a constant possibility of choice regarding the religious sphere is also assumed by the religious economies theory. It must be noted that the argument of free choice is rather limited in empirical reality. Whereas in modern, pluralistic, socially mobile societies (exemplified by the United States) the act of choosing and changing one’s religious affiliation has relatively few limits, in authoritarian regimes it is otherwise. The case of Azerbaijan, as an example of a country balancing between democracy and authoritarianism, is therefore an interesting test for discovering the limits of choice in a changing political climate.

  Another effect of pluralism is a phenomenon of “bricolage.” A number of sociologists have noticed some unconventional practices that lead to changes in existing religious traditions. “Religion à la carte,” or “bricolage” (meaning tinkering),3 as the phenomenon has been labelled, refers to an observation that people not always choose a “complete” religious tradition (as it is transmitted by a class of “religious professionals”) but tend to select ritual, ideological, and ethical options from various religions or religious branches according to their preferences. “It’s like a Lego, you create your own little version of whatever it is” (Berger, 2006). In post-Soviet Azerbaijani context this phenomenon entails a mix of Islamic, Christian, Zoroastrian ideas with folk-religious customs, magic and superstitions. This process of a creative act of transformation of religious traditions is, in my opinion, to a large degree unconscious. People whose system of religious beliefs evidently derives from many sources do count themselves as Muslims. Therefore, it is questionable whether all forms of bricolage, such as the one in the Azerbaijani version, can be interpreted as reflecting rational or voluntary choice.

  Pluralism also affects religious authority and influences its evolution or transformation. In an environment where religions operate on a free market, religious professionals (meaning those for whom religion is not only a way of life but also a job) are faced with fierce competition. The lack of monopoly changes the way authority is legitimized in a society and redefines features and actions or strategies which are most effective in gaining resources and support. In Islam, this problem is further complicated by the fact that, on one hand, “religious experts” do not have such official status as the clergy in Christianity. In many Muslim communities imams perform rituals and lead prayers without any formal qualifications. They are chosen from the group as more knowledgeable than others in the tough science of religion. Diplomas of famous Islamic madrasas or universities add prestige, and fluency in Arabic is a great merit in non-Arab societies. Iran as a theocratic state with Shiite branch of Islam is still another case. Religious scholars ensured themselves an official position through an alliance with the state power and continue to exert influence on state policies. All in all, the criteria for choosing Islamic leaders generally vary from place to place, and this is one of the main feature differentiating this religion from organized institutional religions, such as Orthodox or Catholic Christianity.

  So far we have mostly discussed a sociological approach to the dynamics of religion. The emergence of pluralism in the religious sphere is one of the core point of debate in the sociology of religion. The issue of pluralism and its impact on religious situation has also got to the centre of scientific attention in the wave of research focused around the “new paradigm,” usually labelled “rational choice,” “supply-side,” or “religious economies” theory of religion. It has emerged as one of the most serious alternative to secularization theories, although a closer look at both strands of sociological thinking reveals not only differences but also some similarities, especially in recent reinterpretations of the phenomenon of secularization.4 Nevertheless, the market approach has yielded some inspiring theoretical hypotheses that led to vivid debates among researchers of religion in the last decade. It seems that there can be fruitful discussion on merging ideas from both approaches, the one with more sociological focus and the other from the economic side. In what follows, I will shortly discuss some points for and against the new but influential perspective. I do not intend to summarize the whole approach, as it has already been done many times in the academic literature.5 The focus of the review will be on certain parts of the theory and on the hypotheses that are directly related to the study of religious revival in Azerbaijan.

  1.2Theoretical Propositions about Religious Economies

  The concepts employed in the theory are supposed to parallel economic models of the market, which have proven their usefulness in numerous problems in economics. The basic assumption of the supply-side model of religion is that “religious economies are like commercial economies” (Finke, Stark, 1988, p. 42). The analogy to mechanisms functioning in the market economy can be found even before the market theory of religion crystallized. A few decades ago, still before the advent of globalization, Berger (1967, p. 193–195) in his classic “Sacred Canopy” has claimed that religions in the pluralistic global world are no longer taken for granted by believers, but rather seen as products in a free market economy. Those wares need to be advertised and sold, which can take place only if wishes or preferences of clients will be taken into account. Even though people’s choices in cultural and religious spheres are not unlimited (traditional ties or other social constrains maintain their power), they nevertheless force religious suppliers to strive for clients.

  A lot of theoretical propositions of the market approach focus on the “supply side,” or more precisely, on the changing practices of religious “firms” rather than on the demand side, or behavior of religious “consumers” (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994, p. 232). It is argued that the demand for religion maintains a relatively constant level. Changes in religious observable engagement which have taken place in history many times can be explained by the supply-side factors. Those consist of a number of entrepreneurial actors and institutions—religious firms— that act as suppliers of religious goods and services. The low level of engagement in religious practice is caused not by a weak demand for religion but by either unattractive or badly advertised products and services or by the lack of a “preferred brand of religious activity” (Finke, Stark, 1994, p. 4). On the other hand, vigorous activism of clergy and their successes in
marketing can explain rapid growth of some religious branches. For instance, the popularity of two denominations Methodist and Baptist, in the XIX century in the U.S., Finke and Stark (ibidem) attribute to their strategies of competition in the market. The same reason, changes in the religious firms’ behavior, account for the later failures of the former sect, and the continued success of the latter. This way of reasoning can lead us to the reconsideration of the common interpretation of religious history worldwide.

  Other studies underline the importance of the “demand side.” The assumption is that there is a certain level of demand for religion, arising from the common desire among human beings to overcome existential fears and to be able to cope with death and existential questions. In many religions theology includes ideas on the afterlife. What those religions, for example Christianity, offer then, is the “assurance of eternal salvation” (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006, p. 49). It is not the only thing supplied by religious organizations, but it is the one distinguishing religious business from secular one. This idea of guaranteeing afterlife is guiding churches’ services and influences their organizational structure. Assurance can’t be verified in this life, so affiliation with a particular religious branch relies partially on trust (apart from other constraints, such as social networks, family and peer pressure, ethnic or national identity, etc.). What this theory highlights for better understanding of religious change, such as religious revival, is that the level of demand is not constant. The demand for the religious core product is dependent upon many factors, such as income, risk profile, satisfaction one gets from the service, the price for alternatives, and the full price, meaning in this context mostly the money and time devoted to religious participation (Ekelund Jr., Tollison, 2011, p. 20). Any drastic social change, revolution, transformation, war or conflict will accordingly result in changes in demand for religion. Medieval Europe with the experience of Black Death, constant wars and difficult conditions for a huge part of societies led people towards the church which was offering protection and security (ibidem, p. 59). In the chapter “The Lived Islam” I will point to the problems of transformation of the post-Soviet states and societies. The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR), which lasted almost seventy years, had a profound impact on the lives of people. In December 1991, quite unexpectedly the empire ceased to exist. Fifteen states had to form their political systems and economies, which was a serious task as there were no perfect models to emulate. Single-party rule was replaced with various types of multi-party political systems, and centrallyplanned socialist economies gave way to emerging capitalism. The region, including Azerbaijan, was in turmoil and the feeling of uncertainty among people was commonplace, therefore increasing the level of demand for religion.

  As Ekelund and his collaborators underline (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006, p. 55–58), the demand can be analysed as a demand for a particular form of religion. This is an interesting issue—the evolution of religion is not only a function of supply but also of demand. Demand can be for more or less costly forms of religion, or for strict or liberal versions. Historical evidence, according to the researchers, support the idea that “people exhibit a demand for religion and that churches respond by supplying religious services.” (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006, p. 58). In primitive societies when the survival conditions were tough and science was not developed there was a preference for religious practices involving long, time-consuming rituals and more rigid behaviors resembling cults (ibidem, p. 59). There is a need to pay attention not only to what religious organizations propose to believers, but also to what people need and desire in a given time and place, in a very specific economic, political and cultural context. It is crucial whether they can invest more time or other resources in religious practices. The second side of the model seems to be equally important. In the post-Soviet states a lot of changes have been taking place. The socialist system, in spite of its fundamental faults, ensured social security and benefits necessary for living. After the collapse of the system, in the tough process of transformation, unemployment became a serious problem; regional conflicts intensified and people did not feel safe anymore. This may also be a part of the explanation of religious choices people make in an unstable environment. Uncertainty surrounding everyday life may account for strict religious branches which offer social support and strong networks and communities. Poverty, lack of social order, insecurity as well as weak development of education and science tend to change demand for more strict religious branches. There was, taking this perspective, a high level of demand for those forms of religions which were guiding people in a precise way and acting as a moral and ideological compass. There was and still is a lot of hope in charismatic and strong leaders who have a clear vision on how the worldly order should look. This argument can help us better grasp the rise of Salafi Islam and its popularity in the post-Soviet region since the 1990s. The demand factor is important, but the power struggle inside the religious field is crucial as well. Many powerful processes, for instance decolonization or globalization, have undermined the traditional authority in Islam. Salafists emerged as key players in the transnational Islamic market and refined its position and its form of religion as a result of interaction with other Islamic branches. The competition continuously encourages religious groups to transform themselves and adapt to the needs of time and place.

  Let us pose the very basic question: What is a religious economy? The basic definition within the framework of the theory is as follows: It is “the social arena where religious firms compete for members and resources” (Gill, 2002, p. 119). Religious marketplace is seen as reflecting a structure and function of a “general market”:

  Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market of current and potential customers, a set of firms seeking to serve that market, and the religious “product lines” offered by the various firms (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994, p. 232).

  A religious marketplace is only possible when a number of suppliers are active, and when they are interested in providing services to customers. Generally, there are two kinds of “product lines”: one of a religious and second of a non-religious nature. They involve theological doctrines, identifiable symbols, social help services, opportunities for educational or professional development, or entertainment activities. Some of these product lines are used as an element of promotion or as a response to the needs of potential clients. More formal economic theory looks for a precise definition of the notion “product”. Unlike in business, religious product is ambiguous. What is then the essence of the product? What is the content of religion? What do customers expect in the end to get from religious organizations? Do they expect services or products? And, of what kind? Is the product tangible or intangible? All those and similar questions are still under debate and pose the challenge of applying economic analysis to religion. Most studies do not even attempt at giving a definition of religious product. Ekelund and his team have discussed at great length this problem and present their ideas. They propose to understand the core product offered by religious institutions as a particular kind of information which is unverifiable until death. This feature, unique to religion, implies that religion should be treated as a “credence good” (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006, p. 48).

  “Religious firms” in the market religion theory are defined as:

  social enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain and supply religion to some set of individuals (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994, p. 232).

  This definition clearly points to business-oriented organizations which, apart from their spiritual focus, are engaged in producing and distributing religious products in the market. The aim, as in business, is to ensure maximum profit and sustainability. A firm can function only in relation to potential customers, thus it has to identify its “social niche,” a target audience that it aims at appealing to. A religious enterprise, in order to be effective, must be sensible to ethnic, social, economic di
fferences in interests and aspirations in a society. Preferences in religious styles are widely recognized as being affected by social characteristics, such as social class, social mobility, racial or ethnic minority status, socialization by family and peer groups (Bankston, 2002, p. 312). Economic analysis of churches and sects as firms opens ways to new explanations of the development and evolution of religious doctrines, changes in religious practices and the organizational features of religious bodies (Iannaccone, 1998, p. 1484–1485).

  An ambitious analysis of the church as an economic firm is presented in the books by Ekelund et al. (Ekelund et al., 1996; Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006). The Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages is presented as a quasi-monopolist or “dominant” and bureaucratic company with its regional divisions and the headquarter responsible for strategic planning and finances. Rent-seeking was a crucial element of the church strategy and to succeed in this field it relied upon political and bureaucratic forces. Being a monopolist gave the Church obvious advantages, but it had to remain vigilant to maintain this position. Competition coming from other sects inclined the Church leaders to propose innovations in doctrines. In this way, the authors argue, purgatory was included in the belief system. The Church leaders, faced with a prospect of losing customers, worked towards boosting demand for their chief product, which ultimately are the “assurances of eternal salvation” and “promises of an afterlife.” The concept of religious firms leads to new paths in analysing Christianity with its institutional form of organization. This direction of thinking of the Church was pursued further and resulted in a thorough reinterpretation of the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006). These historical events are presented as a break of the Catholic monopoly in the supply of religion in a huge part of Europe by an “entrepreneurial monk.” Intense competition which appeared in the religious market led to efficiency gains. New Protestant firms which appeared in the market were supplying religious product at a lower prize, which was appealing to many congregants. Analysing church as an economic entity makes sense and offers new insights: It “enables us to specify or observe a particular market structure, the degree of competition therein, managerial/organizational behavior, and a resulting pattern of rent distribution” (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006, p. 36).