Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Read online

  Religious revival and the return of religion to the public sphere consists in the enhanced activities of a variety of Islamic groups, preachers, theologians and activists. Transnational Islamic movements search for means to enlarge their outreach. They have global ambitions, which inevitably leads to conflict. This perspective of looking at religion draws upon the works of, among others, Geertz (1971) and his comparative study of Islam in two places: Morocco and Indonesia. Important work has been done by anthropologists of Islam gathered around the figures of Abdul Zein (1977) and Talal Asad (1986). This approach focuses on lived practices and discourses and their developments in specific historical and political circumstances. It is the study of a social side of religion, not a theological one. It shows the activities of people engaged in developing and transmitting religious teachings, the factors that affect the spread of ideas and interpretations, and decisions of average believers having their own interests and preferences.

  For instance, an anthropological interpretation of Islamic law focuses on the discourse about sharia. In the post-Soviet context an interpretation of religious law is strongly influenced by the decades of imposed secularization. Many religious Muslims in Azerbaijan who are familiar with Islamic law support the current secular political system. In their view, most of Islamic values and norms are already guaranteed by the constitution, without calling them “sharia,” and thus there is no need for an Iranian-style regime.

  This approach advocated, among others, by Talal Asad (1986) can shed new light on the religious revival in post-Soviet Muslim societies. The contemporary academic discussions on Central Asian Islam are either underlining the uniformity of Islam or make use of some simplistic dichotomies. Analyzing the paradigms informing the scholarly representations of Soviet Islam, Mark Saroyan (1997) criticized the common thesis of “two Islams,” i. e., official versus unofficial, which are in opposition and even in hostility towards each other. This thesis is still repeated in a present discourse, but the opposing terms are different. On the two sides of the present barricade there are “traditional” and “untraditional” or “fundamentalist” forms of Islam. As in the past, these marks are closely related to the ideological interests of a state that differentiates between those Muslims who are willing to cooperate and legitimize the political power and those who are more inclined to oppose it.

  To counterbalance this kind of representation, I propose to approach Islam in that area as encompassing several interpretations or, using Asad’s concept, discursive traditions. Only then we can account for various trends and processes that are transforming Muslim communities. While most apparent is the division into Sunni and Shia traditions, there is a need for further differentiation. In the analysis of past religious developments in Azerbaijan, I have focused on the processes shaping those two traditions, but also on Sufism and later trends in Islamic understandings that emerged under Russia’s influence. In the case of contemporary Azerbaijan, the most influential are Islamic models shaped by the national contexts of Turkey, Iran and Arab countries. Another distinguishable trend is Islamic reformism, with local ideas of modernization. Besides, we can distinguish secular tradition, by which I understand the non-orthodox and often syncretic Muslim identity which nonetheless includes some elements of religious engagement.

  One of the most vital changes Islam in the Caucasus has been experiencing is the ongoing process of Sunnitization. In Azerbaijan there is an intense competition taking place between various branches of Shiism and Sunnism. For centuries, the Shia branch had more influence on society and Iran used to safeguard its interests. However, the future of Shiism, which is typically associated with both Iran and Azerbaijan, is uncertain, at least in the Caucasus. With the religious revival in the post-socialist Muslim republics the struggle for “secularized Muslims” began and the traditional power relations are being deeply challenged.

  At the beginning of the 21st century the most popular mosque in Baku was the Abu Bakr mosque. Located at Ulvi Bunyadzade Street in Baku, the mosque became extremely popular with Muslims not only from the capital but also from the wider region. There were sometimes as many as 8000 people gathered for the Friday prayer. That stood in a stark contrast to many traditional mosques attended by only a couple of Muslims. What makes the Abu Bakr mosque, known also as the Sunni Juma mosque, so popular was mainly its charismatic leadership and the community that emerged around it. The imam of the mosque, Haji Gamet Suleymanov is a graduate of the World Islamic University of Medina and a follower of Salafism. Under his guidance, this branch of Islam made its spectacular inroads into a mostly younger, urban segment of the Azerbaijani society. That was a revolution, a radical change. Thousands of people were moved by Suleymanov’s teachings and joined, more or less formally, the Salafi community. He proposed a path of spiritual and moral development and a distance from politics. New language, new context, new inspirations. However, during the peak of its popularity a terrorist attack took place. On August 17, 2008, a grenade was thrown into the mosque during the evening prayer. There were casualties and the attack was attributed by the government to terrorists. The mosque was subsequently closed and the massive “conversions” to Sunnism halted for a while. Nevertheless, since it had so many adherents, it was difficult to stop the process. Sunni Salafism has been proliferating and it is changing the religious structure of the Azerbaijani society.

  There are also other Sunni movements and groups which actively promote their model of Islam. Turkey has been actively engaged in religious affairs in Baku. Due to ethnic and linguistic proximity, for Azeris the Turkish model of religion is an attractive one, more attractive than the Iranian model. Among Turkish movements, the Gülen’s movement, named after its central figure Fethullah Gülen, is exceptionally successful. It acts through educational institutions established in Central Asia and the Caucasus as well as through business networks and media channels. Again, it appeals especially to the younger, more educated parts of society. The movement’s popularity may encounter serious problems because of the events of the coup attempt in Turkey which took place on 15 July 2016. Afterwards, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan accused Gülen and his supporters of masterminding the attack.

  Shiism is, however, not giving up. New interpretations and reinterpretations of the Shia ideology appear. Shiites put emphasis on rationality and try to present their religious model as more rational and intellectually rewarding to believers. Charismatic leaders on the Shiite side are actively engaged in intra-religious competition. The Shia community led by Haji Ilgar Ibrahimoglu is one of the most vibrant and active community. Apart from religious ideas, it does not refrain from getting involved with important public issues, such as the human rights of religious people.

  The religious revival taking place in the whole post-Soviet is not a simple return to the past, as the term may suggest. There is a new aspect to it, an aspect of global interconnectedness. There is an unprecedented plurality of choices and the new means of communication technology make the flow of religious ideas and ideologies rapid and enormous in scope. The inner-religious competition is today probably more intense and wide-ranging than ever before. Those processes are clearly seen in Baku—a capital city on the western coast of Caspian Sea. “The most secularized Muslim capital” has now been taking a lead in the process of religious renaissance. The future of Islam in that part of the world will be determined, to a large extent, on the Absheron Peninsula.

  Chapter 1

  Religion as a Field of Competition

  Among many approaches in the social study of religion, a relatively recent one— the economics of religion—has many advantages in shedding new light on the religious revival taking place all around the world. The idea of applying the science of economics to explain patterns of religious activity and the place of religion in society can be traced to Adam Smith. He is regarded as a pioneer in taking a keen interest in functioning of what is now called the religious marketplace. A lot of reflections and discussions in Book V of his
“An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1776) is devoted to religious institutions. As an economist and philosopher, Smith emphasized the positive effects of competition among religious institutions and stood against the alliance of religion with the state. Competition, in his view, has many functions. Looking from the political point of view, it is a force capable of contributing to social order. For religious institutions competition invigorates their activity towards ensuring survival. Believers, or consumers, on the other hand, gain more freedom of choice.1 Nowadays, researchers, both sociologists and economists, continue this idea of applying economics to exploration of religious activity and build their models using specific concepts and tools of modern economic theory. This approach assumes that people do not change the basic principles guiding their behavior when changing settings from “profane” to “sacred.” The same rules apply to workplace or business as to church. Religion and its impact on society is regarded as too crucial to simply be excluded from academic research. This paradigm is possible due to the redefinition of the scope of economics. Earlier, this discipline was concerned mainly with wealth and money. Contemporary horizons of economists are much wider and focus on utility, or satisfaction also in many “non-market” areas of social life (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006, p. 5). In his Nobel lecture on November 1992, Gary S. Becker (1992) argued for extending the economic approach to analyze numerous social issues, which until then had not been regarded as the domain of economists. This vision inspired many scholars, including sociologists and economists of religion. The academic encounter between economics and religion does not cause so many surprises as in the past.

  The goal of this chapter is to discuss the topic of religious pluralism and basic theoretical propositions of the religious economies approach that provides the theoretical background for this book. The first sections discuss the concept of religious pluralism which is a necessary, although insufficient, condition of competition and its relation to religiosity. It is one of the key topics in the contemporary sociology of religion responding to the urgent need to better understand the fast changing religious landscape in the world and, in particular, local contexts. The prevailing definitions of pluralism do not simply relate to the situation of coexistence of many religions or forms of religions. Pluralism which is interesting for researchers is the complex and dynamic system of social interactions between religious actors. There are interactions of various kinds, such as an ecumenical dialogue or a collaboration in a humanitarian crisis. For analyzing changes in the religious realms, however, it is important to pay attention to the process of competition among religious actors as well as to the context in which competition takes place. When we define pluralism in such a wide sense then it exhibits many similarities to the market approach and both can be linked together in looking for understanding of the contemporary religious revival in Islam.

  The review of a variety of changes triggered by the diversification of religious spheres will follow. The global environment is increasingly competitive, and migrations, travels, mass media and internet show other belief systems. Religions, in order to survive, cannot ignore this fact and continue their traditional activities in an unchanged way. The forces of the religious market have an impact on both sides of the interactions—religious institutions (firms) and believers (customers). After presenting the influence of religious pluralism, I will discuss the religious market hypothesis proposing a causal relationship between pluralism and religious activity. The idea that religious engagement is not static but can depend on various external factors, including the level of pluralism and activism of religious actors, raises controversies and questions. The issue whether a higher number of religious firms and entrepreneurs, using the language of the economics of religion, and their struggle for believers impact the level of religiosity has till now not been settled. It thus remains an open question for further investigations. Another part of this chapter will be devoted to the role of competition and regulation—chief factors identified in the model as linking the levels of pluralism with the levels of religious activity.

  As discussions around this proposition show, there is a need to widen the scope of research on religious pluralism. The mechanisms postulated by the theory should be better understood, not only assumed. One possible way, that has directed my study as well, is to abandon the causal relationships postulated by the theory and search for other possibilities. The anthropological perspective which I applied in the research meant giving voice to the actors themselves. To understand the impact of the unprecedented religious pluralism I was asking people questions about how they perceive the situation. I conducted interviews with both sides of the market—religious “entrepreneurs” who are trying to attract people to their communities, mosques or movements, and with people looking for a suitable Islamic branch and searching for a religious leader they could trust. I observed meetings with religious topics and visiting mosques to see what attracts people to each form of Islamic religion and why. During interviews I asked people about their individual way to religion, when and in which circumstances they became attracted to religious ideas. Anthropological methods, although being non-representative, were useful in gaining more understanding of how competition in a plural religious landscape works.

  So far, most studies in the economics of religion relied on quantitative data and applied to the United States and some other Western states. This is understandable as the researchers who began exploring this topic asked questions relevant to the reality they experienced living and working in these countries. If, however, the theory has universal ambitions and aims at constructing general laws of human behavior, it should encompass data from other political, economic and socio-cultural contexts. It is a challenging task, because American data on religion are more detailed than elsewhere and were systematically collected for a longer time. They are obviously not perfect; the U.S. government does not survey all the aspects of religion interesting to scholars, and religious institutions frequently use the data in their PR activities, for example keeping inclusive records of believers (e. g., the Church listing all baptized people as its members even if some of them never attend a mass or pray). Besides, religious behavior is observable only to some extent. Measuring beliefs, values, morality or symbolic imagery poses numerous challenges. It is hard to evaluate the accuracy of respondents’ answers to questions on their personal beliefs and attitudes. Nonetheless, in the U.S. context researchers can find more data on the history and present situation of religious market than other parts of the world. There is a long history of social surveys covering religious issues. Although several research institutions organize surveys also in the non-Western states, the data are less abundant and less detailed than in the U.S (Iannaccone, 1998, p. 1467–1468). The post-Soviet states, for example, have had a complicated history in regard to state-religion relations and the official data lack reliability. Religion was, to various degrees, an enemy to the state, and religious ideas were considered to be a threat to socialist ideology. Religions which survived were either collaborating with the state or went underground and access to them was limited for researchers.

  Applying the market model to the Islamic religion in the post-Soviet context is challenging and creates many problems. The economics of religion was mostly developed to deal with institutional forms of the Christian religion. This aspect is one of the main differences in dealing with Islam from the point of view of researchers. Contrary to Catholic Christians, Muslims do not have a Pope, or a formally recognized hierarchy of priests with parishes extending all over the world. The institutional character of Islam is different. Religious rites can be private and do not require any intermediary, although this may happen. There is no direct equivalent to the church, or “religious firm” in Islam. There is no central institution in the Muslim world which has the right to excommunicate other groups or define what is proper in Islam. Therefore, there is a need to better conceptualize what “Islamic market” means and who a
re the players. Many communities or movements operate independently and the forms of organization differ, making it more difficult for comparisons than in the case of Christianity. In order to better conceptualize the Islamic market I have taken inspirations from Pierre Bourdieu (1991), whose ideas related to the topic of religious revival I present in the final section of this chapter. The concepts developed by the French sociologist in his analyses of a religious field seem to be a fruitful tool to complement the theory of the economics of religion. Bourdieu’s concept of a “field” shares many common characteristics with the market approach, but it is a wider term and I believe it better suits the situation of Islam. The religious field is an arena of interactions, including competition, between various kinds of participants and players, not only churches. This concept is more flexible and makes it easier to analyze the transactions and interactions between the faithful and religious actors offering goods and services. Bourdieu’s writings also point to the need to explore deeply two internal elements of competition—“capital” and “strategy”. This focus on the struggle for capital and the unequal access to it, as well as on the strategy which every player on the market must choose in a, more or less conscious, process can be a fruitful extension to the market model. It is also a convenient tool for qualitative research helping to formulate adequate questions to believers and religious entrepreneurs. All these reflections do not try to undermine the economics of religion as a research model. It is a paradigm that has many successes in explaining the evolution of religion as well as the behaviors of people and organizations on the religious market. But it can be further expanded, with the help of Bourdieu’s concepts, by taking into consideration the differences in religions in the world, especially outside the Judeo-Christian world.