Grant The Forgotten Hero Read online

  Grant received the report from Smith on January 22nd and immediately forwarded it to Halleck. On the 22nd, he requested and received permission to visit headquarters, so he set off for St. Louis on January 23rd.

  Grant needed little encouragement for offensive action, so Smith's report was a godsend that buoyed his spirits. He finally felt that he had the right support in the right place to accelerate the Union cause in the west. He just knew headquarters would grant him permission to advance, the logic was so obvious.

  Grant met with Halleck, but was sorely disappointed with the outcome. He described the meeting like this. "I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was preposterous."15 When Grant wrote his memoirs, later events may have prejudiced his account of this meeting, but even so, other reports of this meeting were very similar to his version. Suffice it to say that Halleck stomped on Grant pretty hard. Halleck was not the type of individual to allow subordinates much freedom. Again, the author must emphasize Grant’s veracity and while he may have embellished his version of this meeting, his account sounds like vintage Halleck.

  Grant returned to Cairo dejected, but being an eternal optimist, this did not last long. Undeterred, Grant forwarded Smith's correspondence to Halleck on January 24th. On the 28th of January, he telegraphed St. Louis the following message. "With permission, I will take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there."16 On January 29th, he again renewed his request: "In view of the large force now concentrating in this district, and the present feasibility of the plan, I would respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and holding the position. If this is not done soon, there is but little doubt that the defenses on both the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers will be materially strengthened. From Fort Henry, it will be easy to operate either on the Cumberland (only twelve miles distant), Memphis or Columbus. It will, besides, have a moral effect upon our troops to advance thence towards the rebel states. The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the general commanding as to myself, therefore further statements are unnecessary."17

  During the war, Grant was noted for working closely with the navy. Even though this was another branch of the service, the local naval commander was subject to the command of the general in charge of that department, in this case General Halleck. The naval commander in the Cairo vicinity was Commodore Andrew Foote. When Grant arrived back in Cairo, he consulted with Foote concerning the viability of his plan. Foote wholeheartedly concurred with Grant's plan, joining in advocating this action. On January 28th, Foote wrote Halleck: "Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, can be carried with four iron-clad gunboats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?"18 Foote was an experienced sailor, so with him and Smith both recommending this advance, Halleck gave his approval on January 30, 1862.

  Before Halleck's orders to Grant and Grant's orders to his command are examined, let us scrutinize the behind the scenes maneuvering which occurred of which Grant was unaware. Grant is frequently credited with bringing this invasion

  route to Halleck's attention. As previously mentioned, both Grant and Fremont talked about this route months earlier. For all of Halleck's bumbling behavior, he was politically astute and not entirely devoid of intelligence.

  Lincoln and McClellan's plans to invade and liberate east Tennessee had come to a standstill. While attention had been turned away from that locale, Lincoln still insisted his generals do something somewhere. Both Halleck and Buell were reluctant to begin an offensive, each feeling too weak. In addition, both department commanders desired the supreme command in the west, so neither felt in any way compelled to support the actions of the other which could lead to glory for someone other than himself. Between the pressure Halleck was feeling from Washington and his subordinates, and his realization that whoever moved first might receive the top command in the west, Halleck finally approved Grant’s operations. Credit can be given to Halleck for being the first general to make a dramatic move in the west, while Buell never was able to make this kind of decision. Understanding this backdrop, it is appropriate to examine some of the correspondence between Halleck, Buell and Washington.

  On December 31, 1861, Lincoln sent the following message to Halleck: "General McClellan is sick, are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reinforced from Columbus? A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it."19 Buell received the same message. Buell responded: "There is no arrangement between General Halleck and myself. I have been informed by General McCLellan that he would make suitable disposition for concerted action. There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being reinforced from Columbus if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place."20 Halleck responded to Lincoln's observation as follows: "I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to cooperate with him. Hope to do so in a few weeks. Have written fully on this subject to Major General McClellan. Too much will ruin everything."21

  On January 1, 1862, Halleck sent Buell the following message. "I have had no instructions respecting co-operation. All my available troops are in the field except those at Cairo and Paducah, which are barely sufficient to threaten Columbus, etc. A few weeks hence I hope to be able to render you very material assistance, but now a withdrawal of my troops from this state is almost impossible. Write me fully."22

  The correspondence continued on January 6, 1862. Halleck wrote to Lincoln that he could only spare 10,000 men for operations at that particular time. "It would be madness to attempt anything serious with such a force, and I cannot at the present time withdraw any from Missouri without risking the loss of this state. I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull axe, a broken saw, and rotten timber. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it has always failed in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read."23 To Halleck's credit, his concern over the situation in Missouri was genuine.

  Lincoln's response to Halleck's bleak assessment of January 6 was both typical and understandable. Lincoln endorsed Halleck's letter stating: "The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done."24 As history proved later in the war, all Lincoln ever wanted was someone to take charge of the war effort.

  More correspondence flew between Washington and the western commanders culminating in Buell's movement against Zollicoffer in eastern Kentucky and Grant's corresponding demonstration. Grant is usually given credit for steering Halleck toward the move down the Tennessee, but it appears from the following correspondence that Halleck had already given some thought to just such an operation. Before Grant's visit to St. Louis, Halleck wrote McClellan. He explained a direct drive down the Mississippi was not feasible at that time, but went on to outline another plan. "A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. Columbus cannot be retaken without an immense siege train and terrible loss of life.....But it can be turned, paralyzed and forced to surrender. This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theater of war.....But the plan should not be attempted without a large force, not less than 60,000 men.”25

  This could explain the hostility Grant encountered just days later when he laid out the exact same plan before Halleck. Halleck was an exceedingly jealous person and was probably incensed to think that one of his subordinates had the audacity to concoct a scheme which he felt had germinated in his brain alone.

  Further evidence about Halleck's decision to conduct a
n offensive along the Tennessee was confirmed by the message he sent Grant on January 22nd. This was written one day before Grant arrived in St. Louis. In the letter, Halleck told Grant that he was sending him a large contingent of men and for Grant to station them at Smithland near the junction of the Ohio and Cumberland Rivers.

  Besides Halleck’s ambition to be the supreme commander in the West, one other important piece of information reached Halleck about this time. Washington informed Halleck that the Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard was being sent west to join Albert Sidney Johnston. What disconcerted everyone in the Federal chain-of-command was the rumor that Beauregard was bringing with him fifteen regiments. While this report was false, Halleck and McClellan had no way of verifying it. If action was to be taken, it appeared that now was the time before the rebel reinforcements arrived.

  All these events culminated in Halleck finally issuing the orders for the movement up the Tennessee on January 30, 1862.

  Headquarters, Department of the Missouri

  St. Louis, January 30, 1862

  Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Cairo, Ill:

  You will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, all your available force from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort Holt, Bird's Point, etc. Sufficient garrisons must be left to hold these places against an attack from Columbus. As the roads are now almost impassable for large forces, and as your command is very deficient in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the Tennessee river as far as practicable. Supplies will also be taken in steamers as far as possible. Flag-Officer Foote will protect the transports with his gunboats. The Benton, and perhaps some others, should be left for the defence of Cairo. Fort Henry should be taken and held at all hazards. I shall immediately send you three additional companies of artillery from this place. The river front of the fort is armed with 20-pounders. It may be necessary for you to take some guns of large calibre, and establish a battery on the other side of the river. It is believed that the guns on the land side are of small calibre, and can be silenced by our field artillery. It is said that the north side of the river, below the fort, is favorable for landing. If so, you will land and rapidly occupy the road to Dover, and fully invest the place, so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, U. S. Engineers, will immediately report to you, to act as chief engineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt will be made from Columbus to reenforce Fort Henry, also from Fort Donelson at Dover. If you can occupy the road to Dover, you can prevent the latter. The steamers will give you the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island, below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned, it must be taken.

  Having invested Fort Henry, a cavalry force will be sent forward to break up the railroad from Paris to Dover. The bridges should be rendered impassable, but not destroyed.

  A telegram from Washington says that Beauregard left Manassas four days ago, with fifteen regiments for the line of Columbus and Bowling Green. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that we cut that line before he arrives. You will move with the least delay possible. You will furnish Commodore Foote with a copy of this letter. A telegraph line will be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah, east of Tennessee river, to Fort Henry. Wires and operators will be sent from St. Louis.

  H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 26

  Grant had the orders he wanted, so the Federal offensive in the west was about to get underway. Little did Halleck realize he had unleashed the general the Confederates most feared. Once Grant got a hold of the enemy he was loath to let go. As stated earlier, Grant was always subordinate, but he was one man who, if you gave him an inch, would take a mile. He fervently believed in an axiom, which came to be universally accepted in later wars, more than in the times in which he operated, that the on scene commander is the best judge of events occurring around him and therefore, should be left to make the decisions required by the immediate circumstances on the field of operations.

  Halleck told Grant to expedite this operation. Halleck really did not know Grant, but he would soon find out that no one moved faster when it came time for action.

  Always Forward

  Grant's invasion of the South began on February 3, 1862. He moved from Cairo with 15,000 men on transports and Commodore Foote's fleet which consisted of seven gunboats four of which were armored. Rawlins noticed Grant appeared uneasy as they pulled away from Cairo, but when Cairo disappeared from sight, Rawlins felt that Grant "seemed a new man." Grant had been nervous, not from the thought of going into battle, but from the idea that headquarters would recall the mission at the last possible moment. Now they were safely away and beyond recall when Grant clapped Rawlins on the shoulder and said: "Now we seem to be safe, beyond recall.....We will succeed, Rawlins, we must succeed."27

  The transports lacked the room for his entire command, forcing Grant to disembark McClernand's force on the east bank of the Tennessee River nine miles below Fort Henry. This was affected during the afternoon of February 3rd. The steamers returned to Paducah to bring up General Smith's command.

  Meanwhile, Grant and Foote proceeded up the river with the ironclads to ascertain the range of the rebel batteries within Fort Henry. Grant had hoped to move his force closer to the fort and south of a swollen creek emptying into the Tennessee. This would assist their operations immensely if the army could avoid fording the flooded stream.

  Grant reembarked his troops and landed them just out of reach of the guns, north of the creek at Bailey's Ferry. This was about five miles north of the fort.

  During the 5th of February, Grant returned to Paducah to accelerate the remainder of his forces. His total force had not arrived as late as 10 P.M. that evening, but Grant was eager to move in the morning before the rebels received more reinforcements. Therefore, Grant issued his orders for the advance at 11 A.M. the morning of February 6th.

  Headquarters, District of Cairo

  Camp in Field Near Fort Henry,

  February 5, 1862.

  General Field Orders, No. 1.

  The First division, General John A. McClernand commanding, will move at eleven o' clock A.M. to morrow, under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson and take a position on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover.

  It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all reenfocements to Fort Henry or escape from it. Also, to be held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm, promptly, on the receipt of orders.

  Two brigades of the Second division, General C. F. Smith commanding, will start at the same hour from the west bank of the river, and take and occupy the heights commanding Fort Henry. This point will be held by so much artillery as can be made available, and such other troops as in the opinion of the general commanding Second division may be necessary for its protection.

  The Third brigade, Second division, will advance up the east bank of the Tennessee river, as fast as it can be securely done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort; or move to the support of the First division, as may be necessary.

  All of the forces on the west bank of the river, not required to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry, will return to their transports , cross the river, and follow the First division as rapidly as possible.

  The west bank of the Tennessee river not having been reconnoitered, the commanding officer intrusted with taking possession of the enemy's works there, will proceed with great caution, and such information as can be gathered, and such guides as can be found in the time intervening before eleven o' clock to-morrow.

  The troops will move with two days' rations of bread and meat in their haversacks.

  One company of the Second division, armed with rifles, will be ordered to report to Flag-Officer Foote, as sharpshooters on board the gunboats.

  By order:

  U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General commanding. 28

  Throughout the night of
the 5th it rained, leaving an already inundated situation much worse. It was apparent to all, that when the time came, the troops would have a rough go of it traipsing through the mud.

  Fort Henry was a large fort covering ten acres, but was poorly situated on low land with bluffs on the opposite side of the river looking down on the fortress. It was located on the east bank of the Tennessee River. The area had been flooded due to seasonal rains. Although it was a substantial fortress, much of it was covered with water up to two feet deep. The Confederates had begun construction on Fort Heiman overlooking Fort Henry, but the works were not yet completed. Fort Henry was defended by seventeen heavy guns, twelve of which were directed toward the river. Outside the main works was an extended line of rifle-pits. In command of Fort Henry was Confederate Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman. He had with him a force of over twenty-seven hundred men.

  The operations to capture Fort Henry began promptly at 11 A.M. on the 6th. Admiral Foote, noticing the intractable position with which the army was going to have to contend, informed Grant: "General, I shall have the fort in my possession before you get into your position." 29 Soon after, General Smith reported finding Fort Heiman had been evacuated by the rebels during the night.