Hannibal’s Last Battle Read online

  Carthaginian Possessions in Spain, 218 BCE

  Rome, for its part, was very slow in its response to the attack on Saguntum, delaying any decision until after the election of new consuls in March of 218 (the first month of the republican Roman calendar), some time after the fall of the city. Rome finally sent an embassy to Carthage itself demanding the surrender of Hannibal and his advisors. The ultimatum was rejected and the Roman Senate declared war.

  The Second Punic War: Initial Strategies

  Roman troop placements in 218 indicate that the Senate was going to pursue a two-pronged strategy against Carthage, with one army sent against Spain and the other against North Africa itself.109 Commanding the Spanish army was the newly-elected consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio (also referred to as Scipio the Elder, father of Scipio Africanus), charged with intercepting and defeating Hannibal’s army before launching an attack against Carthaginian interests in northern Spain. Scipio commanded a substantial army consisting of 22,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry, supported by some sixty ships.110

  Once Hannibal had been defeated, the Roman plan called for the African army, under the command of Tiberius Sempronius Longus and staging from Sicily, to invade North Africa in a movement reminiscent of Regulus’ campaign (255 BCE) during the First Punic War. This strategy seems to indicate that the Romans intended on fighting a war on foreign soil (Spain and North Africa), probably with the assistance of rebellious Carthaginian subjects in both regions.111 Rome would not be satisfied with merely putting Carthage in its place, Rome was out to break the back of its most potent rival in the western Mediterranean.

  On the other hand, Hannibal’s aim was not the complete destruction of Rome but the reduction of its effectiveness as a regional power. This is clearly seen in the text of the treaty Hannibal made with the Macedonian king Philip V in 215 to help Carthage in its war with Rome.112 With Roman power reduced, Carthage could regain lost territory in Sicily and Sardinia and have free reign in Spain and southern Gaul.

  As mentioned above, Hannibal’s strategy was a mirror of Rome’s: bring the war to Italy and through the destruction of Roman armies on the battlefield precipitate the unravelling of the Roman confederation. Since allies made up more than half of Rome’s manpower reserves, this strategy would have the dual effect of depriving Rome of troops while boosting Punic numbers through recruitment of former Roman allies.113 According to Livy:

  Hannibal’s opinion never varied; the war should be fought in Italy. Italy, [Hannibal] said, would provide both food and supplies and troops for a foreign enemy; whereas if no movement was made in Italy, and the Roman people were allowed to use the manpower and resources of Italy for a war in foreign parts, then neither king nor any nation would be a match for the Romans.114

  To test the theory that the war should be fought in Italy, Hannibal sent agents to Cisalpine Gaul to see if the barbarians there were sympathetic to the idea of direct Punic assistance in making war against the Romans. When the envoys returned to New Carthage in May they carried the answer Hannibal was seeking: the Celts would support Carthage with supplies and troops.115

  The obvious drawbacks of this strategy were the problems that campaigning in enemy territory always conjured: maintaining secure lines of communication while fighting in a hostile environment. To further complicate Hannibal’s plans, to implement his strategy of a war on Italian soil he needed to elude a Roman army sent to intercept him and then bring his invading Carthaginian host across the Alps in winter because the Romans controlled all the coastal approaches to Italy.116

  Historians have long speculated whether this plan was based on sound strategic principles or whether it was influenced by internal feuding within the Carthaginian government. Both Hamilcar and his son Hannibal enjoyed support from some powerful members of the Punic aristocracy, but their political rival Hanno (who had commanded with Hamilcar during the Mercenary War) also exerted substantial influence in Carthage. This may explain why Hannibal never had great support from the Punic navy.117 Unlike the First Punic War where Carthaginian sea power played a decisive role in Punic strategy, the Second Punic War would be a war fought on land in Italy, Spain and finally, North Africa. Confident he now had the allies necessary to pursue a war against Rome in Italy, Hannibal assembled and trained an army in the early spring and considered his land route across the Alps.

  Dangerous Journey: Hannibal Crosses the Alps

  Hannibal left the friendly gates of New Carthage probably some time in mid-June 219 at the head of a very large army by classical standards, consisting of 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and thirty-seven war elephants.118 After a six-week march north along the eastern coast of Spain, Hannibal crossed the Ebro River, the traditional frontier between Carthaginian territory in the south and the wild north. Contemporary sources do not give us very much concrete information about this phase of Hannibal’s march, but we do know the Punic commander did move against a number of pro-Roman tribes living between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. Hannibal lost a lot of troops during this fighting (precise numbers are unknown), but the sacrifices were required in order to secure his line of communication from Italy back to Spain. Without this lifeline, the Italian campaign would be stillborn. Once the Spanish tribes were pacified, Hannibal gave one of his trusted officers a contingent of 10,000 foot soldiers and 1,000 horse to keep an eye on the pro-Roman Massaliote city of Emporion on the coast and guard the mountain passes between Spain and Gaul.119 By the time Hannibal left Emporion in late August his army had contracted significantly due to garrisoning and some desertions. He also released a further 10,000 Spaniards, perhaps as a conciliatory gesture or perhaps to cover up his own troop evaporation.120 Polybius tells us that the Punic general had no more than 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry by the time he began crossing the Pyrenees.121

  Hannibal decided on an interior route because the Romans controlled the coastline between Spain and Italy. Pushing through the tribal resistance in the mountain passes and descending into Gaul, Hannibal negotiated an agreement with many of the Celtic tribes for safe passage, allowing the Carthaginian forces to arrive at the Rhone River relatively unmolested. Hannibal shed another 12,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry on this trek, losing some to war, but most to garrisoning, as recent archaeological finds along this route suggests.122

  Hannibal’s Route Across the Alps, 218 BCE

  Hannibal arrived at his first major geographical barrier, the Rhone River, in late September. The precise place where the Punic army crossed the Rhone has been a subject of great debate among scholars, but Polybius states that Hannibal began crossing the Rhone some four days’ march from the sea, perhaps at the site of the modern French city of Beaucaire.123 There is some suspicion that Hannibal marched along an ancient route that would later be named by the Romans via Domitia.124 To prepare for the crossing, the Punic commander bribed the locals living along the bank of the river and purchased their canoes and boats, even purchasing logs to make their own barges. Within just two days, Hannibal had enough vessels for crossing. But as the Carthaginians readied their boats, the other bank of the Rhone filled with barbarians preparing to contest the crossing. Recognizing the need for a diversion to weaken the barbarians’ resolve, Hannibal sent a detachment of troops (most likely cavalry) north to cross the Rhone upstream, probably across from where Avignon is today.125 There, the Punic horse waited and hid for a few days until the main crossing was ready.

  On the fifth day since reaching the Rhone, Hannibal ordered a full-scale crossing. The first Punic assault rapidly established a foothold on the farther bank, and when the Gauls pored out of their position to attack the invaders, the once-hidden Carthaginian cavalry struck the rear of the tribal warriors with complete surprise, routing the barbarians. Hannibal could now bring the rest of his troops across safely, and the crossing was completed by nightfall. Only his thirty-seven elephants remained on the west bank.

  The next morning Hannibal learned that Scipio the Elder’s Roman fleet had anchored at the mouth of the Rh
one River. He immediately dispatched 500 of his finest Numidian cavalry south to investigate, then went about bringing the pachyderms across the river.126 He also met with an envoy of chieftains from the Po Valley, first among them a powerful man named Magilos. These men had crossed the Alps to meet with Hannibal and cement their alliance against the Romans. Livy even points out that when the Carthaginian troops, tired from their march and apprehensive about crossing the Alps, seemed dispirited, Hannibal attempted to raise their spirits by pointing to the visiting chieftains and said, ‘How do you think these envoys got here, on wings?’127

  After carefully bringing his elephants across the Rhone on large rafts, Hannibal began his march upriver when his Numidian cavalry returned from a clash with Scipio’s reconnaissance force of 300 Roman horse, supported by Gallic cavalry and led by local guides. The scouting Roman cavalry had bumped into the Numidian cavalry, and after a short and bloody fight, chased the African cavalry back to their camp, then turned and bolted back to the mouth of the Rhone.128 Contemporary sources claim that 200 of the 500 Numidian horsemen were killed in this skirmish, with a loss of only 140 Roman horse.129 Scipio immediately broke camp and began rowing up the river in an attempt to catch the Punic army. Unfortunately for the Romans, Hannibal was now many days ahead of them and, after a four-day march north along the east bank of the river, putting more space between himself and his adversary. After resupplying his troops for the winter passage, Hannibal led his men east into the foothills which lay beneath the snow-capped Alps. At the head of the column were the cavalry and elephants, followed by infantry and the supply train. Hannibal himself, with his best infantry, brought up the rear.130 It was mid-October.

  Historians have long debated about what path Hannibal took to cross the mountains, though Polybius clearly indicates that it was a high pass.131 A few days into the march, the Carthaginians encountered the hostile Allobroge tribe holding the high ground dominating a pass ahead. Hannibal sent forward a scouting party made up of Gauls, who reported that the Allobroge warriors had abandoned the high ground during the night. Hannibal then seized the heights and the march was resumed. But the danger was not over, and the barbarians attacked the packed Punic column as it wound along the mountainside, frightening pack animals and men alike, plunging some to their deaths in the gorge below. According to Livy,

  the natives, springing from their places of concealment, fiercely assaulted front and rear, leaping into the fray, hurling missiles, rolling down rocks from the heights above.132

  The barbarians were finally put to flight by Carthaginian soldiers who managed to seize the high ground and attack the tribesmen from behind.133 Hannibal’s troops would be ambushed again by tribesmen a few days later while in a deep ravine. After fierce fighting, the Carthaginians finally forced the enemy warriors to withdraw.

  Hannibal reached the main watershed nine days into the march. Here he rested for two days to allow stragglers to catch up before starting his descent. It was now snowing in the high country, and according to Polybius,

  The track which led down the mountain was both narrow and steep, and since neither the men nor the animals could be sure of their footing on account of the snow, any who stepped wide of the path or stumbled overbalanced and fell down the precipices.134

  Almost as many men and animals were lost over the cliffs as had been killed in the fighting.135 Hannibal faced another setback when his passage was blocked by a massive landslide, so severe it required the reconstruction of the path. Finally, after a reported fifteen-day march (one modern estimate puts it at a more reasonable twenty-four), Hannibal reached the fertile expanses of the Po Valley somewhere near Turin no later than mid-November.136 He arrived with only 12,000 African and 8,000 Spanish infantry and 6,000 cavalry, or about a quarter of the number of troops that set out originally from New Carthage five months earlier.137

  Seizing the Initiative: Early Punic Victories at the Ticinus and the Trebia (218 BCE)

  Hannibal arrived in northern Italy with an army of 26,000 hungry and exhausted men and immediately prepared to enact his strategy to make war against the Romans in Roman territory. An army of 26,000 men seemed ‘pitifully small to challenge the might of Rome’ in the words of one leading authority on Hannibal, yet with the assistance of his Gallic allies, he not only rebuilt his army quickly, he went on to defeat the Romans on two occasions before the end of 218 BCE.138

  Hannibal certainly recognized that his bold crossing of the Alps had given him the initiative in the war against Rome, but he also realized that he needed to quickly resupply his army and replace the fallen troops if he was to push forward with his plans.139 Hannibal’s numbers could only be replaced by Celtic contingents. Unfortunately the first Gauls he dealt with were not the same barbarians he had made a pact with earlier, so his first attempt to recruit troops from the Taurini was met with resistance, forcing him into a demonstration of his army’s might. The chief city of the Taurini was attacked and, after a three-day siege, reduced, its population massacred in a coldly calculated display of Punic military strength intended to overawe the local tribes.140 The demonstration worked. As the Carthaginians helped themselves to the Taurini’s winter stores, barbarians flocked to join the Punic effort. Rested, Hannibal marched down the Po Valley toward his Gallic allies the Insubres and Boii and toward Roman territory.

  When Scipio realized he would be unable to catch Hannibal on the Rhone in southern Gaul, he made a decisive and fateful decision to transfer command of his Roman army to his brother Gnaeus and ordered them westward to Spain to protect old allies and secure new ones. No doubt Scipio understood that Hannibal would need a secure line of communication to conduct a war in Italy, and this army’s presence in northern Iberia could disrupt that lifeline. Scipio returned to the Roman port city of Pisae in Italy and sent word to the Roman Senate of Hannibal’s intentions. The Senate immediately recalled Sempronius Longus from Sicily where he had been preparing his army for an invasion of North Africa. After a Herculean effort, Sempronius was able to transfer his army to the Adriatic port of Ariminum (modern Rimini) by early December.141

  Meanwhile, Scipio took command of two Roman legions operating in the Po River. These legions had been placed there to protect the two new Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona whose 6,000 colonists were barely established when the Celts in the region revolted earlier. It was very uncommon for a consul to abandon one army and take command of another, and it is possible that when Hannibal learned of the existence of a Roman army at Placentia he assumed it was the same army he had evaded in southern Gaul.142 When Scipio discovered the Punic army was now across the Alps and operating in the same area, he marched out to confront the invaders.

  After crossing the Po River with a makeshift pontoon bridge made of boats, Scipio and his two legions marched along its north bank toward where his scouts believed Hannibal’s army was located. Scipio bridged a second river, this time the Ticinus River (a tributary of the Po), somewhere near the modern city of Pavia. The Romans were now marching through the territory of the Insubres, and though the Insubres were allies of Carthage, the presence of Roman legionaries had a chilling effect on Hannibal’s ability to recruit from the local tribes. What was needed was a battlefield victory over the Romans to both boost Punic morale and persuade the Gauls into joining Hannibal. This opportunity took place near the Ticinus River in late November, 218.

  When the two armies’ scouts first made contact with each other, both Hannibal and Scipio ordered their forces to make camp.143 The next day both commanders led a large reconnaissance force on a fact-finding mission. Hannibal brought most of his 6,000 cavalry with him, outnumbering Scipio and his Roman, Latin and Gallic horse, though we are unsure by how much. The Roman consul also had a number of light infantry velites with him. When the two forces finally met, they each deployed ready to fight. Scipio placed his velites as a screen for his Gallic cavalry, keeping his Italian horse in reserve. Hannibal placed his Spanish heavy cavalry in the centre and his Numidian light ca
valry on both wings.

  The Battle of the Ticinus opened in typical fashion with Scipio ordering his velites forward to harass the Punic lines with their javelins, but before these light troops could throw their missiles, both sides’ heavy cavalry surged forward in a charge, meeting in the centre of the battlefield in a general melee as the velites retreated back through the galloping Gallic horse. For a while neither side held an advantage until the Numidian light cavalry swept around the Roman flanks, cutting down first the disorganized velites before wheeling and striking the reserve Roman horse in the rear. During this stage of the battle Scipio was gravely wounded. Tradition states that the consul was only saved by his seventeen-year old son, also named Publius Cornelius Scipio. This younger Scipio would later become Scipio ‘Africanus’, Rome’s greatest general, conqueror of Spain, and the ultimate victor over Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in 202 BCE. Their commanding general and consul wounded, the Romans were routed. And although the Battle of the Ticinus was more of a large cavalry skirmish than a set-piece battle, with Hannibal’s Spanish and Numidian cavalry proving decisive over the Roman and allied horse, it served as a harbinger of the battles to come.

  Demoralized, Scipio and his army broke camp and retreated back over the Ticinus River, and though Hannibal did pursue, he was unable to seize the makeshift bridge before it was dismantled, forcing the Punic commander to march two days westward along the Po before a suitable spot was found to build a bridge. Meanwhile, Scipio retreated back to his base at Placentia, camping west of the River Trebia on the opposite bank to the city. Two days after crossing the Po, Hannibal caught up to Scipio at his base at Placentia and formed up on the flat plain in front of the Roman camp about five or six miles away.