Asimov's SF, June 2007 Read online

  Plainly, President Franklin D. Roosevelt has brought this war on himself and on the United States. On July 25 of this year, he froze Japanese assets in the United States. On the following day, he ordered the military forces of the Philippine Islands incorporated into our own—a clear act of aggression. And on August 1, he embargoed export of high-octane gasoline and crude oil to Japan, a nation with limited energy resources of its own. Is it any wonder that a proud people might be expected to respond with force to these outrageous provocations? Are we not in large measure to blame for what has happened to us?

  Further proof of Mr. Roosevelt's intentions, if such be needed, is offered by the August 12 extension of the Selective Service Act allowing peacetime conscription. Pulling out all political stops and shamelessly exploiting his party's Congressional majorities, the President rammed the measure through by a single vote in the House, a vote some Representatives certainly now regret....

  * * * *

  December 11, 1941—Boston Traveler

  AXIS, U.S DECLARE WAR

  * * * *

  December 12, 1941—Los Angeles Times editorial

  TWO-FRONT WAR

  Having suffered a stinging setback in the Pacific, we now suddenly find ourselves called upon to fight two European enemies as well. FDR's inept foreign-policy team has much to answer for. Mothers whose sons are drafted may well wonder whether the fight is worthwhile and whether the government that orders them into battle has any idea what it is doing....

  * * * *

  December 22, 1941—The New Yorker

  FIASCO IN THE PACIFIC

  War Department officials privately concede that U.S. preparations to defend Hawaii and the Philippines weren't up to snuff. “It's almost criminal, how badly we fouled up,” said one prominent officer, speaking on condition of anonymity. “The administration really didn't know what the devil it was doing out there."

  He and other sources sketch a picture of incompetence on both the strategic and tactical levels. Ships from the Pacific Fleet were brought into port at Pearl Harbor every Saturday and Sunday, offering the Japanese a perfect chance to schedule their attacks. U.S. patterns became predictable as early as this past February, said a source in the Navy Department who is in a position to know.

  Further, U.S. search patterns the morning of the attack were utterly inadequate. Airplanes searched a diamond extending as far as two hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor and a long, narrow rectangle reaching as far as one hundred miles south of the ravaged base, and that was all. There was no search coverage north of the island of Oahu, the direction from which the Japanese launched their devastating attack.

  It has also been learned that a highly secret electronic warning system actually detected the incoming Japanese planes half an hour before they struck Pearl Harbor. When an operator at this base in the northern part of Oahu spotted these aircraft, he suggested calling in a warning to Pearl Harbor. His superior told him he was crazy.

  The junior enlisted man persisted. He finally persuaded his superior to call the Information Center near Fort Shafter. The man reported that “we had an unusually large flight—in fact, the largest I had ever seen on the equipment—coming in from almost due north at 130-some miles."

  "Well, don't worry about it,” said the officer in charge there, believing the planes to be B-17s from the U.S. mainland.

  A private asked the officer, “What do you think it is?"

  "It's nothing,” the officer replied. About twenty minutes later, bombs began falling.

  In the White House, a tense meeting of Cabinet and Congressional leaders ensued. “The principal defense of the whole country and the whole West Coast of the Americas has been very seriously damaged today,” Roosevelt admitted.

  Senator Tom Connally angrily questioned Navy Secretary Knox: “Didn't you say last month that we could lick the Japs in two weeks? Didn't you say that our navy was so well prepared and located that the Japanese couldn't hope to hurt us at all?"

  According to those present, Knox had trouble coming up with any answer.

  Connally pressed him further: “Why did you have all the ships at Pearl Harbor crowded in the way you did? You weren't thinking of an air attack?"

  "No,” was all Knox said. Roosevelt offered no further comment, either.

  "Well, they were supposed to be on the alert,” Connally thundered. “I am amazed by the attack by Japan, but I am still more astounded at what happened to our navy. They were all asleep. Where were our patrols?"

  Again, the Secretary of the Navy did not reply.

  In the Philippines, the picture of U.S. ineptitude is no better. It may be worse. Another of these secret, specialized electronic range-finding stations was in place in the northern regions of the island of Luzon. It detected Japanese planes approaching from Formosa, but failed to communicate with airfields there to warn them. Some sources blame radio interference. Others point to downed land lines. Whatever the reason, the warning never went through.

  And U.S. bombers and fighters were caught on the ground, though General MacArthur knew Hawaii had been attacked. They suffered catastrophic losses from Japanese bombing and strafing attacks. With a third of our fighters and more than half of our heavy bombers—again, the B-17, the apparently misnamed Fighting Fortress—lost, any hope for air defense of the Philippines has also been destroyed. Reinforcement also appears improbable. Our forces there, then, are plainly doomed to defeat....

  * * * *

  December 23, 1941—Washington Post

  FDR DECRIES LEAKS

  Claims They Harm National Security

  President Roosevelt used a so-called fireside chat last night to condemn the publication in The New Yorker and elsewhere of information about U.S. military failings. “We are in a war now,” he said, “so the rules change. We have to be careful about balancing the people's need to know against the damage these stories can cause our Army and Navy."

  He particularly cited the electronic rangefinder mentioned in the New Yorker article. Roosevelt claims the Japanese were ignorant of this device and its potential. (The Post has learned that the apparatus is commonly called radar—an acronym for RAdio Detecting And Ranging.)

  A Republican spokesman was quick to challenge the President. “I yield to no one in my support of our troops,” he said. “But this administration's record of incompetence in military preparation and in the conduct of the war to date must be exposed. The American people are entitled to the facts—all the facts—from which, and from which alone, they can make a proper judgment."

  * * * *

  December 29, 1941—The New Yorker

  DID WAKE HAVE TO FALL?

  More fumbling by officials in Honolulu and Washington led to the surrender of Wake Island to the Japanese last Tuesday. Wake, west of the Hawaiian chain, was an important position. Even disgraced Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who so recently mismanaged the defense of Hawaii, could see this. In a letter dated this past April, which a Navy Department source has made available to The New Yorker, Kimmel wrote:

  "To deny Wake to the enemy, without occupying it, would be difficult; to recapture it, if the Japanese should seize it in the early period of hostilities, would require operations of some magnitude. Since the Japanese Fourth Fleet includes transports and troops with equipment especially suited for land operations, it appears not unlikely that one of the initial operations of the Japanese may be directed against Wake."

  He was right about that—he could be right about some things. He also recommended that Wake be fortified. But work there did not begin until August 19, more than three months after his letter. Guns were not emplaced until mid-October. Obsolescent aircraft were flown in to try to help defend the island.

  After the first Japanese attack on Wake failed, Kimmel proposed a three-pronged countermove, based on our fast carrier forces. Why he thought they might succeed in the face of already established Japanese superiority may be questioned, but he did. The plan did not succeed.

  Bad weather kept o
ne carrier from refueling at sea. Bad intelligence data led to a raid on the Japanese base at Jaluit, which proved not to need raiding. Then sizable Japanese air and submarine forces were anticipated in the area. They turned out not to be there, but it was too late.

  The relief force, centered on the Saratoga, was within six hundred miles of Wake Island when the Japanese launched their second attack. They were able to move quickly and think on their feet; we seemed capable of nothing of the kind. They destroyed our last two fighters with continuing heavy air raids, and landed two thousand men to oppose five hundred U.S. Marines.

  At this point, Admiral Pye, who replaced Admiral Kimmel before Admiral Nimitz arrived—another illustration of our scrambled command structure—issued and then countermanded several orders. The result was that the relieving force was recalled, and Wake was lost. The recall order provoked a near-mutiny aboard some U.S. ships, but in the end was obeyed.

  In another document obtained from Navy Department sources, Admiral Pye wrote, “When the enemy had once landed on the island, the general strategic situation took precedence, and conservation of our naval forces became the first consideration. I ordered the retirement with extreme regret."

  How many more retirements will we have to regret—extremely—in days to come?

  * * * *

  January 1, 1942—New York Times editorial

  FREEDOM AND LICENSE

  President Roosevelt believes news coverage of the war hampers U.S. foreign policy. Neither Mr. Roosevelt nor any lesser figure in his administration has denied the truth of stories recently appearing in this newspaper and elsewhere. On the contrary. The administration's attitude seems to be, Even though this is true, the people must not hear of it.

  Some in the administration have questioned the press’ patriotism. They have pointed to their own by contrast. Quoting Samuel Johnson—"Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel"—in this context is almost too easy, but we shall not deny ourselves the small pleasure. By wrapping themselves in the American flag, administration officials appear to believe that they become immune to criticism of their failures, which are many and serious.

  We are not for or against anybody. We are for the truth, and for publishing the truth. Once the people have the whole truth in front of them, they can decide for themselves. If our government claims it has the right to suppress any part of the truth, how does it differ from the regimes it opposes?

  One truth in need of remembering at the moment is that, just over a year ago, Mr. Roosevelt was running for an unprecedented third term. On October 30, 1940, a week before the election, he categorically stated, “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

  Did Mr. Roosevelt believe even then that he was telling the truth? Given the disasters and the constant missteps that have bedeviled us since we found ourselves in this unfortunate conflict, would it not be better if he had been?

  * * * *

  January 3, 1942—Los Angeles Times

  FDR'S POLL NUMBERS PLUMMET

  Since the outbreak of war last month, Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal popularity with American voters has dramatically faded. So has public confidence in his ability to lead the United States to victory. Newest figures from the George Gallup organization make the slide unmistakably clear.

  Last December 15, 63 percent of Americans polled had a favorable impression of FDR, while 59 percent thought he was an effective war leader. In a survey conducted on December 29, only 49 percent of respondents had a favorable impression of the President. Faith in his leadership fell even more steeply. Only 38 percent of those responding believed him “effective” or “very effective” as commander-in-chief.

  These figures are based on a survey of 1,127 Americans of voting age who described themselves as “likely” or “very likely” to cast ballots in the next election. The margin for error is ±3 percent.

  * * * *

  January 5, 1942—Chicago Tribune

  CAN'T FIGHT WAR WITH POLLS, WHITE HOUSE ALLEGES

  A White House spokesman called the latest Gallup Poll figures “irrelevant” and “unimportant.” In a heated exchange with reporters, the press secretary said, “It's ridiculous to think you can run a war by Gallup Poll."

  This is only the latest in a series of evasions from an administration longer on excuses than results. If Roosevelt and his clique keep ignoring public opinion, they will be punished in a poll that matters even to them: the upcoming November elections.

  Reporters also asked why Roosevelt is so sensitive about being photographed in a wheelchair. “Everybody knows he uses one,” a scribe said.

  "Is he afraid of being perceived as weak?” another added.

  The press secretary, a former advertising copywriter, termed these queries “shameless” and “impertinent.” He offered no explanation for his remarks. Since the war began, the administration has had few explanations to offer, and fewer that can be believed....

  * * * *

  January 8, 1942—Philadelphia Inquirer

  DEMONSTRATORS CLASH—COPS WADE IN

  Accusations of Police Brutality

  Pro- and anti-war demonstrators threw rocks and bottles at one another in an incident in front of city hall yesterday. Shouting “Nazis!” and “Fascists!” and “Jap-lovers!", the pro-war demonstrators attacked people peacefully protesting Roosevelt's ill-advised foreign adventures.

  Police were supposed to keep the two groups separate. The anti-war demonstrators, who carried placards reading SEND JAPAN OIL, NOT BLOOD and U.S. TROOPS OUT OF AUSTRALIA and FDR LIED, did not respond to the provocation for some time. When they began to defend themselves, the cops weighed in—on their opponents’ side.

  "They were swinging their nightsticks, beating on people—it was terrible,” said Mildred Andersen, twenty-seven. She had come down from Scranton to take part in the protest. “Is this what America's supposed to be about?"

  "The cops rioted—nothing else but,” agreed Dennis Pulaski, twenty-two, of Philadelphia. He had a gash above his left eyebrow inflicted by a police billy club. “They're supposed to keep the peace, aren't they? They only made things worse."

  Police officials declined comment.

  * * * *

  January 15, 1942—Variety

  ANTI-WAR PICS PLANNED

  MGM, Fox Race to Hit Theaters First

  Major Hollywood talent is getting behind the building anti-war buzz. Two big stars and a gorgeous gal will crank out The Road to Nowhere—shooting begins tomorrow. Expect it in theaters this spring.

  A new radio program, Boy, Do You Bet Your Life, airs Wednesday at 8 on the Mutual Network. Its shlemiel of a hero soon discovers Army life ain't what it's cracked up to be. Yeah, so you didn't know that already.

  And a New Jersey heartthrob crooner is putting out a platter called “Ain't Gonna Study War No More.” The B-side will be “Swing for Peace.” Think maybe he's out to make a point? Us, too.

  February 5, 1942—newsreel narration

  What you are about to see has been banned by the Navy Department. The Navy has imposed military censorship about what's going on at sea on the entire East Coast of the United States. That's one more thing it doesn't want you to know. Our cameraman had to smuggle this film out under the noses of Navy authorities to get it to you so you can see the facts.

  On the thirty-first of last month, that cameraman and his crew were on the shore by Norfolk, Virginia, when a rescue ship brought thirty survivors from the six-thousand-ton tanker Rochester into port. You can see their dreadful condition. Our intrepid interviewer managed to speak to one of them before they were hustled away.

  "What happened to you?"

  "We got torpedoed. Broad daylight. [Bleep] sub attacked on the surface. We never had a chance. We started going down fast. Next thing I knew, I was in the drink. That's how I got this [bleep] oil all over me."

  "Did you lose any shipmates?"

  "Better believe it, bud
dy."

  "I'm sorry. I—"

  At that point, we had to withdraw, because naval officers were coming up. They would have confiscated this film if they'd been able to get their hands on it. They have confiscated other film, and blocked newspaper reporting, too. The Rochester is the seventeenth ship known to be attacked in Atlantic waters since the war began. How many had you heard about? How many more will there be?

  And how many U-boats has the Navy sunk? Any at all?

  * * * *

  February 9,1942—The New Yorker

  DOWN THE TUBES

  The Mark XIV torpedo is the U.S. Navy's answer to Jane Russell: an expensive bust. Too often, it doesn't go where our submariners aim it. When it does, it doesn't sink what they aim it at. Why not? The answer breaks into three parts—poor design, poor testing, and poor production.

  Some Mark XIVs dive down to the bottom of the sea shortly after launch. Some run wild. A few have even reversed course and attacked the subs that turned them loose. Despite this, on the record Navy Department officials continue to insist that there is no problem. Off the record—but only off the record—they are trying to figure out what all is wrong and how to fix it.

  The magnetic exploder is an idea whose time may not have come. It was considered and rejected by the German U-boat service, which has more experience with submarine warfare than anyone else on earth. Still, in its infinite wisdom, FDR's Navy Department chose to use this unproved system.

  And, in its infinite wisdom, FDR's Navy Department conducted no live-firing tests before the war broke out. None. Officials were sure the magnetic exploder would perform as advertised. If you're sure, why bother to test?

  Combat experience has shown why. Our Mark XIVs run silent and run deep. More often than not, they run too deep: under the keels of the ships at which they're aimed and on their merry way. Or, sometimes, the magnetic exploder—which is a fragile and highly temperamental gadget—will blow up before the torpedo gets to its target. Manufacturing quality is not where it ought to be—not even close.

  Despite this, Navy Department brass is making submariners scrimp with their “fish.” They are strongly urged to shoot only one or two torpedoes at each ship, not a large spread. The brass is sure one hit from a torpedo with a magnetic exploder will sink anything afloat. Getting the hit seems to be the sticking point.