Hustle and Gig Read online

  The guiding questions of my research are: What is life in the sharing economy like for workers? To what extent do the workers consider or experience themselves as entrepreneurs, workers, or sharers who are creating a new type of economy? What types of skills and capital do workers bring to the gig economy?

  My research draws on three main theoretical themes: the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft trust divide; the increasing casualization of labor with a related shift in risk; and the resulting increase in social inequalities.

  Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft, or Technology Leading to the Revival of Trust and Community

  Originally seen as centers of trade, government, culture, and religion, cities took on new importance in the Industrial Revolution, making citizens out of people who had been peasants the day before. The increasing size and importance of cities made early political leaders suspicious. Thomas Jefferson believed that “urban culture would ruin the American desire for freedom,” while Alexis de Tocqueville complained about Cincinnati, describing it as “a picture of industry and work that strikes one at every step.”19 Even worse than being disorganized, cities were seen as destroying humanity. As Bonnie Menes Kahn points out, one of the most disturbing consequences of city life seemed to be the change in human relationships, creating “a breed of savage, self-interested machines[,] . . . strangers, tearing human beings away from one another, rendering men and women less human.”20 Theorist Georg Simmel believed that the overstimulated world of strangers created a city dweller who was callous and blasé, forced to shut down in the face of so much mental stimulation.21 Cities contributed to a “lonely crowd” of people who were looking for clues to how they should act, a people who felt “no moral responsibility because they have no history—no past to honor, no land to defend, no traditions to follow.”22 In this view, cities were at odds with community and human connections.

  This fear of cities as destroyers of community can also be seen in Ferdinand Tonnies’s concept of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. For Tonnies, Gemeinschaft was a community focused on primary relations organized by natural will, house, village, and town, with a focus on collective consciousness and effervescence. Gemeinschaft required that people interact with each other face to face; lacking a division of labor, people knew each other in many contexts. Social conformity was maintained through stigma, informal sanctions, and social traditions—there might be blood feuds, but no lawsuits. By comparison, “the city is typical of Gesellschaft in general.” In a Gesellschaft, connections are abstract and more tenuous, bonds have to be imagined. Connections have to be organized through contracts because members can no longer trust that someone’s word and firm handshake are trustworthy—courts, cops, and lawyers serve as an enforcement mechanism. By definition, when one moves to a “modern”-day society—or at least a city—one loses the community connections of Gemeinschaft; it is also in Gesellschaft that “the family is decaying.”23

  The sharing economy paints itself as a solution, as a return to small-town or even village life. New York University Stern School of Business professor Arun Sundararajan argues that “the extent to which people are connected to each other is lower than what humans need. . . . Part of the appeal of the sharing economy is helping to bridge that gap.”24 John Zimmer, a cofounder of the taxi app Lyft, compares the sharing economy to his time spent on the Oglala Sioux reservation in Pine Ridge, South Dakota: “Their sense of community, of connection to each other and to their land, made me feel more happy and alive than I’ve ever felt before,” he says. “I think people are craving real human interaction—it’s like an instinct. We now have the opportunity to use technology to help us get there.”25 Although Uber and Airbnb can be found all over the world, true economies of scale are most often found in cities. It’s easier to be a Sprig messenger, responsible for delivering healthy meals in twenty minutes or less, if you live in a concentrated city like San Francisco—the same model doesn’t work in rural Idaho or in Atlanta’s suburban sprawl.

  But our trust in humanity doesn’t seem to be increasing. Data from the 2012 General Social Survey, the National Opinion Research Center’s poll of American attitudes, found that only 32 percent of respondents agreed that people could generally be trusted, down from 46 percent in 1972.26 An October 2013 report by the Associated Press and the market research firm GfK found that only 41 percent of respondents (n = 1,227) express “a great deal” or “quite a bit” of trust in the people they hire to work in their homes, 21 percent trust others when they are driving cars, and only 19 percent trust “people you meet when you are traveling away from home.”27

  As for the promise of community offered by these services, academic research to date suggests that it, too, may be a bust. Anny Fenton, a Harvard graduate student who studied social interactions among RelayRides users, found that car owners using the site said their relationships with users were “sterile,” “anonymous,” and “nothing”; however, they felt that they had something more personal to offer and assumed that users would treat their cars better than a typical rental car.28 Research on Zipcar, a service often described as part of the sharing economy, found that users experienced the service in the same anonymous way that one experiences a hotel: “They know others have used the cars, but have no desire to interact with them.” Rather than viewing fellow Zipsters as cosharers of the cars, users were mistrustful of them and relied on the company to police the system. Researchers have suggested that Lyft’s lack of success in relation to Uber may be a result of Lyft “putting too much emphasis on consumers’ desire to ‘share’ with each other,” and that “consumers are more interested in lower costs and convenience than they are in fostering social relationships with the company or other consumers.”29

  My own research echoes this lack of interest in interaction. Rather than create long-lasting relationship with their guests, many Airbnb hosts never meet the person who will be sleeping in their bed or using their bathroom. As a matter of both convenience and personal preference, hosts often make use of strategically located street-side lockboxes (see figs. 3 and 4), KeyCafes (lockboxes in local stores and restaurants), and TaskRabbit workers to allow for interaction-free key transfer between host and guest. This avoidance of contact is so prevalent that in an undergraduate observational study I conducted in the East Village, a popular Airbnb neighborhood, I found numerous lockboxes allowing hosts to exchange keys without any human interaction whatsoever. While the sharing economy may market itself as bringing people together, it results in the ultimate Gesellschaft as fleeting interactions and urban anonymity rule the day.

  Figure 3 and figure 4. Lockboxes, like these, are a common sight in the East Village. Airbnb hosts provide guests with the location of the box (usually a tree guard or nearby fence) and the combination when sending confirmation messages. The lockboxes allow for an interaction-free key transfer between host and guest. Photos by author.

  Although the sharing economy—a term that increasingly feels inappropriate—may have been intended to democratize entrepreneurism, evidence suggests that it may simply be furthering the discriminatory status quo. Discrimination in the marketplace has been well documented by researchers. We know that those with “black-sounding” names are 50 percent less likely to be called in for an interview, and female job candidates are given lower salary offers than men.30 Users hope that the sharing economy makes discrimination harder or less likely, and anecdotal reports about Uber suggest that it may make hiring a cab easier for African Americans by increasing the salience of social class—using Uber entails a credit card, a smartphone, and at least originally, higher rates, and so Uber users are considered wealthier.

  Yet the sharing economy’s emphasis on user names and profile pictures may make discrimination easier. Black Airbnb hosts charge 12 percent less than comparable properties hosted by white hosts, possibly owing to discrimination.31 Meanwhile, iPods for sale on eBay that are photographed while held in a black hand get bids that are 20 percent lower than those held in a white hand.32

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sp; In my qualitative interviews with Airbnb hosts, I’ve found that although some hosts admit to discriminating on the basis of race, hosts actually consider a slew of factors, including profile photos, email communication, reviews, and even outside information gathered through “Internet stalking.” As a result, host discrimination against potential guests may be broader and more extensive than previous studies may suggest. The increase in discrimination, partnered with a reliance on reviews and profiles and a declining level of trust, suggests that the sharing economy—while many things—is hardly a positive return to the ideal of small town life.

  The Increasing Casualization of Labor and the Related Risk Shift

  The sharing economy also brings to the forefront issues regarding the changing relationship between worker and firm and the resulting workplace risks encountered by sharing economy workers. The majority of sharing economy workers—including Uber/Lyft drivers, TaskRabbit runners, Airbnb hosts, and Handy cleaners—are independent contractors. In recent years, the number of workers classified as independent contractors has grown steadily as employers seek to avoid social responsibilities, including workers’ compensation, overtime, and disability accommodations.33 A 2015 Occupational Safety and Health Administration report suggests that temporary workers and independent contractors also receive less training and are more likely to be injured on the job as a result.

  Although researchers have addressed how classification as an independent contractor, as opposed to employee, can affect workers, the concept of risk is more commonly used when discussing entrepreneurs.34 Since the late 1700s, entrepreneurs have been linked with risk-taking based on Ricard Cantillon’s observations that the entrepreneur “buys at certain prices and sells at uncertain prices,” thereby bearing the risk of the transaction.35 Harvard Business School’s Howard Stevenson describes entrepreneurship as “the pursuit of opportunity beyond resources controlled.”36 Although an entrepreneur is often thought of as creating something new, the Oxford dictionary emphasizes control and risk in its definition of an entrepreneur, describing one as someone who “undertakes or controls a business or enterprise and bears the risk of profit or loss.”37 The concept of risk is particularly salient for entrepreneurs, especially in the United States; statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics demonstrate that roughly a third of new businesses will fail in the first two years, and that more than half won’t last five years.38

  Yet Jacob Hacker has noted that risk in the workplace is no longer assumed entirely by entrepreneurs or capitalists.39 Workers have seen their health insurance coverage transformed into high-deductible plans and their company pensions converted from defined benefit to defined contribution plans (401ks), pushing the financial risk of health problems and bad investments onto the workers. The rise of outsourcing and focus on short-term profits further means that workers are constantly competing for jobs in a “spot market” that resembles a trading floor. Thanks to stagnating wages, many families rely on two incomes, and the loss of either can be devastating.

  In 1994, sociologists Stanley Aronowitz and William DiFazio published The Jobless Future, arguing that companies were “scratching every itch of everyday life with sci-tech,” leading toward “more low-paid, temporary, benefit-free blue- and white-collar jobs and fewer decent permanent factory and office jobs.” The secondary labor market is defined as providing workers with low pay, few benefits, and a level of economic insecurity in which work today doesn’t necessarily mean work tomorrow—the very definition of gig employment. While this casualization of the workplace and increasing transfer of risk to workers was once a defining characteristic of the secondary labor market, it has become much more pervasive and generalized, increasingly affecting managerial and professional workers.40 British economist Guy Standing warns that this instability has led to the “precariat,” a growing number of people “living and working precariously, usually in a series of short-term jobs, without recourse to stable occupational identities or careers, stable social protection or protective regulations.” This precariousness often leads to a sense of anxiety, anomie, alienation, and anger.41

  The Wall Street Journal, a bastion of big business, suggests that the rumblings of worker discontent “highlight the ambivalence that many workers feel towards the platforms that supply or supplement their income.” Workers argue that the on-demand platforms give them little control over their labor, and that they are forced to shoulder personal and financial risks. Numerous lawsuits brought by workers of Uber, Lyft, and Handy argue that the restrictions on, and requirements for, workers mean they should be considered employees—not independent contractors. Other suits, such as one against CrowdFlower.com (renamed Figure Eight in 2018), a start-up that breaks digital jobs into tiny tasks performed by millions of workers, argues that workers were paid less than minimum wage. In a video interview, one of CrowdFlower’s cofounders noted that “the firm sometimes paid workers $2 to $3 an hour, rather than the federal minimum wage of $7.25, or paid workers in points for various online reward programs and videogame credits.”42

  Sociologist Allison Pugh suggests that how this instability is experienced depends on the social class and desirability of the worker. In The Tumbleweed Society, she argues that for upper-class people with in-demand job skills, “insecurity looks more like ‘flexibility.’”43 These workers can pursue jobs that are meaningful and that provide the best fit between job and self. For lower-class workers, reduced security in the workplace has also led to an inability to commit in personal relationships. Upper-class workers avoid the same fate in part by creating a moral wall between work and family. Could the sharing economy—by reducing barriers to entrepreneurship—transform insecurity into flexibility for lower-class workers?

  The central role of entrepreneurship in economic growth and development is well researched in economic literature. Entrepreneurs can play a transformative role by increasing competition, shaping markets, and driving innovation and technological improvements.44 But not all entrepreneurism is created equal. As MIT economist Antoinette Schoar notes, “Much less effort has been devoted to studying the actual entrepreneurs who are the agents of this change and the heterogeneity among these individuals.” Schoar argues that there’s a difference between subsistence entrepreneurism, which provides a subsistence income, and transformational entrepreneurs, “who aim to create large, vibrant businesses that . . . provide jobs and income for others.”45

  Where do sharing economy workers fall on this spectrum? Uber-financed research by Jonathan Hall and Princeton economist Alan Krueger notes that more than 90 percent of Uber drivers say they drive with Uber to “earn more income to better support myself and my family,” though only 71 percent of respondents agree that working for Uber actually makes them better off financially.46 In New York City, Airbnb launched a public relations campaign “highlighting its positive economic impact on the city’s predominantly-black neighborhoods, from Crown Heights and Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn, to West Harlem.”47 Airbnb’s Economic Impact Report utilizes internal research (based on guest stays from 2012 to 2013) to argue that the typical host earns $7,530 per year, and that the funds are used to help people stay in their homes. Etsy, the online craft space, notes that sellers report higher levels of education and lower household income than the general population in the United States: 52 percent of sellers have a college education, but the median income is just $44,900, 10 percent lower than the national average. More than a quarter (26 percent) of Etsy sellers earn less than $25,000 in annual household income. The same report further notes that “68% [of sellers] said that Etsy provides supplemental income for themselves or their family . . . contributing 7.6% to household income[,] . . . enough to cover the cost of annual car payments or several months’ rent.”48 Based on these reports—issued by the companies themselves—it appears that while the gig economy may offer workers a way to fight stagnating wages and workplace instability, at best, this work is subsistence entrepreneurism.

  Increasing Social Ine
qualities

  As the Success Stories show, some workers are able to create a middle-class, or higher, living from the sharing economy. Even individuals who are renting out a spare bedroom on Airbnb, ostensibly to make rent, like Ryan in the first chapter, soon discover that if they have the available capital, they can quickly realize considerable profits on their investment. A New York Times article on the business tycoons of Airbnb discusses a real estate agent who started off renting his spare bedroom when the monthly rent on his apartment increased suddenly from twenty-eight hundred dollars to five thousand dollars.49 When the agent realized the potential to exploit the difference between long- and short-term rental prices, he signed a lease for a second apartment. In October 2014, already making up to six thousand dollars a month in profit from his second apartment, “he added a third rental—this one under his wife’s account. He plans to add more he said, possibly even under phony accounts to avoid legal scrutiny.”50 Other documented Airbnb empires include a San Francisco stockbroker who rented six different apartments in order to “create a makeshift hotel that could net him almost $100,000.”51

  In some cases, sharing economy services are used to pad the incomes of the already wealthy. In 2014, the New York State attorney general released a report highlighting Airbnb’s illegal listings, finding that as many as 72 percent of Airbnb listings in New York were illegal. This report, Airbnb in the City, found that although more than 90 percent of hosts in New York City rented two or fewer units on Airbnb, 1,406 hosts (6 percent) during a four-year period acted as “commercial users,” running larger operations that administered as many as 272 unique units each. The sheer number of commercial users meant that they “controlled more than 20% of unique units in New York City booked on Airbnb as private short-term rentals, accepted more than 33% of private reservations, and received more than one of every three dollars in revenue from private short-term rentals on Airbnb for a total of $168 million.”