Grant The Forgotten Hero Read online

  Now a Brigadier-General, Grant required a staff and one of his most noteworthy selections was John Rawlins, the young lawyer from Galena who had so aroused him with his oratory at the outbreak of the war. Rawlins was to become Grant’s chief of staff and his devoted friend for life. The reason Rawlins had not previously joined the army was his wife was dying. This situation prevented Rawlins from joining Grant until September. Major-General Fremont was then in command of what was termed the Western Department with Headquarters in St. Louis.

  Early in August, Fremont ordered Grant to Ironton, Missouri and gave him command of a district in that part of the state. Grant was sent to relieve a Colonel Brown whose command was badly demoralized. Within ten days, Grant restored the command to readiness and was prepared to assume offensive operations against the rebels. Grant's opinion of the war was beginning to change. Up to this point, he had felt that the war would be of short duration, but in a letter to his wife Julia, dated August 12, 1861, he began to see things differently. "You ask my views about the continuance of the &c. Well I have changed mind so much that I dont know what to think. That the Rebels will be so badly whipped by April next that they cannot make a stand anywhere I dont doubt. But they are so dogged that there is no telling when they may be subdued."16 Grant visualized the rebels were going to be fierce opponents, but he still felt the end would be sooner rather than later. Grant had not yet discovered the resourcefulness of Americans, for he had never had Americans as his enemy.

  Grant was ready to move. As Bruce Catton put it, "To move south was Grant's compelling motive, then and thereafter. He comes down in history as a stolid, stay-put sort of character, but actually he was nothing of the sort. He had the soldier's impulse to strike rather than receive a blow."17

  And strike he did! He ordered one regiment toward Greenville and another toward Fredericktown, while readying another for action. His plan was to bring these three forces together to attack Hardee, who supposedly was at Greenville. The next morning he rode to Ironton and take command in person, but that evening General Prentiss arrived with orders to take command of the district. Grant knew that by law he outranked Prentiss, but nevertheless relented. He briefed Prentiss about the situation and left for St. Louis on August 18th. The movement against Greenville came to nothing.

  When Grant reported to General Fremont at headquarters the next day he was assigned to the army post at Jefferson City, Missouri. This depressed Grant being so far away from the theater of active operations, but being the dutiful soldier, he obeyed.

  What Grant found in Jefferson City was a strong contingent of soldiers and mass confusion. The Union had just lost the battle at Wilson's Creek in southwest Missouri two weeks earlier and Sterling Price was occupying Lexington, Missouri which was a threat to Jefferson City. On August 23rd, Grant sent headquarters notice offering insight about later operations concerning offensive actions and his distaste for defensive fortifications unless absolutely required. "I am not fortifying here at all. With the picket guard and other duty coming upon the men of this command there is but little time left for drilling. Drill and discipline are more necessary for the men than fortifications."18 The Jefferson City experience lasted only one week as Grant quickly restored order. While there, he was ordered to outfit an expedition to Lexington, Booneville and Chillicothe with the stated objective of seizing the financial assets of those communities. The Union would keep those assets from falling into the hands of the Confederacy. As had been the case in Ironton, just as he was ready to leave to take command of the expedition, there appeared at his headquarters Colonel Jefferson C. Davis with orders to relieve Grant. Grant was ordered to proceed with all haste to department headquarters in St. Louis to receive "important special instructions."

  While Grant’s assignment at Jefferson City was short, he did write a letter to Julia dated August 26, 1861, containing a comment worth noting. "When I was ordered away from Ironton nearly all the commanders of regiments expressed regret I am told. The fact is my whole career since the beginning of the present unhappy difficulties has been complimented in a very flattering manner. All my old friends in the Army and out seem to heartily congratulate me."19 He had been a failure in business, though not always his own fault, and seemed to be enjoying this new found high regard for his services. He enjoyed hearing that people were appreciating his efforts which only bolstered his confidence.

  Grant left for St. Louis within one hour of the change in command, feeling something was in the works. At least he felt highly regarded and the orders did say "important special instructions." Grant left his only staff officer at the time, C. B. Lagow, to pack their belongings and follow the next day.

  Grant arrived in St. Louis on August 27th and the next day received his new orders. These orders assigned him to the command of the district of southeast Missouri and were dated August 28, 1861. His new command comprised all the territory south of St. Louis in Missouri and all of southern Illinois with headquarters in Cairo, Illinois. Before he established his headquarters, he was ordered to commence a campaign to rid southeast Missouri of the rebel guerilla forces under Jeff Thompson.

  Grant had been summoned to headquarters because Fremont got wind of an expected move by the rebels to march into Kentucky to establish a powerful position at Columbus. Fortifying the bluffs overlooking the river at Columbus would prevent Federal movements on the Mississippi. Consequently, Fremont needed someone to preempt the Southern move and secure Kentucky for the Union.

  Fremont and Grant met for two or three hours as Fremont outlined the plan for his subordinate. The purpose was to make Cairo and Paducah the base for operations against Memphis and Nashville. Fremont had previously informed the President of his plans. Catton best summarized the situation. "It would be Grant's function to tie all these movements into one, to clear southeastern Missouri of Confederate troops, and then to move into Kentucky and occupy the potential stronghold at Columbus, as quickly as he could. Meanwhile, he was to see to it that proper defensive works were completed at Cairo, at Bird's Point, at Cape Girardeau and at Ironton."20 Not only did Grant receive his formal orders on August 28th, but on that date Fremont sent notification to General Prentiss that General Grant did out rank him and Grant was to assume command in southeast Missouri.

  As Grant left St. Louis for his temporary headquarters in Cape Girardeau, he realized these were indeed "important special instructions." From here the National Army would launch the invasion of the South and Ulysses S. Grant would lead it! Writing to Congressman Washburne after the success at Fort Donelson, Grant said it was useless trying to credit one man for the idea of invading the South via the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. He said "General Halleck no doubt thought of this route long ago and I am shure I did."21

  Grant established his headquarters at Cape Girardeau and immediately sent instructions to Colonel Marsh at Jackson, informing him of General Prentiss's approach from Ironton. Once the forces of Prentiss and Marsh combined at Jackson, they were to move upon Sikeston, Missouri, while Grant was to lead a column from Bird's Point. All were to converge upon Belmont which was across the river from Columbus, Kentucky. Thus, southeast Missouri would be divested of rebel forces, but in war, few plans go smoothly.

  Grant met Prentiss in Cape Girardeau as all the movements were to begin. As a matter of fact, Prentiss had already arrived in Jackson and had come on that night to meet with Grant. As Grant gave Prentiss, his orders Prentiss balked. Apparently he had not received Fremont's letter explaining the situation of rank between Grant and himself. Prentiss refused to obey Grant's order and when Grant insisted, he requested a leave of absence. Grant refused the request for a leave of absence, so Prentiss tendered his resignation which was also refused by Grant. To make matters worse, Prentiss put himself under arrest and took off for St. Louis to meet with General Fremont. Needless to say, this comedy of errors brought the entire operation in southeast Missouri to a standstill. Coincidentally, the Union naval commander sent disheartening reports to headqua
rters about recent rebel naval activity. These combined occurrences led Grant to recall the troops occupying Belmont.

  General Polk, witnessing the Federal activity in southeast Missouri, gleaned that Fremont intended to violate Kentucky neutrality and seize Columbus. Therefore, he ordered General Pillow to preempt the Northern move and occupy Columbus. On September 4th, Pillow did just that and Kentucky neutrality was no longer an issue.

  Command Decision

  After such an inauspicious beginning, Grant moved his headquarters to Cairo, Illinois on September 4, 1861. He had failed to clear southeast Missouri and had to withdraw from the strategic position of Belmont which enabled the Confederates to secure Columbus for themselves. This incident or something similar was to happen time after time to Grant throughout the war. For most people, this would have a discouraging effect, but not Grant; he just changed his plans and pressed forward.

  Cairo, Illinois rests at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Strategically, this little town controlled all the movements on these rivers, north, south, east and west. Fremont perceived the importance of this place and had reinforced it. Even Lincoln had seen this as a possible base for an invasion of the South. Now it would provide Grant with an opportunity to vent his aggressive intentions.

  On September 5th, the day after Grant assumed command at Cairo, one of Fremont's scouts appeared at his headquarters relating that he had just come from Columbus. He reported that rebel troops had started or were about to embark upon a mission to seize Paducah, Kentucky at the mouth of the Tennessee River. Paducah was about 45 miles from Cairo. Keep in mind that in the conversation Grant had with Fremont, he had been told that Cairo and Paducah were to be the base of operations against Memphis and Nashville. The first part of his orders, to clear southeast Missouri, had failed. Grant had to act.

  Grant immediately telegraphed department headquarters with the information he had just received. He advised Fremont that he planned to move on Paducah within hours unless headquarters objected. Receiving no response from Fremont, he quickly assembled a flotilla. He boarded the 9th and 12th Illinois regiments, a four gun battery of field artillery and the expedition was off by 10:30 that evening. Grant always acted with alacrity and expected the same behavior from his subordinates. He was to be disappointed many times in this regard, throughout the war.

  The expedition arrived in Paducah shortly after sunrise and none too soon, as it turned out. The city of Paducah was ready to welcome the Confederate troops which were supposed to arrive later that day. In fact, General Tilghman, of the Confederate army, left Paducah just as Grant's Nationals came ashore. Tilghman had been part of the advance guard of a larger force of 3800 rebels who were no more than sixteen miles from Paducah.

  The unseemly arrival of the Federal forces soured a great many faces in Paducah that day. Most residents of Paducah were southern sympathizers and greatly dismayed at the sight of the Yankee invaders.

  Nonetheless, Grant had won the race and saved this strategic spot for the Union. He rapidly deployed his men to guard the roads, railway station and telegraph office. He turned over command to Brigadier-General E. A. Paine with instructions to "exercise the strictest discipline against any soldier who shall insult citizens or engage in plundering private property."22 Grant always exercised the utmost compassion that the situation would allow when dealing with private citizens. No sooner than that situation appeared secure than Grant was off, back to Cairo. He arrived at his headquarters less than twenty-four hours after the expedition had begun. Awaiting him was the authorization from Fremont to take Paducah if he felt strong enough.

  One of the first things Grant did after he returned to Cairo was something atypical of him. He sent a telegram to the speaker of the Kentucky House of Representatives which read: "I regret to inform you that Confederate forces in considerable number have invaded the territory of Kentucky and are occupying and fortifying strong positions at Hickman and Chalk Bluffs."23

  This was a very unusual step for Grant to take and he would only make this mistake once. Grant was always well aware that any discussion of a political nature, even as innocuous as this, must be handled by elected officials of the government, not by soldiers. Clearly, the military was not allowed to dabble in policy decisions. It could be that Grant was just over zealous in his belief in the Union cause.

  After Grant contacted the Kentucky legislature, he telegraphed Cape Girardeau ordering reinforcements to Cairo. At last, he communicated with Fremont outlining to him all that he had done. Unlike his curious telegram with the Kentucky Speaker of the House, this was typical Grant. He was completely subordinate and invariably made every effort to keep his superiors informed. The reader will find that a charge to the contrary was leveled against him later.

  When Fremont responded to Grant’s report, it was as expected. Fremont approved of Grant's occupation of Paducah, but was very upset about his correspondence with civilian authorities. For this misstep, Grant drew a reprimand.

  Headquarters Western Department,

  St. Louis, September 6, 1861.

  Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Cairo, Illinois:

  I am directed by Major-General Fremont to inform you that brigade and other commanders are not to correspond with state or other high authorities, in matters pertaining to any branch of the public service, either in initiating such correspondence or replying thereto.

  All such subjects are to be submitted to the major-general commanding the department, for his information and action."24

  This incident taught Grant a valuable lesson. Henceforth, he was careful in any dealings he had regarding politics.

  In another minor rebuke, Fremont took Paducah away from Grant and assigned it to General C. F. Smith, but if Grant was dismayed he did not show it. After all, his cause had won a victory. Kentucky had been secured for the North and after the legislature passed resolutions favorable to the Union, the question of neutrality was never again raised.

  His first three days in Cairo had been eventful. He had played a giant role in securing the strategic town of Paducah and his actions had played a minor role in helping to erase any vestiges of neutrality in Kentucky. From now on, partly because of Grant's foresight and quick actions, Kentucky would be counted as a loyal border state. Following the activity of the first three days, he settled down to the task of District Commander and the numerous details which required his attention. Contrary to the historian’s portrayals, he always demonstrated great compassion for his men. Cairo was an unhealthy outpost; infested with dysentery, mosquitoes and rats. Grant set Dr. Joseph Brinton to work at improving the health of his command. They set up hospitals in Mound City, brought in nurses, and built winter quarters for the troops. Large amounts of supplies arrived daily causing Grant to spend time attending to the logistics of his command. He made every effort to have his men fed, paid and equipped properly. All District Commanders had these problems of administration, but Grant’s command always stood out as exemplary. With the Confederate army close by, Grant’s mind was constantly focused on offensive actions, contemplating how and where he could attack them to bring about the greatest benefit for the Union cause.

  By mid-September, the rebels had established a defensive line which ran clear across Kentucky on an east-west axis. This line of defense was anchored at Columbus on the Mississippi, through Bowling Green in the center of the state, to the Cumberland Gap in the eastern mountains. The Confederate forces in the west were now commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, who many thought to be the most brilliant rebel commander. General Polk held Columbus, General Simon Bolivar Buckner controlled the center at Bowling Green, and at the eastern end General F. K. Zollicoffer was in command. Buckner had been a good friend of Grant’s before the war in both the regular army and in St. Louis.

  As early as September 10, 1861, Grant had written Fremont, "If it was discretionary with me, with a little addition to my present force, I would take Columbus."25 Grant deduced, as so many times thereafter, th
at inaction strengthened the defender more than the aggressor. He felt that the enemy were making fast their fortifications which would require more forces later to capture.

  On September 11, Grant ordered Colonel Oglesby, who commanded at the outpost of Norfolk, to "renew the armed reconnaissance annoying the enemy in every way possible."26 As stated earlier, this is typical Grant. He always searched for ways to discomfit the enemy instead of waiting for them to attack.

  September 12th saw Grant again suggesting to Fremont possible forward movements. "I am of the opinion that if a demonstration was made from Paducah toward Union City supported by two columns on the Kentucky side from here, the gunboats, and a force moving upon Belmont, the enemy would be forced to leave Columbus, leaving behind their heavy ordnance. I submit this to your consideration, and will hold myself in readiness to execute this or any plan you may adopt."27 Fremont told Grant to reconnoiter the roads leading to Columbus and if the enemy should cross the Mississippi to Belmont, "be present with a force on the Missouri as well as the Kentucky shores."28

  By mid-September, 16,500 men had been placed under his command around Cairo, but subsequently, Fremont was forced to dispatch two of Grant’s regiments to Washington. On September 26, Fremont sent Grant the following orders: "I will re-enforce you with two new regiments as soon as possible. By this means you will be enabled, in concert with Brigadier-General Smith, to control the rebel forces on the Kentucky and Missouri shores. Should the enemy expose a weak point on either side of the river, you may inflict upon him a combined blow; but at present I am not in favor of incurring any hazard or defeat."29 In war Grant was so aggressive, that if you gave him an inch he would take a mile. In the third sentence of the above orders, Fremont gave Grant all the latitude he needed. Fremont, realizing this, immediately in the next sentence, tried to pull back. Nevertheless, in Grant's mind he could have used this order to justify his attack on Belmont some weeks later. After all, Fremont said that if the opportunity arose, strike.