Intellectual Impostures Read online

  INTELLECTUAL IMPOSTURES

  Alan Sokal is Professor of Physics at New York University. In 1996 his infamous article ‘Transgressing the boundaries: Toward a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity’, parodying postmodernists’ use of scientific language, was published in all seriousness by the American cultural-studies journal Social Text.

  Jean Bricmont is Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Louvain (Belgium).

  INTELLECTUAL IMPOSTURES

  Postmodern philosophers’ abuse of science

  Alan Sokal

  and

  Jean Bricmont

  First published in 1997 in French by

  Éditions Odile Jacob

  15 rue Soufflot

  75005 Paris

  First published in Great Britain in 1998 by

  Profile Books Ltd

  58A Hatton Garden

  London EC1N 8LX

  www.profilebooks.co.uk

  This edition published in 1999, 2003

  This English translation © Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont 1998, 1999, 2003

  Typeset in Sabon by MacGuru Ltd

  [email protected]

  Printed and bound in Great Britain by

  St Edmundsbury Press, Bury St Edmunds

  The moral right of the authors has been asserted.

  All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book.

  A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

  ISBN 1 86197 631 3

  TO MARINA

  TO CLAIRE, THOMAS AND ANTOINE

  CONTENTS

  Preface to the first edition

  Preface to the second edition

  1 Introduction

  2 Jacques Lacan

  3 Julia Kristeva

  4 Intermezzo: Epistemic relativism in the philosophy of science

  5 Luce Irigaray

  6 Bruno Latour

  7 Intermezzo: Chaos theory and ‘postmodern science’

  8 Jean Baudrillard

  9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

  10 Paul Virilio

  11 Gödel’s theorem and set theory: Some examples of abuse

  12 Epilogue

  APPENDICES

  A Transgressing the boundaries: Toward a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity

  B Some comments on the parody

  C Transgressing the boundaries: An afterword

  Bibliography

  Index

  PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

  The publication in France of our book Impostures Intellectuelles1 appears to have created a small storm in certain intellectual circles. According to Jon Henley in The Guardian, we have shown that ‘modern French philosophy is a load of old tosh.’2 According to Robert Maggiori in Libération, we are humourless scientistic pedants who correct grammatical errors in love letters.3 We would like to explain briefly why neither is the case, and to answer both our critics and our over-enthusiastic supporters. In particular, we want to dispel a number of misunderstandings.

  The book grew out of the now-famous hoax in which one of us published, in the American cultural-studies journal Social Text, a parody article crammed with nonsensical, but unfortunately authentic, quotations about physics and mathematics by prominent French and American intellectuals.4 However, only a small fraction of the ‘dossier’ discovered during Sokal’s library research could be included in the parody. After showing this larger dossier to scientist and non-scientist friends, we became (slowly) convinced that it might be worth making it available to a wider audience. We wanted to explain, in non-technical terms, why the quotes are absurd or, in many cases, simply meaningless; and we wanted also to discuss the cultural circumstances that enabled these discourses to achieve such renown and to remain, thus far, unexposed.

  But what exactly do we claim? Neither too much nor too little. We show that famous intellectuals such as Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Baudrillard and Deleuze have repeatedly abused scientific concepts and terminology: either using scientific ideas totally out of context, without giving the slightest justification – note that we are not against extrapolating concepts from one field to another, but only against extrapolations made without argument – or throwing around scientific jargon in front of their non-scientist readers without any regard for its relevance or even its meaning. We make no claim that this invalidates the rest of their work, on which we suspend judgment.

  We are sometimes accused of being arrogant scientists, but our view of the hard sciences’ role is in fact rather modest. Wouldn’t it be nice (for us mathematicians and physicists, that is) if Gödel’s theorem or relativity theory did have immediate and deep implications for the study of society? Or if the axiom of choice could be used to study poetry? Or if topology had something to do with the human psyche? But alas, it is not the case.

  A second target of our book is epistemic relativism, namely the idea – which, at least when expressed explicitly, is much more widespread in the English-speaking world than in France – that modern science is nothing more than a ‘myth’, a ‘narration’ or a ‘social construction’ among many others.5 Besides some gross abuses (e.g. Irigaray), we dissect a number of confusions that are rather frequent in postmodernist and cultural-studies circles: for example, misappropriating ideas from the philosophy of science, such as the underdetermination of theory by evidence or the theory-ladenness of observation, in order to support radical relativism.

  This book is therefore made up of two distinct – but related – works under one cover. First, there is the collection of extreme abuses discovered, rather haphazardly, by Sokal; these are the ‘impostures’ of our title. Second, there is our critique of epistemic relativism and of misconceptions about ‘postmodern science’; these analyses are considerably more subtle. The connection between these two critiques is primarily sociological: the French authors of the ‘impostures’ are fashionable in many of the same English-speaking academic circles where epistemic relativism is the coin of the realm.6 There is also a weak logical link: if one accepts epistemic relativism, there is less reason to be upset by the misrepresentation of scientific ideas, which anyway are just another ‘discourse’.

  Obviously, we did not write this book just to point out some isolated abuses. We have larger targets in mind, but not necessarily those that are attributed to us. This book deals with mystification, deliberately obscure language, confused thinking, and the misuse of scientific concepts. The texts we quote may be the tip of an iceberg, but the iceberg should be defined as a set of intellectual practices, not a social group.

  Suppose, for example, that a journalist discovers documents showing that several highly respected politicians are corrupt, and publishes them. (We emphasize that this is an analogy and that we do not consider the abuses described here to be of comparable gravity.) Some people will, no doubt, leap to the conclusion that most politicians are corrupt, and demagogues who stand to gain politically from this notion will encourage it.7 But this extrapolation would be erroneous.

  Similarly, to view this book as a generalized criticism of the humanities or the social sciences – as some French reviewers did – not only misunderstands our intentions, but is a curious assimilation, revealing a contemptuous attitude toward those fields in the minds of those reviewers.8 As a matter of logic, either the humanities and social sciences are coterminous with the abuses denounced in this book, or they are not.
If they are, then we would indeed be attacking those fields en bloc, but it would be justified. And if not (as we believe), there is simply no reason to criticize one scholar for what another in the same field says. More generally, any construal of our book as a blanket attack on X – whether X is French thought, the American cultural left or whatever – presupposes that the whole of X is permeated by the bad intellectual habits we are denouncing, and that charge has to be established by whoever makes it.

  The debates sparked by Sokal’s hoax have come to encompass an ever-wider range of ever-more-tenuously related issues, concerning not only the conceptual status of scientific knowledge or the merits of French poststructuralism, but also the social role of science and technology, multiculturalism and ‘political correctness’, the academic left versus the academic right, and the cultural left versus the economic left. We want to emphasize that this book does not deal with most of these topics. In particular, the ideas analysed here have little, if any, conceptual or logical connection with politics. Whatever one’s views on Lacanian mathematics or the theory-ladenness of observation, one may hold, without fear of contradiction, any view whatsoever on military spending, welfare or gay marriage. There is, to be sure, a sociological link – though its magnitude is often exaggerated – between the ‘postmodernist’ intellectual currents we are criticizing and some sectors of the American academic left. Were it not for this link, we would not mention politics at all. But we do not want our book to be seen as one more shot in the dreary ‘Culture Wars’, still less as one from the right. Critical thinking about the unfairness of our economic system and about racial and sexual oppression has grown in many academic institutions since the 1960s and has been subjected, in recent years, to much derision and unfair criticism. There is nothing in our book that can be construed, even remotely, in that genre.

  Our book faces a quite different institutional context in France and in the English-speaking world. While the authors we criticize have had a profound impact on French higher education and have numerous disciples in the media, the publishing houses and the intelligentsia – hence some of the furious reactions to our book – their Anglo-American counterparts are still an embattled minority within intellectual circles (though a well-entrenched one in some strongholds). This tends to make them look more ‘radical’ and ‘subversive’ than they really are, both in their own eyes and in those of their critics. But our book is not against political radicalism, it is against intellectual confusion. Our aim is not to criticize the left, but to help defend it from a trendy segment of itself. Michael Albert, writing in Z Magazine, summarized this well: ‘There is nothing truthful, wise, humane, or strategic about confusing hostility to injustice and oppression, which is leftist, with hostility to science and rationality, which is nonsense.’9

  This edition is, in most respects, a straight translation from the French original. We have omitted a chapter on the misunderstandings of relativity by Henri Bergson and his successors, which seemed to us of marginal interest for most British and American readers.10 Conversely, we have expanded a few discussions concerning intellectual debates in the English-speaking world. We have also made many small changes to improve the clarity of the original text, to correct minor imprecisions, and to forestall misunderstandings. We thank the many readers of the French edition who offered us their suggestions.

  While writing this book, we have benefited from innumerable discussions and debates and have received much encouragement and criticism. Although we are unable to thank individually all those who have contributed, we do want to express our gratitude to those who helped us by pointing out references or by reading and criticizing parts of the manuscript: Michael Albert, Robert Alford, Roger Balian, Louise Barre, Paul Boghossian, Raymond Boudon, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Bouveresse, Georges Bricmont, James Robert Brown, Tim Budden, Noam Chomsky, Helena Cronin, Bérangère Deprez, Jean Dhombres, Cyrano de Dominicis, Pascal Engel, Barbara Epstein, Roberto Fernández, Vincent Fleury, Julie Franck, Allan Franklin, Paul Gérardin, Michel Gevers, Michel Ghins, Yves Gingras, Todd Gitlin, Gerald Goldin, Sylviane Goraj, Paul Gross, Étienne Guyon, Michael Harris, Géry-Henri Hers, Gerald Holton, John Huth, Markku Javanainen, Gérard Jorland, Jean-Michel Kantor, Noretta Koertge, Hubert Krivine, Jean-Paul Krivine, Antti Kupiainen, Louis Le Borgne, Gérard Lemaine, Geert Lernout, Jerrold Levinson, Norm Levitt, Jean-Claude Limpach, Andréa Loparic, John Madore, Christian Maes, Francis Martens, Tim Maudlin, Sy Mauskopf, Jean Mawhin, Maria McGavigan, N. David Mermin, Enrique Muñoz, Meera Nanda, Michael Nauenberg, Hans-Joachim Niemann, Marina Papa, Patrick Peccatte, Jean Pestieau, Daniel Pinkas, Louis Pinto, Patricia Radelet-de Grave, Marc Richelle, Benny Rigaux-Bricmont, Ruth Rosen, David Ruelle, Patrick Sand, Mónica Santoro, Abner Shimony, Lee Smolin, Philippe Spindel, Hector Sussmann, Jukka-Pekka Takala, Serge Tisseron, Jacques Treiner, Claire Van Cutsem, Jacques Van Rillaer, Loïc Wacquant, M. Norton Wise, Nicolas Witkowski, and Daniel Zwanziger. We are also indebted to our editors Nicky White and George Witte for many valuable suggestions. We emphasize that these people are not necessarily in agreement with the contents or even the intention of this book.

  Finally, we thank Marina, Claire, Thomas and Antoine for having put up with us for the past two years.

  PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

  We are delighted by the interest that Intellectual Impostures has elicited, both in France and in the English-speaking world. In this new preface, we would like to make some general comments on the critical reactions to our work.

  Let us begin by noting that many of our opponents, even the most virulent ones, concede mezzo voce that our main theses are valid. For instance, John Sturrock writes in the London Review of Books that ‘we’re bound – happy, indeed – to agree that, so far as the purportedly scientific metaphors or extended analogies in Lacan and Co. are concerned, Sokal and Bricmont are right, and that the impostors are abusing concepts that they don’t know enough about to call acceptably in evidence.’1 Julia Kristeva, who accuses us of ‘disinformation’, nevertheless admits that ‘obviously I’m not a real mathematician.’2 Michel Serres, who claims to be unaware of our book because he has no time to read the newspapers, is far harsher towards Baudrillard and Kristeva than we are: ‘It was indeed rather hilarious. I used to read them in the old days: it was enough to make one roll over with laughter.’3

  So, what are we taken to task for? The criticisms can be divided roughly into four types. A (very) few reviewers discuss what we wrote and try to refute it. Other commentators raise objections (often perfectly valid ones) to ideas that are not in fact ours – and that we may have expressly rejected in the book – while attributing them to us implicitly or explicitly. Yet a third group of critics pretend to discuss our book, while actually doing something completely different: for example, attacking our personalities, our alleged motivations for writing the book, or the failings of scientists in general. And finally, some reviewers agree with us but think that we do not go far enough.

  One finds, in the first category, an article by the American physicist N. David Mermin defending some of Latour’s ideas on the theory of relativity,4 as well as a few commentaries by psychoanalysts and mathematicians on Lacan’s and Deleuze’s use of mathematics.5 Let us emphasize that these objections, while in our view mostly erroneous, are at least relevant in the sense that they try to address our arguments. But, concerning the ‘impostures’ part of the book, there is (thus far) nothing else. The dearth of pertinent critiques amid the fury provoked by our book provides indirect confirmation of the validity of our theses: for if we were wrong, it would be easy to refute us by showing that the mathematics or physics invoked in the texts that we quote do indeed play some useful intellectual role.

  Let us now turn to the much more numerous critiques that attribute to us, directly or indirectly, ideas that are not ours. Some of these authors discourse at length on what ‘Sokal and his friends’ think (according to them), without bothering to cite a single sentence of our book.6 Others associate us with ‘
scientistic’ currents that they then criticize (often rightly), implying that our ideas are similar but without offering a shred of evidence.7 The technique employed in all these attacks was explained over 150 years ago by Schopenhauer in The Art of Always Being Right: namely, enlarge your opponent’s target so as to make him look ridiculous. For example, we have been accused of rejecting all metaphors, all poetic use of language, all transfers of concepts from one field to another, and even all critical thought.8 And people sometimes purport to ‘refute’ us by exhibiting examples of useful metaphors or of philosophers who don’t abuse science. But, like everyone, we are favourable to the use of metaphors and to philosophical analysis. We are simply opposed to mystification, which is quite a different matter.

  Still other reviewers accuse us of being philosophical ignoramuses: they portray us as ‘naive realists’ or as extreme supporters of ‘common sense’ who neglect a century of debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. But these authors carefully avoid quoting a single word of the long Chapter 4 that we devote to these questions.9 Or else they quote selectively from the book in order to discover nonexistent ‘contradictions’.10 We are aware that these philosophical questions are subtle – much more subtle than the ‘impostures’ part of the book – and we would be happy if our arguments were subjected to rigorous criticism. But, so far, nothing.

  The third type of reaction – which purports to discuss our ideas but in fact does something quite different – takes various forms; here are a few:

  1. Name-calling. Some of our opponents seem to think that clever epithets can replace the detailed refutation of our arguments.11 And the insults are legion: ‘little schoolteachers’12, ‘cowboy and pharmacist’13, ‘Francophobes’ and ‘purveyors of disinformation’14, ‘gendarmes’15, ‘thought-cops’16, ‘censors’17 and even ‘dwarfs [who] resemble teenagers playing Game Boy all day long’18. Still more extraordinary, Philippe Sollers asserts, in an interview paradoxically entitled ‘Answer to imbeciles’, that our private lives ‘merit investigation’: ‘What do they like? What paintings do they have on their walls? What are their wives like? How are those beautiful abstract statements translated in their daily and sexual lives?’19 Well! Let’s concede once and for all that we are arrogant, mediocre, sexually frustrated scientists, ignorant in philosophy and enslaved by a scientistic ideology (neoconservative or hard-line Marxist, take your pick). But please tell us what this implies concerning the validity or invalidity of our arguments.